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Abstract 
The number of citizens participating at the elections is shrinking. The crisis of participation is 
one of the most important problems of the contemporary democracies. Not only that, the new 
cohorts of voters participate less, but also the number of voters that used to vote and stop 
voting is increasing. The aim of this thesis is to investigate the reasons why these citizens, 
whom I refer to as the new non-voters, stop voting. It focuses on this specific category of 
voters and tends to offer theoretical explanation and empirical evidences for the reasons of 
these voters to stop casting the ballots.   
I argue that spatial model of voting which is based on the claim that voters vote for the party 
which is the closest to their position on the ideological spectrum and thus every shift of the 
party demands vote swing of the voters and opposite has limits to explain the behaviour of 
the new non-voters.  Based on the standard revealed preference argument and building on the 
exit, voice and loyalty model, I argue that instead of voters deciding to shift voting for 
another party once the party shifts its ideological positions, they decide to exit participation in 
reaction to the party’s inconsistency.  
The thesis shows that the number of new non-voters varies among countries. The percentage 
of new non-voters per countries differs from below 2 % in Netherlands to 26% in Poland. 
Post-communist countries, countries with majoritarian systems and non-compulsory voting 
have higher number of new non-voters. Testing my theoretical model on an individual level, 
results show evidence in support of my main hypothesis, that ideological inconsistency 
influences voters to stop voting. Ideology matters and the new non-voters stop voting when 
parties they used to vote for change their ideological positions. Additionally, younger, poorer, 
dissatisfied, divorced, and more educated voters with weaker party identification are more 
eager to become new non-voters. 
An in-depth analysis on US voters using panel data confirms the findings of the large N -
Analysis. Ideological inconsistency strongly influences voters’ decision to stop voting. 
Digging deeper, testing the ideological shifts in eight different policy areas, the thesis shows 
that traditional topics have a very strong demobilizing power for electoral participation. 
Traditional values and shifts in positions on human rights have a very strong impact on the 
decision of voters to stop casting a ballot.  
Results also show that political parties that make more dramatic changes of their ideological 
positions lose bigger number of their supporters. This is especially clear for parties around 
the center, while party families on the extremes lose less of their supporters no matter the 
change of their ideological positions. 
This thesis contributes trilaterally to the state of art. It offers a different theoretical approach 
in explanation of the voters’ behaviour. If focuses on a specific category of voters which has 
been understudied and offers empirical evidence at individual, party and country level for the 
new non-voters. 
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unbelievably important role in my development as a person and I own so much to her. The 
same with my father Zaharin. His support to let me fly freely, his unquestionable trust in my 
capacities was something that I needed. This magical circle of three is closed with my 
amazing sister Ljubica. She has been so important support to me and she is more than just a 
sister, but closest friends. I think I miss chances every day to tell them how important they 
are in my life and how much I love them. I have been privileged to have them as my family 
and they are the most important thing for me. I would have not succeeded if I couldn’t rely on 
their support, unconditional love and unlimited confidence in me.  Without any doubt, I 
dedicate this thesis to them.  
 
Trajche Panov, Florence, May 2016 
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
1.1. Introduction 
After the United Kingdom General Election 1979 and electoral defeat of the incumbent 
Labour Government led by James Callaghan, the party went through a dramatic change that 
would shape its electoral success over a longer period. The party was divided among different 
ideological groups with inside left and social democrats within the party and serious pressure 
from outside left and trade unions. Michael Foot, a writer, political commentator, critic, 
journalist, long-term member of the Parliament and ultimately a minister, as a long-standing 
figure of the familiar inside left, emerged as an attractive candidate given his ability to appeal 
across the Party towards the concerns of the centrists as well as the social democrats. “He 
also possessed long-standing left-wing intellectual credentials which continued to appeal to 
many within the rank and file as well as to social democrats” (Crines 2010, Chavda 2007).  
The charismatic Foot, who at the party race for leader had been seen as a moderate and 
candidate of compromise, lead the party to a dramatic swing to the left (Franklin 1984) that 
created important consequences to the internal organization and for electoral success.   As a 
result of this ideological change which primarily meant returning to the old inside left 
positions on economy and society which were abandoned by the Labour under Wilson in the 
1960s, the party was faced with internal crisis.  Not longer after the election of Foot , at the 
beginning of 1981, Roy Jenkins, David Owen, William Rodgers and Shirley Williams, (the 
so-called "Gang of Four") who were senior members of the Labour with more moderate and 
right wing ideological standings left the party to form the Social Democratic Party. This split 
in the already divided party from inside was largely seen as the consequence of changing its 
ideology i.e returning of the Labour Party's to the left positions hold after the WWII. 
Furthermore, the 1983 Labour manifesto, strongly socialist in tone, advocated unilateral 
nuclear disarmament, higher personal taxation and a return to a more interventionist 
industrial policy. Additionally it also pledged that a “Labour government would abolish the 
House of Lords, nationalize banks and leave the then-European Economic Community” 
(Crines 2010).  At the UK General Elections 1983, Labour was faced with the worst electoral 
result in their history winning around 28% of vote share and decrease of electoral support for 
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9.3%. The overall turnout went down by almost 4 %. Many of the traditional voters of 
Labour shifted their vote to the Social Democrats, but also a very big number decided not to 
vote. 
In 2012, the US Senator Richard Lugar was facing the Primaries to win the Republican’s 
nomination for another term as Senator from Indiana. Lugar was the most senior Senate 
member of the Republicans and the longest serving Senator in Indiana’s history serving for 
36 years and had been re-elected for five consecutive times. In his long term as Senator, 
Lugar has been considered moderate Republican with liberal views on gun control and 
immigration and to some extent on abortion, but still economically conservative and against 
Obama’s health care reforms.  As a significant political figure and frontrunner, his victory at 
the Elections 2006 was so certain that Democrats did not even contest his seat by nominating 
their party candidate. This allowed Lugar to win his sixth term as Senator with 87 % vote 
support. 
At the Republican Primaries 2012, Lugar was challenged by the Tea Party movement 
candidate and Indiana State Treasurer Richard Mourdock. Mourdock’s ideological positions 
were significantly more conservative with strong opposition of gun control and abortion, 
even where it is a result of rape. The support of the Tea Party movement, his ideological 
positions, as well citizens’ fatigue of the old and long-serving in Indiana where Lugar was 
situated brought him a significant victory with around 60 % of votes at Republican’s Primary 
and a nomination for the post of Senator in a strongly Republican Indiana.  
However, Republicans and Mourdock lost the elections and, after 36 years, a Democrat was 
elected to substitute Lugar representing Indiana in the Senate. Even in highly contested and 
close elections with a significant turnout increase compared with the elections of 2006, when 
democrats did not participate with their candidate, Mourdock won less votes than Lugar six 
years ago. Mourdock’s defeat has widely been seen as his failure to attract those Republicans 
who had made Lugar a mainstay in the Senate for nearly four decades. Most of the voters 
strongly supporting Lugar and Republicans decided not to cast the ballot for Senator or not to 
vote at all. The electoral result in Indiana was widely shaped by the strategy of the 
Republicans to nominate an ideologically more conservative candidate. With the nomination 
of Mourdock, the party has significantly changed its ideological position. This resulted in a 
majority of voters to vote for the Democratic candidate Donnelly who also held conservative 
views, but much closer to the positions of the median Indiana voter.  
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Mitt Romney’s campaign for Republican’s nominee for President of US and his campaign at 
the US Presidential Elections 2012 against the incumbent and Democrat contender Barack 
Obama show two different faces of the candidate. The former Massachusetts Governor has 
been perceived as a moderate Republican when governing this state. Some of the policies he 
introduced as a Governor include health care reform, the first of its kind in the nation, which 
provided near-universal health insurance access through state-level subsidies and promoting 
raising various fees which was criticized by his opponents in the party as tax increases. His 
positions regarding abortion have dramatically changed from pro-choice during his 
gubernatorial campaign to pro-life in his later stage. Similar patterns have been seen with gun 
control regulations and the foreign policy of the USA. In general, he shifted positions and 
emphases to better align with traditional conservatives on social issues when he decided to 
run for Republican Presidential Nominee for Elections 2008 and again 2012. In order to win 
the Republican nomination, Romney took more conservative stances than he was known for 
before. 
His strategy to shift ideological positions depending on the electoral arena and posts he 
competed for caused him to be widely criticized for ideological flip-flopping and a lack of 
consistency. His opponents used his different positions about certain issues to question his 
credibility as a candidate. His ideological inconsistency was often a subject of criticism 
during the campaign for US Presidential Elections 2012 by President Barack Obama. With 
his more conservative views during the campaign he endangered the support of the 
independents and moderate Republicans as well. 
Besides the bad economic conditions and the highest unemployment rate in the last 60 years 
during his term, President Obama won re-election. Mitt Romney missed the chance to take 
advantage of the bad circumstances for Obama losing both the popular vote and the Electoral 
College. The overall turnout rate decreased by more than 3 %. 
Finally, parliamentary elections in Poland took place in 2005. These elections were organized 
after 15 years of transition and recently after the accession of the country to the European 
Union. Poland, similar to other post-communist countries from Central and Eastern Europe, 
is characterized with instable party systems, electoral volatility, unclear ideological positions 
and higher level of voter dissatisfaction with democracy and political parties (Rose 1995, 
Casal – Bertoa 2012, Tucker 2012, Kostadinova 2005). The turnout decreased by 
approximately 6 %, and more than 26% of voters that voted at the previous elections in 2001 
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did not vote at the ones in 2005. Similar patterns can be seen in other post-communist 
countries. 
Three important phenomena can be identified from these four elections. First, a significant 
number of citizens who have participated at elections decide to drop out of voting. Despite 
their previous record of voting, these citizens stop voting at the next elections. The case of 
Poland tells us that this number can be as big as a quarter of the voting population. Second, 
political parties shift their ideological positions. Parties or candidates running on behalf of the 
parties change their positions. The motives for these ideological fluctuations can be different: 
(i) the party wants to get closer to the median voter, (ii) it aims to get closer to the party core 
voters, (iii) it tends to reclaim the party’s old ideological positions changed by the 
predecessor party establishments or (iv) the party responds to the changed socio-economic 
circumstances in the country etc. Third, there is a pattern of voter turnout decline. The overall 
number of citizens who participate at elections is decreasing. Larger and larger number of 
voters decide not to use their democratic right to select their government and, while one 
group of scholars claim that this is bad for democracy and representation, others claim that 
when the voter turnout levels are lower, less-educated and poor citizens participate less and 
therefore the quality of the electoral decisions is better.  
These three important social phenomena are a starting point of this thesis. The aim of the 
thesis is to analyse why voters do stop voting, how parties influence their decision and how 
does this dropping out affect the overall voter turnout.  It is common knowledge that turnout 
is not constant over time— it rises and falls from one election to the next. Hence it is 
important to analyse the reasons that cause these fluctuations or more concretely how 
political parties and candidates as main actors on the supply side influence these phenomena. 
Thus an important aspect of my analysis includes the choices offered to the voters by the 
candidates and parties. 
1.2. What’s puzzling about turnout?  - Citizens who stop voting and political parties  
Mark Franklin in one of the most comprehensive studies on voter turnout stresses that the 
particular topic of voter turnout is one of the biggest political science puzzles. “Almost 
everything about voter turnout is puzzling, from the question of why anyone bothers to vote 
at all, to the question of why certain variables appear to explain voter turnout in some 
circumstances but not in others”. (Franklin 2004). Although, as I have stressed above, the 
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turnout is not constant and rises and falls from elections to elections, it is a conventional 
wisdom that the levels of traditional electoral participation have been decreasing in the last 
few decades (Almond 1960, Wattenberg 2002, Franklin 2004). Political participation consists 
broadly of three types: representative, extra-representative, and direct participation. While 
there are clear evidences of growing trends of extra-representative and direct participation, 
the representative or the electoral participation is in decline.  Numerous research studies have 
focused on investigating reasons for turnout decline. In the most recent study on the turnout 
levels in US from 1972 to 2008, Leighley and Nagler (2014) provide the most systematic 
analysis of voter turnout focusing on the demographic characteristics and political views of 
voters and non-voters in American presidential elections since 1972, and examine how 
electoral reforms, income inequality and the choices offered by candidates influence voter 
turnout. The authors conclude that there are sharp differences in policy preferences between 
the voters and non-voters and this shapes voter turnout in overall. 
Regarding political attitudes and evaluations, citizens also demonstrate a very high level of 
dissatisfaction with governmental performance (Torcal and Montero 2008). The distrust in 
the social and political institutions in the last two decades is significantly higher than in the 
eighties (Norris 2005). Previous research suggests that citizens have become more negative in 
their evaluations of the political system in many democracies (Klingemann, 1999; Dalton, 
2004; Stoker, 2006, 2006). While there is not complete agreement on the magnitude of the 
changes (Klingemann and Fuchs, 1995; Norris, 2011), the causes behind and consequences of 
the perceived changes has been debated.  
On the other site, political parties which are largely understood to form the basis of 
democracy (Dalton & Wattenberg 2000, p. 3) and "modern democracy is unthinkable save in 
terms of political parties" (Schattschneider, 1942, p. 1) have passed through serious losses of 
membership and public support. Empirically this claim of decline has been supported by 
several studies. Dalton (2000) shows that feelings of partisanship have declined even more 
severely than initially thought, and Mair and Van Biezen (2001) report that party membership 
has declined over time. Mair (2005) combines several indicators of involvement in parties 
and reports that turnout, electoral volatility, party identification, and membership have all 
declined over the past few decades in a number of democracies, which points to a general 
decline in involvement in political parties (Van Biezen, Mair, Poguntke 2009, 2011). 
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The “golden era” of political parties, which have come to be understood as a vital part of 
democratic governments, especially in Europe (Mair & Thomassen 2010; Dalton 2006) and 
in which, most importantly, they expressed the ideological preferences of citizens and 
converted them into public policy (Ezrow 2010, Pennings & Keman 2002), has finished a 
long time ago (Rueda 2007). Political parties have passed through a process of 
transformation, the old traditional social cleavages have diminished (Franklin 1992), and 
from mass parties (Sartori 1967) they have evolved to catch-all parties, drifting from a 
society oriented to a state oriented cartel party system (Katz and Mair 1995). This period was 
characterized by dramatic shifts in party ideologies (Rueda 2007, Kriesi 2008, Volkens and 
Klingeman 2001). On the left – right spectrum, this has resulted in a convergence between 
traditional left wing and right wing parties moving toward the political center, where the 
concentration of the median voter can be found. Political parties today seem to be in decline. 
The old ideological divisions seem to be in demise, and now political parties compete on 
different socio-cultural issues. While those concerned with the formation and development of 
cleavages have repeatedly pointed at the importance of a new socio-cultural dimension 
(Kriesi et al. 2006, 2008) or authoritarian-libertarian dimension (Kitschelt and McGann 1995) 
of party behaviour, those studying the parties’ policy agendas have paid remarkably little 
attention to the socio-cultural issues that over time have become increasingly salient, not only 
in political debates and electoral campaigns, but also in the opinions and worries of voters. 
While numerous research studies have been focused on analyzing these phenomena, there is a 
lack of a systematic attempt of these two phenomena to be correlated and their 
interdependence to be tested in a comprehensive and comparative perspective. Additionally, 
while the vast majority of the research has been conducted to offer an explanation of the 
turnout decline with emphasis on the voters or non-voters or, in the case of the most 
sophisticated study of Leighley and Nagler (2013), the difference between the former and 
latter, there is a lack of research on the demobilized component of the electoral population. 
These citizens whom I refer as new non-voters are assimilated in the category of the non-
voters assuming homogeneity between them and habitual non-voters. In this thesis I strongly 
argue that new non-voters significantly differ from habitual voters and habitual non-voters 
and the factors that have resulted in their electoral demobilization have to be investigated 
with a different approach.  
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In these terms the thesis offers a multilateral contribution to the state of art. First, although 
this thesis does not analyse voter turnout, it looks at the turnout phenomenon from a different 
perspective focusing on a specific category of voters who used to participate at elections and 
stopped voting at a certain electoral cycle. Second, it enriches the research on different 
categories of voters by offering a comprehensive analysis of the demographics, socio-
economic characteristics and political interests of these new non-voters. Third, it focuses on 
political parties as main actors on the supply side and looks in their behaviour or, more 
concretely, on their ideological consistency as an explanatory factor for citizens to stop 
voting. Fourth, as I will show later in the next chapter, it contests the existing spatial model of 
voting by adding two important components that shape the behaviour of individuals (i) voters 
build a close relationship with the party they used to vote for, and their party identification or 
loyalty constrains their rational behaviour as utility maximisers on the political spectrum, (ii) 
when the party voters used to vote for changes its ideological standings, voters punish its 
behaviour by deciding to exit the voting and not to swing vote support for other party. Fifth, 
various methodological considerations have been taken into consideration and different data 
sources have been utilized in order to be offered the most comprehensive and multifaceted 
analysis of the new non-voters and determinants of their behaviour. 
1.3. Who are the new non-voters? Demographics, political trust and party identification  
Little is known about new non-voters. To my knowledge there is no research focused on 
investigating characteristics of these citizens and the reasons why they stop voting. This 
category is understudied and, as I have mentioned above, it has been assimilated amongst 
non-voters. Furthermore, the majority of research on voters assumes homogeneity of policy 
preferences of voters and non-voters. Leighley and Nagler (2014) show that this is not the 
case. Voters and non-voters do not prefer the same policies. Their conclusions challenge the 
conventional wisdom regarding differences in the preferences of the voters and non-voters 
and show that, contrary to the claims of Wolfinger and Rosenstone (1980) that is not 
important who votes because of the similarity of their preferences, voters significantly differ 
from non-voters in their preferences. But while Leighley and Nagler claim that parties and 
candidates focus more on preferences of the voters, it is crucial to investigate why, if 
candidates are focused on voters’ preferences, certain citizens decide to stop voting? Is it that 
while emphasizing more on voters’ interests they shift certain policy positions and thus they 
can cause a group of voters to feel unrepresented and to stop voting? 
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Previous research gives only limited sources and possibilities for characteristics of the new 
non-voters to be understood. In one of the very few works which investigates the diversity of 
the non-voters, Doppelt and Shearer (1999) draw upon a sample of 1,011 likely non-voters 
(likely because the interviews were conducted prior to the 1996 election) to identify 5 
subgroups of non-voters. These groups are as follows: Doers, Unpluggeds, Irritables, Don’t 
Knows, and Alienateds. While their research does not allow them to draw claims about the 
history of voting of these citizens and thus it disables them to identify a group of voters that 
used to vote and then did stop voting, two clusters conduct information that might be useful 
from perspective of new non-voters. “Of these clusters, they detail that “the Doers, the largest 
of the clusters, look startlingly like voters and represent the largest single segment of non-
voters – nearly one third of the total and the Alienateds most closely capture the stereotypical 
non-voters profile but represent only 12% of all non-voters” (Hilty 2013). I argue that it is 
likely that new non-voters share certain characteristics of the voters since they used to be one 
of them and reasons for their decision to stop voting might be because of the alienation of the 
party they used to vote and not the party system as a whole. 
While Doppelt and Shearer are quick to agree with the literature which paints non-voters to 
be more “alienated, less affluent, less educated, younger, and more likely to be members of 
minority groups than their voting counterparts,” they also point out that these overall facts 
obscure the fact that many non-voters cannot be described as such.  For these scholars, 
conducting the cluster analysis provided a much more accurate and nuanced picture of 
reported non-voters (Hilty 2013). In a different research focused on the diversity of non-
voters, Ragsdale and Rusk (1993) differentiate clusters with the following labels: politically 
ignorant, indifferent, selectively aware, conditionally inactive, and dissatisfied. Despite the 
differences in the labels, this study similarly finds that the largest group of non-voters (the 
dissatisfied) is highly informed and engaged, opposing the traditional picture of non-voters. 
In addition, Hilty (2013) analysed validated turnout data from 2008 to discover seven clusters 
on non-voters with different demographic and political characteristics. Although this research 
goes further methodologically by offering validated turnout analysis, it still does not capture 
precisely the difference within the groups identifying who the previous voters are, how they 
differ from other groups and, most importantly, why they became non-voters.  This thesis 
aims to offer an extensive overview of the characteristics of the new non-voters after drawing 
a clear identification of these new non-voters. Not only that it is important these voters be 
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differentiated from the habitual non-voters, but they have to be distinguished from the 
intermittent voters. In this sense, the thesis aims to identify new non-voters and separate them 
from the larger group of habitual voters and additionally analyse those new non-voters who 
quit voting on a permanent or a long-term basis.   
Identifying the most important characteristics of these citizens is of crucial importance in 
order to better understand their behaviour and to develop a theoretical model that will explain 
reasons why citizens stop voting. I am particularly interested to show the differences between 
these citizens on one side and habitual voters and non-voters on the other. I will look into 
account three sets of variables: (i) socio-demographic characteristics, (ii) political 
information and trust and (iii) party identification and ideology.  
If the most previous research it is pointed out that non-voters are more “alienated, less 
affluent, less educated, younger, and more likely to be members of minority groups than their 
voting counterparts”; it is interesting therefore to analyse whether the new non-voters are 
better educated, older and belong to the majoritarian group of the population, since they have 
belonged to the group of voters. On the other hand, it is important to show whether and to 
what extend they differ from voters, and whether there are some characteristics that 
distinguish them and facilitate their decision to exit participation. The role of demographics is 
still of crucial importance when explaining voting habits and, although most of the patterns 
are stable, certain changes occur, as is the case with gender (Leighley and Nagler 2014).   
Citizens' evaluations of the political system and its actors affect their propensity to vote 
(Powell 1986, Gronlund 2007). Earlier theoretical and empirical research has shown that 
political trust and satisfaction are often explanatory variables that influence voters’ incentives 
to participate at elections. Political trust involves normative expectations towards political 
institutions and actors, whereas satisfaction may be regarded as an indicator of attitudes 
towards policy outputs.  Therefore I consider that trust can be an important element of 
differentiation between new non-voters and the others. Many have stressed the decrease of 
political trust and satisfaction (Norris 2005, Rose 1995, Kriesi 2013) among voters and 
therefore it is important its effect be tested. The level of political information and knowledge 
on the other hand will show us the level of sophistication of new non-voters, and to what 
extend they are capable to understand political processes and react to them. 
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Party identification and ideological standings of the citizens are arguably some of the most 
important explanatory factors affecting the decision of a voter to vote or not at elections. 
From Campbell et al (1960) and their funnel model, party ID is established as one of the 
strongest factors that explains voting. Most recent studies (Dinas 2013) show that 
identification strengthens as voters get older and participate more. They become loyal to the 
party they support (Hirschmann 1970, Weber 2011). I look how this loyalty and attachment 
to the party is manifested when political parties behave in a way to make voters questioning 
their attachment to the party.  On the other site, party ideology plays a very important role in 
the electoral process. I intend to show that ideology drives the behaviour of voters and 
influences their decision to forego voting or keep the same behaviour.  
1.4. Theoretical model 
After finding out who the new non-voters are, the logical consequence is the “Why?” 
question. Why do voters stop voting? Which factors influence voters to stop voting and 
which are the mechanisms that cause citizens to make this decision? Majority of the dominant 
theories of voting do not exactly capture the behaviour of new non-voters and thus do not 
offer feasible explanations for the reasons of their participation exit. The starting point I 
follow is based on the notion of the standard revealed preference argument according to 
which individual choices are the result of an optimization problem. At a general level, my 
work is related to the literature on revealed preferences which tries to “determine the 
restrictions that observed behaviour imposes on the structure of preferences, or alternatively 
the type of behaviour which would represent a violation of basic tenets of the theory of 
choice” (Degan and Merlo, 2009). More concretely, I want to understand and offer an 
explanation as to what stimulates voters to change their preference to cast the ballot. Why 
these voters violate their expected behaviour and hence oppose the already established tenets 
of choice. As consumers in the electoral process, their decision has to be related with the 
change of the offer or the product political actors offer to voters.  
In this sense, I develop my argument on the Exit, Voice and Loyalty model for economic 
organizations developed by Hirschmann (1970) and most recently implemented on voting 
behaviour by Weber (2011). “The sequence of the model starts with a drop in quality of the 
product offered by a supplier. Due to incomplete information, the supplier does not learn 
immediately about this lapse but has to observe consumer behaviour. Consumers who notice 
the drop in quality have two options. They may switch to another supplier (“exit”) or they 
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may advise their supplier to address the problem (“voice”). A third, residual option is to 
remain inactive. Consumers’ choices among these options can be explained by a set of factors 
involving costs and benefits” (Weber 2011). One factor is loyalty. I modify Hirschmann’s 
argument claiming that one of the ways the loyalty can be manifested is by exiting the market 
or staying inactive. In electoral terms, this would mean that voters instead of swinging vote 
preference, they decide to exit voting. Voters are loyal to their parties through party 
identification that has been strengthening through years of electoral participation and 
supporting a certain political party (Dinas 2013). Voice, therefore is a more soft 
manifestation of reaction of the offer and behaviour of parties; being inactive (exiting voting) 
is the next level, while swinging vote for other party is the harshest way of punishing the 
party. By understanding the relationship between exit and voice, and the interplay that loyalty 
has with these choices, political parties can craft the means to better address their members' 
concerns and issues, and thereby effect improvement. Parties’ failure to understand these 
competing pressures can lead to a loss of their electoral support. 
Voters’ loyalty to the party they used to support is much stronger than the one consumers 
have to their suppliers. The market principles are much less applicable for voters because the 
support for the party brings to a development of closer psychological attachment and 
identification with the party or candidates. Voting entails a choice over a set of alternatives. 
This choice is likely to induce rationalization. In so doing, it provides signals of group 
identity, which in turn strengthens people’s partisan ties (Dinas 2013). Rather, it is the act of 
voting for a party that, itself, bolsters partisan attachment. This act leaves a long-lasting 
imprint on people’s partisan outlooks. Therefore, I argue that disappointment by a party’s 
offering is much more likely to bring an exit from participation than to shifting vote choice. 
The third element of my theoretical model is based on what I claim a limitation of the spatial 
model of voting. The spatial theory of voting which has been originally formulated by Downs 
(1957) and Black (1958) and developed by many authors including Davis, Hinich and 
Ordershook (1970), Enelow and Hinich (1984) and Hinich and Munger (1994), offers a 
political economic theory of voting based on the rational choice of the individuals. According 
to this theory, voters are assumed to vote for the candidate who is closest to them in terms of 
issues – where issue preferences are represented as a location (voter ideal point) in n-
dimensional issue space (Downs, l957; Davis, Hinich and Ordeshook, l970; Enelow and 
Hinich, l990). Hence, simplifying the argument, this theory implies that parties should 
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frequently shift their positions until they find the maximum concentration of the supporters, 
and consequently voters should swing their vote choice simultaneously when a new party 
comes closer to their ideal point.  
This is not the case in reality. Voters are relatively constant in their electoral support, mainly 
because of the attachment and ties they have built with the party. On the other side, parties 
have been observed by voters through their ideological positions manifested in their political 
platforms. As I have argued previously, the voters do not observe political parties with the 
same attention, they are more focused on the behaviour of the party they used to vote and 
therefore they are much more capable to notice its changes and move around the ideological 
spectrum. When a party moves, the move by its own has been seen by the voters as a sign of 
inconsistency, a moment of lack of reliability and relevance and furthermore it is considered 
as a loss of credibility (Tavits 2007). Based on the already developed attachment with the 
party, I argue that voters are more likely to stop voting instead of shifting its choice to the 
other political parties. When the party alternatives are more limited as in the two-party 
systems, this exit is even more emphasized. I will test these assumptions in both two-party 
and in plural party systems as well. 
1.5. How to study the new non-voters: A multi-faceted approach 
This thesis offers a multi-faceted approach in studying new non-voters. It aims to analyse 
these citizens and to understand the individual level characteristics, and also the 
consequences of the number of new non-voters per country and per party. This approach has 
several advantages: (i) it explains the whole picture by looking into the behaviour of the 
individuals but also in the consequences of that behaviour on higher levels, (ii) by studying 
higher levels of aggregation it aims to offer an explanation about the role of the institutional 
and structural factors (iii) it takes into the consideration the interdependence and hierarchical 
structure of the individuals, parties and countries, (iv) it uses cross-sectional and panel data in 
order to most accurately identify the new non-voters.  
A country level analysis is utilized to show whether and to what extent there is a difference in 
the number of the new non-voters per country. It also proves that the problem of the 
participation exit is a prominent problem of the democracy and worth studying. In this sense, 
it gives the basis for proceeding into deeper analysis and utilization of data and methods to 
understand the reasons for voters to stop voting on individual level. A party level analysis 
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follows up as an investigation of the consequences of the different ideological strategies for 
the number of the voters parties lost between two cycles.  Thus, from a methodological 
perspective, this is a complex and exhaustive task and it demands very coherent data sources. 
The solidity of empirical evidence I offer in the following chapters is based on several data 
sources. 
I rely heavily on the Comparative Studies of Electoral System Datasets (CSES) Modules I, II 
and III as it provides the largest samples of nationally representative data collected on the 
population of around 50 electoral studies per module all around the world for the 1996-2011 
period, which allows me to distinguish between voters, habitual non-voters and new non-
voters. I strongly rely on the questions of the electoral participation and vote choice at the 
previous and most current first order elections. In this way I gain information about the exit 
of the voters and their vote choice before. Additionally, I use these datasets to construct my 
dependent variable for party and country level as well. The information I have on an 
individual level I aggregate to calculate the number of new non-voters per country or party.  
The information I get from the cross-sectional comparative data from CSES does not let me 
conclude as to the nature of the exit. Panel Data with information about vote record of 
individuals in several first-order electoral cycles is required to be able to address in a most 
accurate way the problem of the nature and constancy of the exit.  Therefore, I utilize the US 
as my in-depth case study. The Youth and Parents Socialization Panel, which includes a 
cohort panel analysis of voters during a longer time spam from 1964 to 1997, is utilized. 
There are four waves of the data and nine presidential electoral cycles included. The 
participation question is based on self-reported turnout and these data allows testing and 
offers a coherent theoretical model that would explain the reasons why voters stop voting at 
the presidential elections in a two-party electoral system such as the US. 
The construction of the main independent variable requires a lot of attention regarding the 
reliability and quality of the data. The most dominant attempt for data collection on party 
ideologies has been done in the Comparative Manifesto Project. This database includes 54 
countries from which 25 are OECD countries, 24 are Central and Eastern European countries 
and 5 are other countries, of which two are EU members. Although, there are several modes 
of measuring party ideology or party positions, the CMP Database is most acceptable for the 
purposes of the project because it consists of 988 parties in 673 elections, with 3924 party 
programs and manifesto’s, five different programmatic dimensions, and 113 programmatic 
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data variables (Volkens at al 2015, Comparative Manifesto Project, Manifesto Research 
Group Manifesto Dataset MDS2015 Data Handbook, 2015).   
Other text-based measurements of the party manifestos have been conducted by Laver & 
Garry (2000), Laver, Benoit & Garry (2003) and Slapin and Proksch (2007). Although there 
are serious indications for a systematic coder error (Benoit, Laver, Mikhaylov 2009) within 
the CMP Database, the limitations of this database continue to be less inhibiting than the 
limitations presented by other methods. In the case of the US, where CMP is particularly 
unable to adequately capture ideological movements of the parties, I use the aggregated 
perceptions on ideological positions of parties on a seven-point scale from the American 
National Electoral Studies (ANES) Dataset. 
Another important methodological problem I deal with is the problem of over-reporting, 
which is particularly present with the self-reported turnout. Numerous research done on the 
issue of reporting turnout suggests that social desirability response bias influence direct self-
reports in surveys. Respondents most inclined to over report their voting are those who are 
highly educated, those most supportive of the regime norm of voting, and those to whom the 
norm of voting is most salient, the same characteristics that are related to the probability that 
a person actually votes (Hoolbrok 2009, Kattosh and Traugott 1981, Belli, Traugott and 
Beckmann 2001, Silver, Anderson and Abramson 1986). In certain occasions, self-reported 
voter behaviour is unreliable and thus it can significantly skew findings. The use of self-
reported data would lead researchers to mistakenly classify some non-voters as voters, 
resulting in findings that would yield an inaccurate picture of both groups and “exaggerate 
the differences between the two. In aggregate level analysis, it offers a smaller number of 
new non-voters than the one in the reality.  
1.6. Structure of the thesis  
The thesis is organized in six chapters. In this introductory chapter, by providing real world 
examples, I have presented the problem of the increasing number of the voters who drop out 
of voting, before discussing what I consider a puzzle of the turnout decline and introducing 
my plan how to study this phenomenon. I have presented the basis of my theoretical model, 
the methodological concerns and offered solutions as to how my research question can be 
most adequately designed.  
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The second chapter offers an extensive discussion on the theoretical model. This chapter is 
divided into two parts. In Chapter 2 I present my theoretical assumptions which will be tested 
in the empirical chapters. I argue that spatial model of voting, which is based on the claim 
that voters vote for the party which is the closest to their position on the ideological spectrum, 
and thus every shift of the party demands a vote swing of the voters to the opposite, has limits 
to explain the behaviour of the new non-voters.  Based on the standard revealed preference 
argument and building on the exit-voice loyalty model I argue that voters, instead of deciding 
to shift voting for other party once the party shifts its ideological positions, they decide to exit 
participation and in that way react to a party’s inconsistency. The chapter ends with 
presentation of the list of control factors included in the model and a brief discussion of the 
theoretical and methodological ambiguities and solutions to overcome them. 
A short overview of the research design and the methodology is presented in chapter 3. The 
chapter first discusses the theoretical and empirical uncertainties which need to be taken into 
account when dealing with the analysis of the new non-voters. It proceeds with discussing the 
datasets which are used to analyse the phenomenon. The fourth section deals with 
operationalisation of the variables and the methods used to test the theoretical model. 
In the fourth chapter, I discuss the necessity of a different approach in studying turnout by 
focusing on specific categories of voters. I argue that new non-voters not only have been 
understudied or falsely assimilated with non-voters or intermittent voters, but focus on how 
study of this group of voters can have multilateral benefits. I offer empirical evidence from 
70 electoral studies showing that the number of the new non-voters is negatively correlated 
with the turnout levels in the countries. Additionally, the number of new non-voters also 
significantly influences electoral outcome and turnout difference between the last two 
electoral cycles. I proceed with analysis of the factors that influence the number of new non-
voters per country. Examining the impact of institutions, socio-economic environment and 
the role of party systems, I show that post-communist countries, larger countries with 
majoritarian system and non-compulsory voting have higher number of new non-voters. 
In Chapter 5, I test the theoretical model on cross-sectional data from CSES Module II. After 
discussing the theoretical explanations of voters that stopped voting in a comparative 
perspective followed by a brief review of the literature that analyses turnout and ideological 
and policy inconsistency of political parties, I present the differences between the new non-
voters, habitual voters and habitual non-voters regarding (i) socio-demographic 
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characteristics, (ii) political trust and information and (iii) party and ideological engagement.  
Results from statistical models using Multi Level Modeling show evidence in support of my 
main hypothesis that ideological inconsistency influences voters to stop voting. Ideology 
matters and the new non-voters stop voting when parties they used to voter for, change their 
ideological positions. Additionally, younger, poorer, dissatisfied, divorced, well-informed 
and more educated voters with weaker party identification are more eager to become new 
non-voters. 
Chapter 6 offers an in-depth analysis on US new non-voters using panel data. This enables 
me to get information as to the nature of the exit and to observe the behaviour of new non-
voters in a longer time series. Using the US as a case study has multiple advantages. First, the 
American electoral context provides the most adequate conditions for testing my theoretical 
model. Second, American media discourse is focused on the ideological standings of the 
parties and their nominees, which constitute a very important part of the campaigns. Third, 
the decline of voter turnout in elections in the US in the last six decades emphasizes the 
necessity of a different approach to analyse the reasons as to why voters stop voting. Fourth, 
and very importantly, the US is the most appropriate case study for methodological reasons. 
Complex panel data for many electoral cycles over a significantly long period of time has 
only been gathered in the US. 
Results confirm the findings of the large N - Analysis. Ideological inconsistency strongly 
influences voters’ decisions to stop voting. Digging in deeper, testing the ideological shifts in 
eight different policy areas, this thesis shows that traditional topics have a very strong 
demobilizing power for electoral participation. Traditional values and shifts in positions on 
human rights have a very strong impact on the decision of voters to stop casting a ballot. 
Regarding demographics and other controls, trends are similar, except for gender. Contrary to 
the findings from the comparative chapter, males in the US stop voting more than their 
female compatriots. 
In Chapter 7, I analyse the influence of the number of new non-voters on the party level. I 
look at the reasons for the variance in the number of the new non-voters per party and how 
their different electoral strategies shape the number of supporters they lose. I discuss the 
current development of the political parties and how they influence the decline of the political 
participation. Furthermore, the chapter offers a theoretical explanation of the parties’ 
electoral strategies followed by a brief review of the literature that analyses parties’ 
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transformation and their ideological and policy inconsistency. I contribute to the debate for 
the importance of the ideologies in contemporary times and reasons for parties to shift their 
positions by looking to the internal structures, or more concretely the role of the leader and 
parties’ roles in the governmental formation.  
Results also show that political parties that make more dramatic changes of their ideological 
positions lose bigger number of their supporters. This is especially clear for parties around 
the center, while party families on the extremes lose less of their supporters no matter the 
change of their ideological positions. The number of the new non-voters is two percent higher 
among the parties in government than among parties in opposition, which indicates that 
voters can easily be disappointed in the party performance when the party is in power rather 
than in opposition. 
The last chapter, Chapter 8, provides some general discussion on findings and offers 
explanations about the implications of this research and its theoretical and practical 
contributions. It proposes an analytical way and methodological suggestions for extending 
this research on different time period or party context in Europe or around the world. Finally, 
it discusses its strongest contributions and limitations as well before providing additional real 
world examples that confirm the main findings of the thesis. 
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CHAPTER TWO  
Understanding the new non-voters: The Theoretical Model 
 
2.1. Introduction 
New non-voters are very important category of citizens. Their number varies among 
countries and this pattern is directly correlated with the turnout trends in the countries. The 
significant number of new non-voters per country in a conservative approach, using a self-
reported turnout which has been characterized with the problem of over reporting turnout 
(Holbroock and Krosnick 2010), is a very important finding which emphasizes the 
importance of these groups of citizens. Additionally, these voters who have dropped out of 
the electoral process can directly influence the electoral outcome when the electoral 
competition is close. A higher number of new non-voters also cause a turnout decline 
comparing with the previous electoral cycles. Many of the differences among countries can 
be explained by the main institutional, socio-economic and political factors that influence 
turnout differences between countries. Nevertheless, we do not know which determinants 
drive the individuals to change their decision.  
The lack of research on the new non-voters causes a lack of theoretical explanation of the 
reasons why these voters stop voting. This chapter offers my theoretical model which will be 
tested in the forthcoming empirical chapters. The chapter proceeds as follows, a general 
discussion on the factors that influence the decline of voter participation is discussed before I 
proceed with a discussion on the distinction between the new non-voters and the others. The 
limitations of the spatial model are presented in section 2.4 which is followed with extensive 
debate on the relevance of the ideological inconsistency in comparison with alienation and 
indifference. The chapter concludes with graphical presentation of the theoretical model 
which summarizes the overview of the other determinants that influence voters to stop voting. 
2.2. Factors that influence the decline of voter participation 
Voter participation has attracted a lot of attention from voting behaviour scholars. A vast 
literature analyses the factors that influence low turnout in elections. Following the 
pioneering pieces in the field of voter turnout decline by Powell (1986) and Jackman (1986), 
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three major groups of factors that influence lower voting participation and a further 
theoretical explanation have become dominant. The institutional context (i), the 
socioeconomic variables (ii), party systems and electoral outcomes (iii) and rational choice 
theory of voting are the main approaches that voting turnout scholars use in explaining why 
citizens do not vote.  Political parties as substantive actors in the electoral process, though 
however the changes of their ideological positions are not considered adequately as factors 
that influence the decision of voting. The following text will present some of the most 
influential investigations and their contribution to the solving of the puzzle of low voter 
turnout (Franklin 2004).  
According to the rational choice theory, voting on elections is an irrational decision that 
voters make (Downs 1957). As one vote cannot decide the outcome of the elections, than the 
only rational decision made by the voter is not to participate on the elections. Nevertheless, 
instead of the irrationality of voting, citizens still decide to participate at elections in large 
numbers.  
Citizens might vote out of other reasons, in order to express their will and to choose their 
representatives. While voting to select representatives is labeled as “instrumental”, these 
other motivations receive the denomination of “consumption”. Citizens could vote to fulfill a 
civic or moral duty (Riker & Ordeshook 1968: 28; Campbell et al. 1960: 105-10), to reap the 
approval or avoid the criticism of third parties, that is to say, to overcome the social 
disapproval brought about by their lack of participation in elections (Coleman 1990: 290-92; 
Mueller 1989: 363-69), or to contribute to sustain democracy (Downs 1957: 266-70; Riker & 
Ordeshook 1968: 28). Consequently, citizens might also attach an expressive value to the act 
of voting, and, for this reason, participate at higher rates than expected according to the 
instrumental voter model. John A. Ferejohn and Morris P. Fiorina (1974: 527-28), on the 
other hand, defended the substitution of the rule of maximization of expected utility for the 
minimization of maximum regret. In other words, citizens would vote to avoid the potential 
regret that they would have if they do not do it, and their preferred party loses by only one 
vote. Consequently, voters will decide not to vote only if they do not find any personal or 
social incentive, or if they are dissatisfied by the political actors – parties and candidates that 
participate in elections.  
According to Powell, “the turnout is inhibited by its institutional context, and the main 
emphasis is on party-group linkages, which is the most powerful variable in his model” 
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(Powell 1982, 1986). He has shown that turnout is higher in countries with “nationally 
competitive districts” and “strong party-group linkages.” Nationally competitive districts 
enhance turnout because “parties and voters have equal incentive to get voters to the polls in 
all parts of the country” (Powell 1986, p. 21), and electoral choice is simpler when and where 
groups (e.g., unions, churches, professional associations) are clearly associated with specific 
parties (Powell 1986, p. 22). An emphasis of the institutional factors is dominant in another 
pioneering research of voter turnout by Jackman (1986). He put his focus on the number of 
parties, national competitive districts, electoral disproportionality as variables that explain the 
variance of the voter turnout. Jackman’s analysis does not include any socioeconomic 
variable and this is considered to be one of the weak aspects of the research (Blais 2005). 
Teixeira (1987, 1992) has provided a significant contribution to the analysis of the reasons 
for low turnout and the phenomenon of political apathy. In his first work, “Why Americans 
Don’t Vote: Turnout Decline in the United States, 1960-1984” he “pays careful attention to 
demographic factors (such as age, race, and region) and includes new hypotheses that might 
account for the "disconnectedness" of people from the political system. In particular, he 
raises the possibility that the marked decline in "rootedness” in US society (as measured by 
the decline in people married and living with their spouses and the increase in residential 
mobility) could bring about less political involvement” Teixeira (1992). Yet he is also well 
aware of the political science findings regarding turnout and includes three important 
“sociopolitical" variables in his study: partisanship (strength of party identification), efficacy, 
and campaign newspaper reading. 
Franklin (2004) claims that due to the fact that people are not eager to change their already 
adopted behaviour, which is also reflected in their electoral habits, the low turnout or political 
apathetic behaviour can be explained by the behaviour of new voters and special attention 
should be paid to their behaviour. He stresses that “from the age that citizens are eligible to 
vote for the first time, the significance of the elections in relation to their own lives, 
determines whether they will vote or not. The most significant factors that can influence new 
voters are the importance of the elections, the level of competitiveness, and the degree of 
executive responsiveness” Franklin (2004). 
Piven and Cloward (2000) tried to answer the question of why Americans continue to have 
low voter turnout and whether or not politicians in fact benefit from this system. Again 
favouring the approach that institutional factors influence the low turnout and thus cause 
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political apathy, the authors assign larger importance to the factors connected with political 
parties. They claim that party competitiveness, party constituencies, their linkage to party 
elites, and voter registration requirements determine the composition of the body of voters. 
Sandel and Plutzer (2005) look at another factor that could explain lower voter participation 
by examining family influences on voter turnout, especially focusing on the influence of 
divorce during adolescence on voting.  Their analysis shows large effects of divorce on voter 
participation among white families negatively influencing the turnout levels by nearly 10 
percentage points, while demonstrating that “the impact of divorce varies by racial group and 
can rival the impact of parents’ educational attainment, which is generally regarded as the 
most important non-political characteristic of one's family of origin” (Sandel and Plutzer 
2005). 
Investigating the electoral effect of party policy shifts, Tavits (2007) argues that whether 
party policy shifts are damaging or rewarding depends on whether the shift occurs in the 
pragmatic or principled issue domain. On pragmatic issues, voters value "getting things 
done." “Policy shifts in this domain signal responsiveness to the changing environment and 
are likely to be rewarded. Principled issues, however, concern core beliefs and values. Any 
policy shift in this domain is a sign of inconsistency and lack of credibility, which is likely to 
lead to voter withdrawal. These arguments are supported by evidence from 23 advanced 
democracies over a period of 40 years” (Tavits 2007). 
Comparative survey data from 10 post-communist countries show that the majority of 
electors are demobilized, that is, they distrust parties, do not identify with a party, the modal 
group is a “don’t know” when asked to express a party preference, and committed partisans 
form only a quarter of the electorate (Rose 1995).  Rose claims that “the result is that 
electoral support for parties is extremely volatile by comparison with election results in 
earlier waves of democratization”. According to him, this fact is not a immediate threat for 
the regime, however, “for even though most people do not believe they can influence 
government, even more importantly, they feel greater freedom from the state, which can not 
influence them as in the days of the Communist party-state” (Rose 1995). 
With all the previously described approaches they indicate the following: first, that there are 
various factors and determinants that influence low voter participation and that the precise 
nature of these factors has yet to be determined. Second, political parties are already 
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considered as important factors that influence the low level of participation, but party 
ideology shifts as a variable that can potentially cause a voting demobilization is not 
adequately considered and its importance is underestimated. Third, there is a lack of research 
on the new non-voters who stopped voting. The factors that influence this non-voting and the 
consequences for the democracies are not taken into serious consideration.  
2.3. The new non-voters and others 
The new non-voters have one characteristic that essentially differentiates them from the 
habitual voters and habitual new non-voters. These citizens used to participate at elections, 
they used to vote for a political party or candidates and have built up a close relationship with 
the party they used to support. Hence, the main hypotheses that have been applied to non-
voters do not correspond with the characteristics and behaviour of the new non-voters. The 
same applies when these citizens are compared with the habitual voters. These new non-
voters have also an enriched habit of voting, their level of political knowledge and 
information should be higher in comparison with non-voters, but still they choose instead to 
drop out of electoral process rather than keep voting. Regarding the channels of participation 
(Teorell et al 2007), these citizens influence electoral processes by exiting from further 
participation and this is how they demonstrate their disappointment with the product’s quality 
decline in the electoral process. Therefore the reasons for their participation exit should be 
searched in the actors that can influence the “products’ quality”. In the electoral processes 
these actors are political parties and candidates. Their behaviour between two elections is the 
determinant that caused this group of voters to change their behaviour and instead of voting 
to decide to stop voting. 
Hence, the general approach I follow is based on a standard revealed preference argument, 
according to which individual choices are the result of an optimization problem. At a general 
level, my work is related to the literature on revealed preferences which tries to “determine 
the restrictions that observed behaviour imposes on the structure of preferences, or 
alternatively the type of behaviour which would represent a violation of basic tenets of the 
theory of choice” (Degan and Merlo 2009). It originated in the context of consumer theory 
with the work of Samuelson (1938, 1948), and was later developed by, among others, 
Houthakker (1950), Afriat (1967) and Varian (1982) (Degan and Merlo 2009). Their goal is 
to find “necessary and sufficient conditions for the observed consumer choice data to be the 
result of the maximization of some well-behaved utility function subject to a budget 
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constraint” (Degan and Merlo 2009). More concretely, I wish to understand and offer an 
explanation as to what stimulates voters to change their decision. Why these voters violate 
their expected behaviour and hence oppose the already established tenets of choice. As 
consumers in the electoral process, their decision has to be related with the change of the 
offer or the product political actors offer to voters.   
Similar to Meyer (2013), who argues that parties are constrained by their respective 
ideologies, I build my argument as to parties’ behaviour. Meyer claims that exactly 
ideologies play very important role in the parties’ behaviour. Parties have strong ideological 
constraints that drive their behaviour. Well-informed parties differ from badly informed 
parties by the fact that even when they shift their ideological positions, they never leave their 
ideological territories. Meyer argues that ideology provides a partition of the policy space and 
that parties have intrinsic and extrinsic motivations to choose policy positions that conform to 
their ideological area. 
Meyer claims that for several reasons, party leaders have intrinsic and extrinsic motivations 
to avoid leaving their ideological territories leapfrogging their competitors. “Yet, parties 
usually choose policy positions simultaneously thus implying uncertainty of the rival parties’ 
platform choices. Parties may therefore mistakenly cross the ideological boundaries. Once 
information on rival parties’ policy positions is present, parties correct for this by shifting 
back to their ideological territories” (Meyer 2013). This process of correcting their 
ideological positions is a proof of their ideological inconsistency and permanent flip-flopping 
of their positions. According to Meyer, answering the question of why parties adapt their 
policy positions, researchers usually proceed from vote-seeking and office-seeking party 
incentives. “Shifts in public opinion, poor electoral performance in the past, or shifts of rival 
parties may make parties to adapt their policy platforms” (Meyer 2013). 
Just as importantly, my strategy for analyzing the new non-voters as a different category of 
citizens  means determining the differential impact of different sorts of change on different 
groups of voters and therefore this produces a model that persuasively establishes the 
primacy of electoral competition in influencing turnout levels. Voters in general, as it has 
been seen with newly enfranchised individuals, are also known to rapidly become immunized 
against changing their minds if they support the same party at even a quite small number of 
consecutive elections (Butler and Stokes 1974). Therefore I claim that they are more eager to 
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stop voting than to shift voting to another party once they notice ideological inconsistency of 
the party they used to support. 
Seen in this light, the drop out of participation of the new non-voters would be blamed on 
parties and politicians for failing to present issues of vital concern – for failing to keep their 
positions constant and to put emphasis on their traditional values and to find  way to 
operationalize these values in public policies. Thus the possible consequences on the turnout 
levels based on the declining participation of voters who used to vote would have been 
blamed on the character of the election, not on the characters of those who failed to vote or 
their attitudes towards the regime (Franklin et al 2004). 
2.4. The limitations of the spatial theory of voting and its failure to explain the 
behaviour of new non-voters 
The spatial theory of voting which has been originally formulated by Downs (1957) and 
Black (1958) and developed by many authors including Davis, Hinich and Ordershook 
(1970), Enelow and Hinich (1984) and Hinich and Munger (1994), offers a political 
economic theory of voting based on the rational choice of the individuals. According to this 
theory, voters are assumed to vote for the candidate who is closest to them in terms of issues 
– where issue preferences are represented as a location (voter ideal point) in n-dimensional 
issue space (Downs, l957; Davis, Hinich and Ordeshook, l970; Enelow and Hinich, l990).  
The formula that presents the vote choice according to the proximity spatial theory of voting 
is the following: 
  ui(vi pj) = - (vi – pj)
2                        
                                                (1) 
where v is the position of voter i on the left-right ideological scale, u is his utility and p is the 
position of party j in a certain question on the same scale (Fazekas and Meder 2013).  
According to Pratt (2013) a rational, ideological elector will vote for that candidate whose 
ideological position will give that elector maximum utility: 
Cpi = argmax  upi (c)                                        (2) 
Where an elector with ideological preferences pi has a utility upi(cj) of voting for a particular 
candidate with ideology cj 
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Spatial theory of voting supposes that “each voter has political views (i.e. their bliss point) 
that can be represented by a position in some common, multi-dimensional ideological 
(metric) space, and each candidate can also be represented by a position in the same 
ideological space. According to the spatial framework, in each election, each voter will cast 
her vote in favour of the candidate whose position is closest to her bliss point (given the 
positions of all the candidates in the election). If this is the case, we say that voters vote 
ideologically” (Degan and Merlo, 2009). The party or legislators also vote ideologically in 
the legislative houses and they support a policy outcome closest to their ideological positions. 
They also have symmetric single-peaked utility functions centered on their ideal points in the 
policy space (Converse, 1964). In this sense ideology which as a political concept has been 
thoroughly muddied by diverse uses is understood as "belief systems" ... A belief system is 
defined as a configuration of ideas and attitudes in which the elements are bound together by 
some form of constraint or functional interdependence." (Converse, 1964: 207). 
A part of the proximity theory which I elaborated above, the directional theory, as a second 
major spatial voting theory also adopts a rational choice perspective, in the same sense that 
preferences over parties are assumed to be representable by a utility function. Additionally, 
what differentiates direction from the proximity theory is the emphasis of the direction of the 
ideological positions. 
Ui (vi  pj) = (vj – n) (pj - n)                                                            (3) 
where similarly to the proximity theory, v is the position of voter i on the left-right 
ideological scale, u is his utility and p is the position of party j in a certain question on the 
same scale while n represents the ideological middle or the neutral or central point between 
left and right. 
Even with this differentiation, both theories assume that voters possess preferred position on 
an issue space or on a policy option space, and they see and have knowledge or they are 
aware of the possible programs that parties offer them through those lenses. Parties as part of 
their electoral offer have expressed positions on the same issue space, and it is assumed that 
voters have some information about these positions. “In this general form, issue voting 
theories can be expressed for each political issue, and the final expected utility is given by a 
weighted summation, according to the salience of each issue for the voter” (Fazekas and 
Meder 2013). 
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These basic postulates of the spatial theory of voting assume that voters make their decision 
exclusively based on their utility maximization ,which means that in reality they would swing 
their vote choice almost regularly in order to choose the closest party to their ideological 
positions. On the other side, regarding parties, according to these orthodox understandings of 
the spatial theory, political parties are assumed to change their positions regularly in order to 
attract the largest number of voters and thus to maximize the profit by winning most seats, 
vote or by implementing their preferred policies while being party in power.  This is 
particularly important for minority or disadvantaged parties in order to win elections. 
The spatial theory has attracted a lot of attention of voting behaviour scholars and different 
subgroups have been differentiated. The ones who support a Downsian logic based on a 
rational and centripetal minimization of distances (Blais et al. 2001), the ones who believe in 
a more symbolic and centrifugal dynamic that leads voters to choose a party according to the 
direction and the intensity of their issue preference (Macdonald et al. 1991, 1995) and the 
others who find mixed evidence for both explanations (Lewis & King 1999; Cho & Endersby 
2003) have not yet reached a consensus about the ultimate winner between the spatial 
accounts of issue voting (Pardos-Prato, 2010).  
The last consists of acknowledging the validity of both approaches and integrating them into 
a unified theory of voting that is supposed to fill the empty centre between them (Adams & 
Merrill 1999; Merrill & Grofman 1999). Nevertheless, all of them tend to upgrade the basic 
claims, and therefore to offer a more coherent theory of voting based on the importance of 
ideologies. 
Merill and Grofman show that voter choice in a variety of spatial models, including what are 
normally regarded as directional models, can be viewed as proximity decisions in which the 
candidate locations are replaced by shadows, where shadow locations are defined by a simple 
transformation, usually involving shrinking. Thus voters choose that candidate whose shadow 
is nearer. This approach unifies their understanding of what otherwise appear to be disparate 
spatial models and permits us to see relations among them. 
Jessee (2009) using a novel survey design on the case of US Presidential Elections 2004, 
directly tested the validity of the spatial theory and its assumptions on the mechanisms that 
affect voters to make their decisions. The results showed that voters do have meaningful 
ideological positions and additionally that these ideological positions are strongly related to 
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policy proposals in the Congress. Jessee (2009) discovered that independents behave mostly 
according to the spatial theory of voting, while partisans make voting decisions that 
significantly differ from the unbiased assumptions of the spatial voting models. When the 
level of information increases, partisans show voting behaviour that converges with the 
unbiased postulates of the spatial models, and in this sense closer to the one of the 
independents. Though even when controlling for information, there is an important difference 
of the behaviour of partisans and the main assumptions of the spatial voting model. 
Downsian theory implies that the strategy for parties in minority positions is positional  
manoeuvering: as a disadvantaged party moves its ideological position towards the median 
voter, it gains votes and gradually overcomes its minority status. But this strategy is not 
always feasible. Frequent changes in ideology may not be credible (and often not even 
perceived by voters: see Adams, Ezrow and Somer-Topcu 2011), and parties often pursue 
conflicting goals that prevent effective ideological maneuvering (Müller and Strøm 1999), so 
that the possibilities of the leadership to exploit positional strategies are limited (Grofman 
2004).  
These shifts and regular ideological maneuverings are not utility maximizing because at the 
same time voters are not perfectly rational and they do not always make their decisions based 
only on their goal to maximize their utilities. Additionally, this approach limits any 
explanation about new non-voters because these voters substantially differ from others 
because they have already voted and thence stopped voting. According to spatial models of 
voting theories, voters will rather shift their party choice than drop out of voting.  
Spatial theory of voting also implies that voters do not develop any relationship with the 
political parties or candidates they used to support and that their vote choices are not based on 
certain constant affiliation with the political parties. This limits utility of the spatial theories 
to explain why certain voters remain voting constantly for the same party no matter whether 
there is another political party with the closest ideological position. Furthermore, this theory 
is limited to explain why certain considerably large groups of voters stop voting although 
there might be a political party closer to their position.   
The spatial theory of voting fails to take into account the importance of the credibility of the 
political parties (Adams, Ezrow and Somer-Topcu 2011) and this is a very important 
characteristic that influences voters to stop voting. In this thesis I argue that the loss of 
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credibility, based exactly on this rational choice based theory of constant ideological shifting, 
demobilizes voters of further support for the political party at the elections.   
Furthermore, the spatial theory of voting does not take into consideration the psychological 
bounds between political parties and individuals. The funnel model of causality (Campbell et 
al, 1960) has shown that the party identification is one of the strongest factors that influence 
vote choice and turnout (for more details see chapter III). The party identification is built up 
in the process of socialization and it is mostly inherited in the family. Voters predominantly 
tend to keep their loyalty to the party that they used to support and rarely shift their vote 
choice. Based on these claims that have been confirmed by numerous previous research 
studies (Alford 1963,Inglehart and Klingemann 1976, Bartle 1998, Bellucci 2006, Green and 
Hobolt 2008), party identification is an important determinant that not only drives the 
rationality of the voters’ decisions, but furthermore it directs voters to focus more on the 
exact behaviour of the party they used to support and they identify with.  
This is particularly important for new non-voters. Being supporters of a certain political party 
and having a stronger identification with it, the citizens are related to and affiliated with that 
party. They follow the party, have accumulated knowledge about it and they are fairly 
informed by the party’s behaviour. Therefore when a political party shifts its ideological 
position, these voters are aware of party’s inconsistency; their perspective on the party as 
credible and constant and relevant has thus been changed.  But instead of swinging their vote 
to the other party which might be closer to their ideological position, these voters decide to 
punish the party by dropping out of the voting process. In this perspective, the relationship 
between the party for which the voter has been voting is still strong enough that it disables 
her of voting for others and, instead, the voter sends the message to the party by exiting the 
electoral process. The exit can be permanent, resulting in a decision by which the voter is not 
to be remobilized in the long run, or the voter can reclaim his decision after registering an 
increase in the party’s credibility.  
2.5. Abstention because of loss of credibility instead of alienation or indifference  
Spatial theory of voting takes into account two different ideological phenomena under which 
voters abstain or might choose to abstain. Despite the fact that indifference and alienation 
have been notified even by Downs (1957b) in the earliest stage of the development of the 
spatial voting theory, only later did Hinich and Munger (1997) give comprehensive and 
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parsimonious definitions of both factors and the expected consequences. Under the 
framework of the spatial theory, citizens abstain when parties do not provide them with 
enough utility. “Provided that the individuals' utility calculus is defined in terms of distance, 
abstention occurs in the literature as two diferent phenomena which take into account the 
distance between the voter and the party, as well as the relative distance between the voter 
vis-a-vis the two nearest alternatives” (Rodon 2013).  
If all alternatives in the election are far from the voter's ideal point, that voter is alienated and 
she is less likely to vote. The greater the difference between the voter's point and the nearest 
alternative, the less likely the individual is to vote, compared either with other voters or other 
elections where perceptions of the diference are smaller. On the other side, an indifferent 
citizen is the one who is equally distant from all or both main alternatives in the ideological 
spectrum. She does not view one party platform as significantly closer to her own preference 
than the other party platform. In spatial terms, both political alternatives are providing the 
same utility, so a voter does not have enough incentives to participate. A perfectly indifferent 
situation occurs when a citizen is located in a perfectly equidistant position with regards to 
the closest political alternatives.  
Previous research has not been unanimous regarding the effect of these two phenomena. 
Furthermore, findings demonstrate that there are still many doubts regarding the effect and 
the circumstances under which alienation and indiference operate. Zipp (1985) in one of the 
first research studies on the effect of indifference and alienation found neither of the two 
phenomena significantly affected the overall probability to participate. Contrary to these 
findings, Katz (2007) argued that both indifference and alienation contributed to increase 
abstention in the 2002 Brazilian election, with indifference accounting for slightly more than 
50% of the rate of abstention. Some other studies have shown as little as 9-point drop in 
turnout among indifferent persons and a 14-point drop in turnout among alienated individuals 
(Johnston, Matthews and Bittner, 2007).  
Adams, Dow and Merrill, (2006) test the influence of the indifference and alienation on 
abstention and discovered that abstention due to either alienation or indifference benefitted 
Republican candidates, but only very modestly. “Second, Presidential elections involving 
attractive candidates motivate higher turnout, but only to the extent that abstention stems 
alienation rather than from indifference. Third, paradoxically, citizens' individual-level 
tendencies to abstain because of alienation are strongly affected by their evaluations of the 
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candidates' policies, whereas aggregate turnout rates do not depend significantly on the 
candidates' policy platforms” (Adams et al. 2006). 
Contrary to these findings, Plane and Gershtenson (2004) claim that ideological location of 
the candidates indeed influences the overall level of electoral participation. Tests on midterm 
Senate elections confirm that alienation and indifference also influence the voting in these 
type of elections as numerous research studies have shown for presidential elections, and they 
additionally normatively claim that in order to have higher participation, there should be a 
candidate with centrist positions which will stimulate voting. 
Recently, Peress (2010) found indifference to be more important than alienation. 
Additionally, Rodon (2013) demonstrates that the effects of indifference and alienation are 
positive, but they are relatively low, especially in the case of indifference. Moreover, he 
reveals that the effects of indifference and alienation, where relevant, are strongly 
conditioned by the polarization of the party system and the effective number of parties. 
A part of the limited and often contradictory effects of these phenomena found in the 
previous research, abstention by indifference or alienation does not offer an explanation 
about the voters who have stopped voting because these two phenomena once again do not 
take into account the relation that the voter has with the party she used to vote and the effect 
of the party identification as an important determinant of voters behaviour. As I have argued 
previously, the voter does not observe political parties with the same attention, she is more 
focused on the behaviour of the party she used to vote and therefore she is much more 
capable of noticing its changes and moves around the ideological spectrum. When a party 
moves, the move itself is seen by the voters as a sign of inconsistency, a reflection of a lack 
of reliability and relevance, and furthermore it is considered as a loss of credibility.  
While it is of great importance whether there are political parties closer to the ideal position 
of the voters, and this can accelerate or deny their decision to stop voting, the voters analyse 
the ideological arena from the perspective of the party they used to support, and therefore the 
ideological shift of this party brings confusion among the voters. An impression is created 
that the party does not stand behind its own position and does not represent a certain system 
of values, but instead flip flops its positions based on contemporary trends. 
I argue that the voter is analyzing his psychological relations with the party he used to vote 
for and strongly identifies with, instead of the party system as whole or his relation with other 
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political parties. In this sense, the ideological moves and shifts of that party causes alienation 
between the voter and the party and this feeling of being alienated is more important than the 
possibility that the voter does not find any party close to her ideological views. Similar to 
indifference, the voter is focused on his party behaviour and therefore the possible 
equidistance between two or more parties do not play an important role for voter’s behaviour. 
Hence, when analyzing the reasons for new non-voters to stop voting, ideological 
inconsistency as a reason for loss of credibility is more important determinant for the 
abstention than the alienation or indifference. I argue that the relationship between voters and 
parties they used to support is stronger than their position on the ideological spectrum. 
2.6. Not only ideological inconsistency - What else matters?  
The thesis theoretical approach emphasizes the importance of ideological inconsistency and 
its crucial role in voters’ decision to stop voting at elections. Voters punish political parties 
when the latter shift their ideological positions and they drop out of voting. Nevertheless, 
building a model of dropping out of voting at the individual level whilst considering only 
ideology as only an explanatory factor is not an accurate enough approach. Previous research 
on the determinants of individual voter turnout has included more than two hundred different 
variables (Smets and Van Ham 2012). A meta– analysis of determinants of individual voter 
turnout has shown than only in the last ten years in the most influential journals of political 
science, numerous models have been tested and hundreds of variables offered. However, 
from Smets and Van Ham’s findings it can be concluded that the progress in attempts to offer 
a unified model that would explain the variance of the individual turnout has been still 
limited. 
I control for different factors that influence voters to stop voting. Some of them accelerate the 
process of dropping out of voting, the others influence on voters to keep taking part of the 
electoral process. Additionally, not only individual characteristics drive voters’ decisions to 
stop voting. Voters support certain political parties, whilst their behaviour also influences 
them to stop or keep voting. In the end, there are significant differences among countries in 
the number of new non-voters and different institutional, electoral and socio-economic 
factors contribute to voters’ decisions to stop voting. I offer a multi-level model with 
individual level, party and country level variables in order to understand the determinants that 
drive the new non-voters and stimulates them to exit participation at elections.  
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This approach will give an additional value in order to understand the behaviour of new non-
voters and reasons why do they stop voting. As I have already mentioned and will further 
elaborate, there is no systematic research on new non-voters. We have a very limited 
knowledge about their number, their characteristics and reasons why they have stopped 
voting. Therefore research on new non-voters is of crucial importance, and this is therefore 
the main contribution of this thesis. 
While I will discuss variables included in the models in further chapters when testing my 
hypotheses (for more, see the following chapters), I will just briefly introduce some of the 
approaches I take into consideration in order to better explain the reasons why voters stop 
voting. Starting with the baseline model offered by Nie and Verba (1972), socioeconomic 
status, race, age, urbanization and partisanship will also be taken into consideration as factors 
that influences on voters to stop voting. I argue that higher socio-economic status influence 
voters to keep voting no matter the changes in other factors. Citizens with better socio-
economic status tend to vote more than the ones with lower status (Nie and Verba 1972) and 
it is expected that they would be more reluctant to stop voting. Nevertheless, the influence of 
this variable is expected to be limited. Regarding race, my expectation corresponds with the 
majority of the findings which show that minorities and different races participate less. In this 
order I expect that minorities are more eager to stop voting comparing with the members of 
majority groups and whites.  Urbanization is also a demobilizing determinant, citizens in 
urban areas are more eager to stop voting than citizens who live in smaller, rural 
environment. Gender is another very important baseline variable. Findings about the trends of 
this variable are not unanimous, according to some research men participate more and women 
less, while the newest trends (Nagler and Loughley 2014) show that women are the ones that 
vote more frequently. I am unable to further provide a precise explanation as to why men or 
women stop voting more frequently. Regarding age, my expectations are that younger voters 
are more eager to stop voting then older generations. 
As I have also mentioned earlier, the psychological model offers an important explanation of 
determinants of voting and non-voting. Campbell et al. (1960) argue that the funnel model of 
causality is the best predictor of whether one individual will decide to vote and for which 
party. Hence, Party ID is the strongest factor that shapes and the decision of an individual to 
vote and their vote choice. According to Campbell et al, the Party ID is learnt in adulthood 
through parents and socialization. Every individual forms a psychological attachment to a 
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certain party and this affiliation shapes the development of their own attitudes for societal 
issues. These attitudes are adopted from the party positions and they are the result of the 
emotional attachment that one has with the party. Regarding new non-voters, Party ID has 
double importance. First, as a result of the party identification voters develop a relationship 
with the party they supported and they are aware of its behaviour regarding ideological 
changes. Secondly, as has been shown by numerous research studies, Party ID is a strong 
motivator of voting, and hence my expectations are that citizens with a strong Party ID are 
more eager to keep voting in comparison with others. Nevertheless, this is not in contrast 
with the importance of the Party ID for citizens to react on ideological inconsistency.  
The other set of variables that will be included in the research are social embeddedness 
variables and political distrust. Voters who are involved in political and social events are 
more eager to keep voting in comparison with others. The level of political trust is also very 
important. Voters who have lost trust in parties and institutions are the ones that would stop 
voting.  At the end, political knowledge as well plays a very important role. Its role is also 
double. Firstly, the level of political knowledge is an important indicator that voters are aware 
of political phenomena, they are able to understand the processes and to make accurate 
judgements about political actors. On the other hand, based on the research of individual level 
voter turnout, I expect that more knowledgeable voters would remain voters once other 
circumstances remain the same. 
At the party level, as I have said, my attention is focused on party ideology shifts or 
ideological inconsistency. Enelow & Hinich (1982) investigate the way in which voters are 
using ideological knowledge from the past to predict expected differences in ideological 
positions of candidates and parties in a spatial model. In a probabilistic voting setting, authors 
show that previous ideological stances affect the perceptions of voters and, in turn, the 
optimal positions of candidates (Enelow & Hinich 1982; Enelow & Hinich 1984). Enelow & 
Hinich (1984) base their finding on testing different issue salience. My approach is not to 
concentrate on issue salience in this work in order to focus on the intuition associated with 
ideological shift or inconsistency of political parties. The other variables included in the 
model are organizational strength, leadership change, whether party belongs to the 
government or the opposition, and ideological distance with the closest alternative. 
Regarding country level variables, in terms of types of heterogeneity, Pardos- Prato (2010) 
argues that it is important to note that Kedar distinguishes between party-specific 
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characteristics and institutional mechanisms. The both types of factors directly affect my 
argument. Based on a rational choice approach, Kedar argues “that voters are concerned with 
policy outcomes and therefore take into consideration the institutional mechanisms that 
convert votes into policy. More specifically, her compensational model predicts that choice 
will depend on how much citizens expect their votes to be watered down by mechanisms like 
the effective number of parliamentary parties, the district magnitude or the control over 
plenary agenda” (Kedar 2005a: 186; 2005b: 419). Other additional variables I include in the 
analysis are compulsory voting, electoral system, access to ballot box as well the general 
economic situation of the country and the level of democratic performance. 
The theoretical model explaining why voters stop voting in comparative context looks like 
this: 
Theoretical model: 
 
2.7. Conclusions  
This chapter offers my theoretical model which will be tested in the forthcoming empirical 
chapters. The lack of research on the new non-voters causes a lack of theoretical explanation 
of the reasons why these voters stop voting. I argue that spatial model of voting which is 
based on the claim that voters vote for the party which is the closest to their position on the 
ideological spectrum and thus every shift of the party demands vote swing of the voters and 
opposite has limits to explain the behaviour of the new non-voters. At a general level, my 
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work is related to the literature on revealed preferences which tries to “determine the 
restrictions that observed behaviour imposes on the structure of preferences, or alternatively 
the type of behaviour which would represent a violation of basic tenets of the theory of 
choice” (Degan and Merlo 2009). 
My theoretical argument is that the voter is analyzing his psychological relations with the 
party he used to vote for and strongly identifies with, instead of the party system as whole or 
his relation with other political parties. In this sense, the ideological moves and shifts of that 
party causes alienation between the voter and the party and this feeling of being alienated is 
more important than the possibility that the voter does not find any party close to her 
ideological views. Similar to indifference, the voter is focused on his party behaviour and 
therefore the possible equidistance between two or more parties do not play an important role 
for voter’s behaviour. 
I control for different factors that influence voters to stop voting. Some of them accelerate the 
process of dropping out of voting, the others influence on voters to keep taking part of the 
electoral process. Additionally, not only individual characteristics drive voters’ decisions to 
stop voting. Voters support certain political parties, whilst their behaviour also influences 
them to stop or keep voting. In the end, as I will discuss further in the proceeding chapters, 
there are significant differences among countries in the number of new non-voters and 
different institutional, electoral and socio-economic factors contribute to voters’ decisions to 
stop voting. 
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CHAPTER THREE  
How to study New Non-Voters: Research Design and Methodology 
 
3.1. Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to discuss the research design and the methodology used to study 
the new non-voters. The complexity of the studied phenomena demands a serous 
methodological considerations in order the negative effects of potential ambiguities to be 
minimized. The thesis accepts a multi-facetted approach analysing the phenomenon of 
dropping out of voting at individual -, party-, and country- level. Furthermore, in order to 
better understand the nature of the shift, an in-depth case study based on longitudinal data 
analysis is necessary to be utilised. This demands important methodological aspects to be 
taken into account in the process of research design in order to create an optimal environment 
for testing the theoretical model.   
The chapter first discusses the theoretical and empirical uncertainties which need to be taken 
into account when dealing with the analysis of the new non-voters. It proceeds with 
discussing the datasets which are used to analyse the phenomenon. The fourth section deals 
with operationalisation of the variables. The dependent variable is discussed extensively in 
order to clarify the decisions for its operationalisation. The problems with the main 
independent variable are also presented in this section. The chapter proceeds with a brief 
discussion of the methods used for testing the theoretical model before concluding briefly 
with the overall summary of the research design and methodology of the thesis.  
3.2. Brief discussion of major methodological and theoretical ambiguities 
This thesis is faced with three major methodological and theoretical uncertainties that need to 
be clarified before empirical research is conducted. The first ambiguity is related to the 
definition of the new non-voters. The second one is related to the availability of data for 
testing the theoretical method. 
A new non-voter is defined as a citizen who used to participate at elections and at one point 
decided to drop out of the elections process. Furthermore, this group of voters has voted and 
has supported a certain political party and in that way gave a legitimation of the democratic 
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formation of political institutions. The fact that these voters have a record of voting means 
that their feeling of social duty and rationality of voting has been established. Therefore the 
major theories which offer an explanation about differences between voters and non-voters 
do not capture the characteristics of the new non-voters. A different approach is required. 
But, before testing a new theoretical model for new non-voters, the most important question 
is whether these new non-voters stopped voting on a permanent or temporary basis. The 
dominant research conducted to date classifies the new non-voters in the category of 
intermittent voters. As I will have discussed further, this category captures many different 
sub-categories and different determinants drive their behaviour. The reasons for including all 
these phenomena under one concept lay in the methodological problems. In order to be able 
to provide a specific definition of the character of the voting exit of these voters, long-term 
panel data with several time points is required. There is lack of upgraded, long-term data that 
would offer a precise answer about the nature of the exit. Moreover, there is not any 
guarantee that in future the new non-voter would not decide to re-enter the electoral process.  
There are two possibilities that enable testing this question. The first is the one I implement in 
this thesis and is based on the Youth and Parents Socialization Panel which includes a cohort 
panel analysis of voters during a longer time spam from 1964 to 1997. There are four waves 
of data and nine presidential electoral cycles represented. The participation question is based 
on self-reported turnout and the problem of over-reporting turnout is a big concern. 
Nevertheless, these data allow testing and offering a coherent theoretical model that would 
explain the reasons why voters stop voting. The data is not upgraded and do not offer a 
testing of the model on the most current electoral environment. The other approach is based 
on the utilization of voter calls data. This data is based on validated turnout report and would 
help in the precise identification of the number of new non-voters, but lacks any data that 
enables formulating and testing a theoretical model.  
Another ambiguity regarding the nature of the exit is related with the conservativeness of the 
operationalization of the exit. Hypothetically, in a time spam of 10 electoral cycles, one voter 
who has voted at the previous elections and stopped voting in the next three or four cycles 
before restarting to vote again should also be considered as new non-voter during a certain 
period, and reasons for her decision should be investigated.  
The methodological problems that this research faces might be one of the reasons why there 
is such a lack of research on these citizens. This is exactly one of the biggest challenges for 
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me in order to conduct research that could identify and analyse new non-voters, and in turn to 
offer and test a model that will explain the reasons for exiting the electoral participation. In 
order to offer a coherent, comparative and in-depth analysis of the new non-voters, I combine 
two different approaches and use two different types of data. I am using a comparative data 
that includes thirty-seven countries and offers a vast variety of factors that could influence on 
voters to stop voting. A part of the comparative approach which is based on data with only 
two time points, I use the USA as an in depth case, where the YPSP panel dataset is utilized 
in order to identify the nature of the new non-voters. This compromise enables me to deal 
with the problem as to the nature of the exit, but at the same time to offer a comparative, 
cross-sectional research study as a different terrain for testing my hypothesis for the influence 
of ideological inconsistency on new non-voters decision to stop voting. 
The third important methodological obstacle originates in the nature of the data which is 
utilised to conduct the research. The thesis heavily relies on survey data. While survey data is 
a conventional source for investigating political behaviour phenomena, an additional obstacle 
for the research is the fact that the data is based on self-reported turnout. Numerous research 
has reported social desirability problem with self-reported turnout which results in citizens 
intending to over-report their participation at elections. This is particularly important for the 
research design of the thesis.  The high percentage of reported turnout, which defers 
significantly than the turnout rates, decreases the number of the new non-voters which can be 
identified. This is particularly visible in the case of the analysis of the US new non-voters. 
The high percentage of reported turnout in the US Youth and Parents Socialization Panel 
1984-1996 (see appendix) creates only a small number of new non-voters of above 5 % of the 
entire sample. In this sense the theoretical model is tested in very conservative circumstances. 
A positive relationship in line with the theoretical expectations, thus, would have an 
additional value.  
3.3. Data 
As a result of the multifaceted approach of analysing the phenomenon of the new non-voters, 
which also includes an analysis on the aggregate (party and country) level, different dataset 
are utilized to test the theoretical assumptions. For the purposes of this research, the database 
from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) Module 2 2001-2006 and Module 
3 2006-2011 will be used. Due to the lack of a Comparative Panel Database for Western, 
Central and Eastern Europe, this database is the most applicable for the needs of this study, 
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due to the question within the report highlighting voting preferences during the previous 
elections, as well as current ones, which is vital for the operationalisation of the dependent 
variable. This database consists of information from thirty-eight countries’ post-electoral 
studies, and therefore is acceptable for the purposes of testing the model.  Since the purpose 
of this chapter is to draw general inferences about the influence of the party ideology shift on 
political apathy, and not to limit the observation to one particular region, the model will 
include all countries without any exclusion. As such, in the sample, there are countries from 
South America, North America, Europe, and Asia.   
In order to measure which variables influence voters in the US to stop voting, the database 
from the Youth and Parents Socialization Panel Study Wave IV 1984-1996 is utilised. This 
database is most appropriate for this study because it includes a longitudinal survey of 
individual decisions to participate at presidential elections in the USA. On the other hand, the 
measurement of ideology shift is also a complicated process. There are several main 
alternatives for measuring the ideological shift of candidates and parties. As some of the most 
acceptable indicators for measuring party ideology, programmes cover a wide range of 
political issues and themes and therefore can be taken as a “set of key central statement of 
party positions” (Budge, Robertson, Hearl 1987). Nevertheless, it has been reported that the 
Comparative Party Manifesto (CMP) which represents the most comprehensive attempt for 
measurement of ideology faces serious indications of systematic coder error (see Benoit, 
Laver, Mikhaylov 2008). The experience has shown that the US political parties’ dataset is 
particularly problematic because of less significance of the party manifestos. Therefore, for 
the main hypothesis I use the aggregated perceptions about the ideological positions of the 
candidates from American National Electoral Studies (ANES) Dataset for the period of 1980-
1996. For measurement of the ideological positions of different issues, I am forced to return 
to the CMP 1980-1996 Dataset, because it is the only data that allows the measurement of the 
positions of eight different political issues.  
Regarding the availability and quality of the data, there is another serious ambiguity that 
should be addressed; the quality and reliability of the data for construction of the main 
independent variable. The most significant attempt to collect data on party ideologies has 
been conducted in the Comparative Manifesto Project. This database includes 54 countries, of 
which 25 are OECD countries, 24 are Central and Eastern European countries and 5 are other 
countries, of which two are EU members. Although there are several modes of measuring  
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party ideology or party positions, the CMP Database is most acceptable for the purposes of 
the project because it consists of 988 parties in 673 elections, with 3924 party programs and 
manifesto’s, five different programmatic dimensions, and 113 programmatic data variables 
(Volkens et al. (2015): The Manifesto Data Collection. Manifesto Project 
(MRG/CMP/MARPOR)).   
Additionally, this database has other advantages, including the fact that it is based on content 
analyses of the electoral programs of political parties. Electoral programs are some of the 
most acceptable indicators for measuring party ideology, because they cover a wide range of 
political issues and themes, and therefore can be taken as a “set of key central statement of 
party positions” (Budge, Robertson, Hearl 1987). They are “authoritative statements of the 
party policies because they are usually confirmed by party conventions”, and thus are 
representing the positions of the entire party, not only the views certain factions or the 
leadership. The advantage that the database offers, at least for the purposes of this research, is 
that data is published before every election and, therefore, the changes in party positions or a 
party ideology shift can be studied. 
Other text-based measurements of the party manifestos have been conducted by Laver & 
Garry (2000), Laver, Benoit& Garry (2003) and Slapin and Proksch (2007). Whilst there are 
serious indications of systematic coder error (Benoit, Laver, Mikhaylov 2008) within the 
CMP Database, the limitations of this database continue to be less inhibiting than the 
limitations presented by other methods. In order to deal with the problem that has been 
reported by Benoit, Laver and Mikhaylov, but at the same time to take an advantage of the 
wider comparative perspective of the CMP data, I will use this data with additional 
robustness checks with the corrected error-term data by Benoit and Laver. In the case of 
USA, where CMP is in particular unable to adequately capture ideological movements of the 
parties, I am using the aggregated perceptions on ideological positions of parties on a seven-
point scale from the American National Electoral Studies (ANES) Dataset. 
3.4. Operationalisation of the variables 
3.4.1. The new non-voter variable 
When operationalizing the dependent variable, Youth and Parents Socialization Panel Study 
Wave 1984 - 1996 is used. The “New Non-Voter” is constructed as three category variable 
and has values “1” for voters that used to vote but have stopped voting on a permanent basis, 
42 
 
“2” for habitual voters that have regularly participated at all four electoral cycles and “3” for 
all other categories. The data covers four electoral cycles of presidential elections starting 
with 1984 and finishing with 1996 US elections. Therefore, the “New Non-Voter” is coded as 
“1” for the voters that voted at the 1984 US presidential elections but afterwards have 
stopped voting.  The same principle is used for voters that have voted at the elections in 1984 
and 1988 but have stopped casting ballots at consecutive electoral cycles. As I said above, all 
other individuals that have shown permanent voting habits are in a separate category which is 
used as a base category in the statistical models, while permanent non-voters as well the 
intermittent voters are coded into one category.  
3.4.2. Party ideology shift score 
The party ideology shift variable will be constructed by subtracting the score for aggregated 
perceived values of the presidential candidates ideology on the scale from 1 (extremely 
liberal) to 7 (extremely conservative) from the ANES Dataset during an election from the 
score for the party  candidate’s ideology in the previous election, when the voters voted for 
the candidate’s party. 
Party Ideology Shift = Party Ideology Score (t) – Party Ideology Score(t-1) 
t- Most recent election cycle, t-1 Previous election cycle 
Every voter is matched with the ideology shift score of the party she used to vote for before 
stopping voting, and with the election year when the voter stopped voting. There is not an 
accurate difference between the candidates perceived values of the ideology and party’s 
values. The difference in the values between these two categories is very small and therefore 
choosing party or candidates’ ideological shifts does make a substantial change. On the other 
hand, choosing candidates ideological positions is better because of the bigger visibility of 
the candidates and the media exposure of their ideological standings. 
When relying on CMP Dataset, the similar approach it taken. The variable for ideology shift 
is constructed by subtracting the score for ideology in one election cycle with the score from 
the previous cycle. The ideology shift variable will include all seven domains measured in the 
CPM Database including foreign policy such as external relations and freedom and 
democracy, a political dimension covered by the political system, an economic and social 
dimension covered by economy, welfare and quality of life, and social and cultural issues 
covered by the dimensions: fabric of society, and social groups. All of these domains consist 
43 
 
of the most important variables for determining ideology shift of political parties. 
Furthermore, a detailed, theoretical justification for the selection of these components is 
discussed below, in a subchapter where the party ideology shift variable will be explained. In 
general, these components express crucial political phenomena and they are the most 
important components in which parties and voters distinguish each other. 
3.4.3. Policy shift 
Besides party ideological shift, variables for eight different policy areas are constructed by 
subtracting the ideological scores from the manifestos of two parties. The policy areas 
include: economic, international and security; social welfare issues; human rights, 
multiculturalism; shift in traditional values; labour rights, and minority rights. From the 
manifestos of Democratic and Republican parties for the period of 1980 to 1996, ideological 
scores for every policy area are constructed and that score is subtracted from the score for the 
same policy in the party manifesto for the next electoral cycle. 
3.4.3. Control variables 
Taking into account the previous theoretical findings as well as the importance to offer a 
better specified model, a corpus of control variables will be included not only with a purpose 
of assessing the theoretical prepositions and their effects on the dependent variable, but also 
to control their effects when the results are evaluated. The model will include the socio-
demographic variables as control variables. Age, gender, occupation, urban-rural dwelling, 
and income are the standard and common used socio-demographic variables that can 
influence the models. Apart from the utilisation of these control variables, the multilevel 
model also includes variables for membership in trade unions and interest in politics. The 
assumption surrounding the trade union membership variable is that members of these 
organizations usually vote for leftwing or social democratic parties, and that membership 
affiliation would mean that these voters would continue to vote for the party even if an 
ideology shift occurs.  
The interest in politics variable is a control variable which gives information about the 
individual’s level of knowledge for the party actions. The assumption is that the higher the 
interest in politics, the greater the chances that an individual will notice an ideological shift 
within the political parties. This variable indirectly controls the level of information for 
politics. Therefore, based on the previous assumption, interaction between political 
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information and party ideology shift is employed. This variable controls the chance party 
ideology shift to be noticed. The last control variable that will be included will address how 
individuals evaluate the performance of the Government overall. A negative evaluation can 
be one of the reasons for non-voting or a shifting preferences from the parties in power, no 
matter the effects of the ideology shift. 
On the country level, a dummy variable for post–communist countries will be created. The 
purpose of this variable is to test whether there are differences between voters as a result of 
being citizens of post-communist countries or established democracies. Electoral system 
variables will also be introduced as a result of the theoretical explanations that in countries 
with proportional representation system the voters are more motivated to participate as a 
result of the more competitive elections. The change of the economic growth measured by the 
GDP of the countries will also be included followed by the access to the ballot for the citizens 
as one of the factors that can simplify the voting procedure and therefore motivate voters to 
participate at elections (Trechsel 2007).   
 3.5. Methods 
The complexity of the issues demands a thorough consideration of the most appropriate 
methods to be used to test the theoretical model. The comparative analysis includes not only 
the individuals and their vote preferences, but these citizens are influenced and clustered 
within the political parties they used to vote for. Furthermore, the different institutional, 
economic and political circumstances in these countries can differently affect voters’ 
behaviour.   For the purposes of this investigation, the individual level can be defined as the 
way in which certain variables influence the voting behaviour of individuals. On the party 
level, the thesis investigates which variables influence the change of total number of votes 
that the party won during the elections. Additionally, this thesis will measure the influence of 
the ideological shift on the issue of most importance for the individual citizen as regards ones 
voting behaviour. Therefore, different statistical models will be used for the three different 
levels. The hypothesis for the influence of the ideology shift on individual level will be tested 
with Multi Level Modeling (Mix Effects or Hierarchical) (MLM). 
When investigating the reasons why voters stop voting in the US, the most appropriate 
method for testing the theoretical model is multinomial logistic regression. I have chosen 
mlogit because the dependent variable includes more than two categories and it falls into any 
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one of a set of categories which cannot be ordered in any meaningful way. Also, multinomial 
logit enables me to better discern the differences between these categories of citizens and to 
show whether independent variables differently affect different categories.  Taking into 
consideration that the ideological variables are higher (party) level variables, I am using 
clustered standard errors (Moulton 1990; Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan 2004). This way 
I am avoiding the problem of mis-specification, which can lead to standard error which are 
seriously biased and can cause a spurious regression as a result of this mis-specification 
(Moulton 1990). 
At party level, the main hypothesis was tested using linear regression to examine how a party 
ideology shift influences voters to stop voting, or whether as a result of this ideological shift 
the voters who have supported party during past elections will choose to abandon voting for 
the party in the current election. 
3.6. Conclusions  
The aim of this chapter was to briefly discuss the research design and methodological aspects 
of the following empirical chapters. There are several important empirical and theoretical 
ambiguities which are necessary to be taken into account. The complexity of the 
operationalisation of the dependent variable is one of the major theoretical and 
methodological concerns. The important issues here are the nature of the exit and the duration 
of this exit. In order to deal with these issues, the research is designed to take into 
consideration the general aspects of the phenomenon by using a comparative multi-level 
individual analysis. The duration and the nature of the exit is taken into account by 
introducing an in-depth case study analysis on US new non-voters based on longitudinal data.  
The other problems important to be addressed are related with the quality of the data. The 
operationalisation of the main independent variable, party ideology shift, is also a complex 
problem to be dealt with. The quality of the data is the important aspect that can influence the 
quality of the analysis. In order to outcome the possible problems, a combination of different 
datasets is utilized. The same approach is applied in the operationalisation and utilization of 
the most adequate variables and methods to test the theoretical assumptions. Having in mind, 
the complexity of the research question, the lack of adequate data and the problem of self-
reported turnout, the research is faced with a conservative environment for testing the 
assumptions. The research design and methodological decisions taken are in order to enable 
46 
 
the best possible conditions which will result with valuable conclusions and contributions to 
the state of the art. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
The new non-voters: An empirical overview and country-level comparison  
 
4.1. Introduction 
The electoral participation of citizens is a serious problem for contemporary democracies. 
While this problem varies from country to country, the general trends show that the number 
of voters who participate at elections is shrinking compared with the level of participation in 
previous decades (Wattenberg 2002, Franklin, 2004, Leighley and Nagler 2014). The crisis of 
participation is one of the most obvious examples of the crisis of democracy (Almond et al 
1960). While the majority of the voter participation literature has been concentrated on 
studying the general trend of lower turnout, only a very small amount of research has been 
focused on studying one particular category of voters – voters that have stopped casting their 
ballot despite their previous record of voting participation. The demobilization of the voters 
has taken a very important number of citizens out of the electoral processes. We know very 
little about these voters. A vast amount of research on voters and non-voters has been 
produced, but even scholars of voter demobilization research (Avey 1989, Rose 1995) do not 
analyse the characteristics of these new non-voters. This thesis attempts to answer exactly the 
following research question: Who are the new non-voters and why do they stop voting? 
As I will show below, the main trends of the low voter turnout research have focused on 
different institutional variables or on socio-economic environment (Blais, 2006). Some other 
approaches have focused on explaining the decline in turnout as a result of the generational 
gap and enfranchisement of the young people to vote (Franklin 2004), while others choose 
more exotic explanations like genes (Fowler et al 2008). While the party system has been 
considered as an important explanatory variable, the main focus has been put on the number 
of parties as the main party system variable (Jackman 1987). The ideological inconsistency of 
the parties, and consequently the ideological instability of the party system, have not been 
considered as a potential explanatory factor for demotivating voters, although a significant 
amount of research has been focused on explaining party ideology changes (Mair 1994, 
Volkens and Klingeman 2001, Kriesi 2008, Gerring 2000, Tomz and van Houweling 2011). 
This is precisely the novelty of the approach of this thesis. 
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In this chapter I shall first discuss the importance of a different approach in investigating the 
demobilization of voters and I will show how the number of new non-voters is an important 
factor that can influence (i) the overall voter turnout, (ii) electoral outcome and (iii) relation 
between the number of new non-voter and country level turnout. In the second part of this 
chapter, building on the voter turnout literature at country level, I disentangle the reasons for 
the significant differences of the number of the new non-voters between countries. The 
chapter concludes with shorter summary of the most interesting findings at country level and 
the importance of the new non-voters in wider electoral context. 
4.2. The declining level of electoral participation and the necessity of focus on a different 
category of citizens  
A vast majority of literature has pointed out the problem with the decline of participation. As 
I have stressed above, Almond (1960) considers the crisis of participation as one of the six 
most important features of the crisis of democracy. Citizens are becoming disaffected with 
the political and economic processes in contemporary democracies (Torcal and Montero 
2006); they are more critical about politics. (Norris 1999) and this directly affects their 
political participation. 
All these levels of declining satisfaction with the major democratic institutions and 
politicians, the observed withdrawal of people from the political process in general, and the 
disappearing popular component of democracy through the decline of membership of the 
political parties, which will be discussed further in the thesis specifically: all point to 
problems with democracy. Essentially, it seems that the concerns for the future of democracy 
are based on changes in political participation. And all three types of political participation 
are not equally affected by these trends of disaffection and criticism. Political participation 
consists broadly of three types: representative, extra-representative, and direct participation. 
While there are clear evidences of growing trends of extra-representative and direct 
participation, the representative or the electoral participation is in decline.  
Much attention has been devoted to the attributes of non-voters as compared to voters and the 
reasons behind their lack of participation in elections. While there is much scholarship 
attesting to the fact that non-voters differ from voters along the key attributes studied like 
demographics, political participation, and political interest and knowledge, to my knowledge 
there is no research on the voters who stopped voting after a previous record of electoral 
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participation. Research has shown that voters and non-voters indeed differ in terms of 
relevant social characteristics and the assumption that politicians take into account voters’ 
interests more strongly appears to be valid (Lutz and Marsh, 2007, Rosema, 2016). The 
majority of the literature has been focused on distinguishing among habitual voters, habitual 
non-voters and intermittent voters (DiCamillo 2006).  The third category represents a sum of 
many different phenomena and it is not able to catch up all the different processes that can 
strongly influence the level of turnout or the electoral outcome. The voters that reentered the 
voting process after abstention might differ from voters that exited from casting their ballot 
although they used to participate at elections before. Secondly, the reasons why these voters 
re-mobilize or drop out are different. Thirdly, this approach does not capture whether voters 
demobilize on a temporary or permanent basis. Fourth, regarding vote choice, there is very 
little evidence whether voters vote for the same party or they swing their vote choice. 
The dominant holistic approach in analysis of the voters has given a very important 
contribution to the research of voting. A lot of puzzles have been solved, a lot of evidence has 
been offered in order to explain why some voters vote, why others do not and how this 
influence voter turnout and vote choice. The necessity of studying different subcategories of 
citizens in the electoral process has also been explored, but numerous research studies have 
focused only on the main two categories of voters: habitual voters and habitual non-voters. 
Significant research has also been conducted on the new eligible voters who start voting after 
the disenfranchisement (Dinas 2010, Smets 2010), but there is lack of any systematic analysis 
of the voters who has been demobilized or remobilized in the electoral process. California 
Voter Foundation (CVF) has released the results of a statewide survey on the attitudes of 
infrequent voters and citizens eligible to vote but not registered. According to their survey, 
the citizens can be divided in the next categories with approximate share of around 45 % of 
regular voters, 25% of non- voters,  and 20 percent of infrequent voters which I divide in two 
same categories of remobilized and new non-voters. Ten percent of the citizens are 
categorized as new eligible voters or the young citizens who gain the right to vote for the first 
time.  
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Figure 4.1. Classification of Voters – California Voter Foundation (2014) 
 
Source: California Voter Foundation (CVF) 
The study of the new non-voters therefore it is a very important contribution to better 
understanding of the electoral process. Studying this category of voters is important because 
they can influence overall electoral participation and this might be an explanation for the 
decline of the voter turnout for some elections. Additionally, in certain close electoral 
competitions, the number of the new non-voters can be decisive for the electoral outcome. 
These voters who have stopped voting can certainly decide the winner of the election process. 
I will discuss further these patterns using data from CSES Module II & III from the period of 
2001-2011. 
Studying new non-voters is important substantially and methodologically. Substantially, it 
will also enable us to understand who these voters are and what the reasons for them to stop 
voting are (i). It allows us to offer and implement a dynamic approach in analyzing the 
electoral process (ii) and to assist with our explaining the reasons why at some elections the 
number of new non-voters is higher, while at others very few voters drop out of casting their 
vote (iii). It assists in offering a theoretical and empirical explanation as to individual motives 
to stop voting (iv), but also reviews other electoral actors, primarily political parties (v) and 
in an analysis of how parties’ behaviour influences voters to stop voting.  
Voters 
Habitual Voters
Habitual Non-Voters
New Non- Voters
Remobilizied Voters
New eligible voters
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Methodologically this thesis differs from the previous research on demobilized voters, in that 
it attempts to identify these voters based on their previous voting record, to disentangle their 
individual characteristics and to investigate this phenomena on the country or party level, by 
identifying the number of voters dropping out based on their individual report whilst not 
using the turnout decline values or the difference of the electoral results of parties between 
two electoral cycles. The operationalization of the dependent variable, hence, differs from all 
other approaches, and this is another novelty of the approach of this thesis. Besides the fact 
that this approach requires a very complex data collection process, and that it faces numerous 
data limitations, which I shall discuss in next chapters, it is the best possible way to answer 
the above-mentioned questions of great importance for the better understanding the electoral 
process as a whole.  
4.3. The new non-voters and channels of participation 
According to the participation typology of Teorell, Torcal and Montero (2007, 340-343) there 
are two dimensions of participation: the channel of expression and the mechanism of 
influence. They base the mechanism of influence dimension on Hirschman’s distinction 
between exit and voice. The exit-based mechanism of influence entails that people can opt 
out of a participation-scene: the authors argue that the logic is the same as for firms and 
consumers on a competitive market – once the quality of a product declines, customers can 
choose to stop buying that product. AS concerns voting, this would mean that people can 
choose to abstain or to vote for a different party. On the other hand, voice-based mechanisms 
of influence involves not so much opting out as putting in effort or participation within the 
participation form in order to get preferences across. While, Teorell et al (2007) (but see also 
Hirschman 1970; Verba et al. 1978) argue that “the voicebased mechanisms of influence are 
often much more manifest than exit-base mechanisms when it comes to preferences and 
demands, it conveys more or more specific information than exit-based mechanisms, and 
pressure is more exercised by the intensity of the arguments”, this is the opposite for the 
voters that stopped voting. These citizens influence electoral processes by exiting from 
further participation and this is how they demonstrate their disappointment with the product’s 
quality decline in the electoral process. This is different than swinging vote choice: the 
message these voters send to political actors is stronger. 
Regarding the channel of expression, Teorell, Torcal and Montero argue for one distinction: 
between participation that takes place with the framework of representation, and participation 
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through extra representative channels of expression. In this perspective, voters that stopped 
voting express their actions within representative channels of participation. They send their 
message to their elected representatives in indicating that something has caused them to drop 
out of voting. Furthermore, if we accept this Teorell et al distinction, the channel of influence 
is crucial dimension of participation for new non-voters, showing their influence by exiting 
the process. Channels of expression are not so crucial in explaining the behaviour of these 
voters who have stopped voting. While their participation through extra representative 
channels of expression can be still very high, their electoral non-participation is the way they 
influence the electoral process.   
4.4. The new non-voters and overall turnout trends 
Research at the aggregate level of voter turnout has shown that the number of variables  
which affect turnout levels is quite large (Powell 1980, 1982, 1986; Jackman 1987; Crepaz, 
1990; Jackman and Miller 1995; Franklin 1996, 2002; Blais 2000; Norris 2002 Smets and 
Van Ham 2012). Some of these approaches have intended to provide a novel explanation of 
the differences in the turnout trends. 
 According to the scholars that emphasize the importance of the generational replacement, 
previous elections that stimulate high turnout leave a high turnout footprint (Franklin 2004). 
And this footprint is a result of the habit of voting that voters have inherited and they are 
practicing in the past, except for the new cohort of the enfranchised voter who may then also 
follow this pattern. Newly enfranchised individuals are known to be particularly less 
interested to participate at elections and to be significantly responsible for such changes as 
occur in the support for existing parties (Campbell et al. 1960; Butler and Stokes 1974; Nie, 
Verba, and Petrocik 1978; Inglehart 1977, 1990, 1997; Rose and McAllister 1990; Franklin et 
al., 1992; Franklin and Ladner 1995; Miller and Shanks 1996). The findings of Franklin at al 
(2004) strongly emphasize the need to take account of generational replacement when 
investigating turnout change. They suggest that by taking into account the size of new cohorts 
we can measure the short-term effects of variables whose values change too frequently to 
have long-term consequences. Their results show that “the decline of the turnout in the 
previous 5 decades of the 20
th
 century are exactly results of the legal enfranchisement of 
voting and changing the age eligibility of younger citizens to participate at elections which in 
long term cause a decline of 3 percentage points” (Franklin, Lyons, Marsh 2004).  
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Other research has stressed the requirements for a different, new approach to understanding 
the mainsprings of turnout change – and hence of turnout decline. There is some concern 
among politicians and commentators that the decline could be the result of increasing 
alienation of contemporary citizens from the political process in their countries, and at least 
one study purports to have established a link between disaffection and lower turnout 
(Teixeira, 1992).  The others have focused on the baseline model (Nie, Verba and Petrocik 
1978), rationale of voting (Ricker and Ordershook 1968) or the role of institutions (Piven and 
Cloward 1994, 2005).   
Figure 4.2 The New Non-Voters and Overall Turnout rates 
 
Source: CSES Module II & III 2001-2011 
None of these approaches has taken into account the importance of the new non-voters. As I 
have shown previously, this category of voters has been understudied and hence the possible 
effect of the new non-voters on turnout trends has not been emphasized and studied 
previously.  There is an important relation between the level of turnout and number of new 
non-voters per country
1
 and this correlation is very high. Figure 1.3.1 which includes 68 
different elections from the period of 2001 to 2011 from CSES Dataset Module II & III 
shows a strong linear negative relationship between the number of the new non-voters and the 
voter turnout. The higher the number of the new non-voters, the lower the turnout level. 
                                                          
1
 The number of the new non-voters is the percentage of the respondents who used to vote at the previous 
elections, but did not vote at the most current elections. This percentage is calculated when the number of these 
respondents is divided by the number of respondents included in the survey per each country 
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These findings strongly confirm the need of studying the new non-voters not only so as to 
understand their characteristics and to scrutinize the reasons why they stop voting as the 
primary goal of this thesis, but because they are very important in order to understand better 
the fluctuations or trends in the voter turnout.  
The data also shows that this phenomenon is most clearly visible in the case with the post-
communist countries. These countries are among the countries with the highest number of 
new non-voters and lowest turnout levels (I will discuss further the reasons for this later in 
the chapter). Except in post-communist countries, a large number of new non-voters exists in 
the cases of Mexican elections 2003 and South Korean elections 2006. The percentages of 
new non-voters are considerably higher in these countries and it are above average.  
Western European countries in general have similar and considerably stable trends of voter 
turnout and number of new non-voters. Switzerland and United States are the only exceptions 
among established western democracies with lower turnout rates, but there is a difference in 
the number of new non-voters. In Switzerland in the elections in both 2003 and 2007 that are 
included in the study, the number of the new non-voters is higher than the average, while in 
US Presidential Elections 2004 there are 7.1 % of new non-voters or lower than the average.   
On the other site of the extreme are the countries with compulsory voting, the number of new 
non-voters in these countries in very low and the turnout levels are very high. In general, the 
majority of the countries are characterized by medium level of voter turnout which fluctuates 
from 55% to 65%, and a medium number of new non-voters which is around 10 percent. 
There is not even one single election in the data that is characterized with very high turnout 
and large number of new non-voters. 
While there is not any confirmation so far for causality between these processes, and it is not 
clear which phenomenon influences the other, these data demonstrate that voters that have 
voted and decided to stop voting should be studied in detail. Although, the thesis does not 
have an ambition to analyse the turnout levels, it is clear from Figure 4.2 that these 
phenomena are strongly related. No previous research has focused on understanding who 
these voters are, what their number is and whether they directly influence the turnout levels. 
Nevertheless, the patterns I presented above and the ones I will present below emphasize the 
importance of new non-voters as a crucial component of the voting population.  
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4.6. The new non-voters and closeness of electoral outcome
2
 
The other reason for the importance of the new non-voters as a different component of the 
electoral process is the possible effect of the number of these citizens on the electoral 
outcome. In a particularly close and competitive electoral environment the voters that have 
stopped voting can be a decisive factor that directly influences the winner of the elections. 
Closeness of electoral outcome has an important role in the electoral process. It also seems 
clear that voters respond to the salience of an election, turning out in larger numbers when the 
race is a close one and when if offers the opportunity for consequential departures in public 
policy (Franklin and Hirczy de Mino, 1998; Blais, 2000; Franklin, 2001). 
Figure 4.3 The New Non-Voters and the Closeness of the Electoral Outcome  
 
Source: CSES Module II & III 2001-2011 
On the other hand, according to the rational choice theory, Riker and Ordeshook (1968), 
elaborating the ideas of Downs (1957), pointed out that the chances of any one vote affecting 
the outcome of an election for nation-wide public office were virtuall zero – even in a close 
race. For this reason, they went on to argue, “people (unless they had quite unreasonable 
                                                          
2
 The closeness is calculated as the difference in the electoral results between the first and the second political 
party or coallition 
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expectations about the importance of their vote) could not be voting with the purpose of 
benefiting from the outcome” (Riker and Ordeshook 1968:28). Nevertheless, the Figure 4.3 
shows some other patterns. There is a linear and positive relationship between the number of 
new non-voters and closeness of electoral outcome. In the majority of the cases included in 
the sample the number of the new non-voters is larger compared with the difference between 
the two closest parties or candidates. In a particular electoral environment like Greece or 
Italy
3
, or majoritarian FPTP systems as United Kingdom or USA, even a slight difference 
between political parties or candidates can decide which party or candidate will be in power. 
Additionally, as the number of new non-voters are not equally distributed between parties 
some of the parties lose more of their previous voters than others and this influences their 
electoral success.  
The majority of the cases in Figure 2.3 are characterized with a medium number of new non-
voters and a medium difference between two most successful parties or candidates at the 
elections. While in those elections that are not particularly close, even when the number of 
new non-voters is higher, it is hard to claim that the number of the new non-voters decides 
the winner; there are a very large number of cases when this claim can be easily 
hypothesized. The data clearly shows that voters who used to cast the ballot and then stopped 
participating at elections can influence the electoral process and be a decisive factor 
regarding the electoral winner.  
Digging deeper in the data it seems that the effect of the number of new non-voters on the 
closeness of electoral outcome is biggest in proportional representation electoral systems with 
medium number of political parties. In 2003 in Belgium, aside from the small number of new 
non-voters, their effect on the electoral outcome could be very big taking into account only 
0.5 percentage point difference between two major political parties. In Finland 2003 and 
2007 the number of new non-voters is much bigger and hence the possible effect stronger, 
taking into account once again that differences between major parties were smaller than 1 
percent. Similar cases are those of Germany, Denmark, USA etc. On the other extreme there 
are countries like Sweden and New Zealand, where the number of new non-voters is very 
small and the difference between two major parties very big. The Polish elections of 2001 
                                                          
3
 The electoral legislature in these countries enables the party with the most votes, no matter how small or big 
the difference with the second most successful party, receives additional seats in the Parliament in order that a 
governmental stability be secured. 
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represent a clear extreme case with the highest percentage of new non-voters in the sample 
and the biggest difference between two major political parties. 
Non-competitive elections cause lower turnout and possibly a higher number of new non-
voters. Similar to the previous graph, at this stage of the research I do not tend to disentangle 
or discuss the possible endogeneity or reversed causality effect; the intentions with the graphs 
is to provide solely descriptive evidence from electoral data which will emphasize the 
importance of these new non-voters for the electoral process. These new non-voters used to 
participate at elections, they supported a certain political party and manifested a higher level 
of political consciousness. Their decision to stop voting at the next elections therefore can 
directly influence the power balance between parties and hence drive the electoral process.   
4.7. The new non-voters and turnout differences between two electoral cycles
4
 
The third important reason for studying the new non-voters is their relation with the turnout 
differences between two electoral cycles. In the first place, turnout varies from election to 
election both up and down; and while it is possible to imagine secular trends in civic virtue, it 
is hard to imagine what would cause it to fluctuate both up and down from election to 
election (Franklin 2004). Numerous previous research studies have missed out on taking the 
new non-voters into account when investigating the reasons for turnout changes and, more 
concretely, the decline of the turnout. The main conclusion drawn from the previous research 
has been focused on insisting on institutional changes or generational evidences for the 
decline in spite of searching for reasons among the voters that have used to participate at 
previous elections.  
Figure 2.4 shows that a slight majority of cases in the dataset have been faced with decline of 
the turnout between two elections in the period of 2001-2011. We can observe three different 
trends in the data: (i) Most of elections are characterized with turnout fluctuations around 10 
percent or less. The fluctuations are usually smaller which means that the turnout levels are 
more or less stable with certain shocks that cause bigger and more dramatic changes.  (ii) The 
countries that faced only very small changes of the turnout rates have also very small number 
of new non-voters. Most of the cases with small turnout fluctuations are characterized with a 
smaller number of new non-voters. The number of these cases in the sample is also 
considerably large.  (iii) The data also shows that the countries with largest number of new 
                                                          
4
 The turnout difference between two electoral cycles is calculated when the turnout percentage at the previous 
elections at time (t-1) is subtracted with the turnout percentage at the most current elections at time t  
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non-voters have faced decline of their electoral participation during two elections. These 
three trends confirm the importance of the new non-voters as a separate category of citizens 
worthy of further research.  
Figure 4.4 The new non-voters and turnout differences between two electoral cycles 
 
Source: CSES Module II & III 2001-2011 
While it is puzzling as to what causes turnout decline, and why certain variables influence the 
electoral participation in certain elections and in others they do not (Franklin 2004), the 
figure shows a negative and significant relationship between the number of new non-voters 
and the turnout fluctuations between those two electoral cycles. A very high number of new 
non-voters that rises above 20 percent results in a turnout decline compared with the level of 
participation from the previous elections.  
Turnout is a very complex phenomenon, and many different factors and categories influences 
its fluctuation. The new non-voters are only one of the demobilizing components which cause 
negative trends in the overall participation. Whether the turnout will be down or up, 
comparisons with the previous elections depend of the ability of political actors to mobilize 
more voters than the ones they have demobilized. This thesis, as I have stressed before, does 
not have as an intention to study the turnout trends and reasons for it. However, with this 
graph, as with the previous two, it tends only to emphasize the importance of the new non-
voters in a broader electoral context. On the other hand, studying a different category of 
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citizens will contribute to better understand the electorate, reasons why some voters stop and 
the others continue to vote and last but not the least how many voters stop voting and do they 
differ significantly from habitual voters and non-voters.  
4.8. What has driven voters to stop voting, and why are there differences between 
countries?  
Voting is not only a process of selection of new political elites.  The act of voting is a 
confirmation of the legitimacy of the system (Rokkan 1962), and one of the main features 
that determines the health of a democracy (Blais et al. 2001). Voting is the act that enables 
the mass inclusion of citizens in the political process. Furthermore, regardless of divided 
opinions (Schumpeter 1962), voting is fundamental for democracy. Therefore the relevance 
of the debate among political scientists about the importance of full participation at elections 
is never exhausted. While significant political thinkers consider full participation as a clear 
sign of the legitimacy of the political system and the only way of electing the best possible 
political elite (Lijphart 1997: 2, Tingsten 1963: 230), others claim full participation causes a 
lower quality of political decisions, as a poorer and less-educated majority votes and makes 
political decisions which can result in totalitarianism or populist regimes.  
The empirical facts do not give a clear confirmation of any of these simplified and polarized 
claims. High turnout can also be a characteristic of democratic regimes, while low turnout is 
not necessarily a feature of developed countries. Many different factors influence differences 
in turnout between countries as well as the differences in the number of new non-voters per 
country. 
Based on the most influential theories on differences of the turnout levels in different 
countries, I will offer an explanation for the differences in the number of the new non-voters 
per country. As it has been shown above, there is a strong linear and negative relationship 
between the turnout levels and number of new non-voters per country. From the pioneering 
works on the determinants of voter turnout by Powell (1982, 1986) and Jackman (1987) until 
some of the most recent research (Leighley and Nagler 2014), several sets of variables have 
been identified as factors that affect electoral participation. According to Powell (1982), the 
main variables that enhance turnout are “nationally competitive districts” and “strong party – 
group linkages”. “Nationally competitive districts” affect voter participation and turnout level 
because the incentive for political parties is to motivate voters to vote in all parts of the 
country, and not only in swing constituencies or states, as is the case in the US. Similarly, in 
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states where groups such as religious organisations, professional associations, trade unions or 
other different youth or women’s’ organizations are clearly associated and affiliated with a 
certain political party, the vote choice is simpler and voter turnout is higher. Powell, 1982, 
22). As a consequence, the number of new non-voters will be smaller in countries with 
nationally competitive districts, because the incentive of these voters to stop voting is lower, 
regardless of changes in other circumstances. Similarly with party-group linkages, voters that 
are closely affiliated with some of the organizational groups are more likely to continue 
voting than those that do not belong to any group or union. 
Jackman (1987) has strongly emphasized the impact of institutional variables. His research 
has identified five institutional variables that enhance turnout. According to him “nationally 
competitive districts”, a greater number of parties, unicameralism, electoral disproportionality 
and compulsory voting all influence voter turnout. However, Jackman’s research excludes the 
impact of the strong party – group linkages identified by Powell, and his analysis does not 
integrate the socio-economic environment as a determinant of the differences in turnout 
among countries (Blais 2006). 
This primary research on the variables that affect turnout, especially Powell’s model, 
differentiates three different sets of variables which take into account (i) the social and 
economic environment, (ii) the constitutional setting (institutions in the strict sense of the 
term), and (iii) party systems and election outcomes (Powell, 1982). Furthermore, according 
to Blais (2006), Powell’s sequential model, “which includes a distant set of variables 
(socioeconomic), an intermediate set (institutions), and more proximate factors (party 
systems and election outcomes) established the basis of the research on the differences 
among voter turnout at country level” (Blais 2006). The most important literature on voting 
behaviour has followed this pioneering research by offering a comprehensive explanation of 
factors that influence voter participation at elections, but with contradictory findings 
concerning the main reasons why voters vote at all, and why they decide to stop participating 
in elections. The following subsections will offer a brief review of the impact of the 
abovementioned set of variables, including the additional explanation of the determinants of 
voter turnout in consolidated democracies, and more concretely, the reasons why voters stop 
voting in post-communist countries. 
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4.8.1. Institutions that influence voters to stop voting 
Starting with a systematized analysis of the determinants of voter turnout differences among 
countries, institutional variables are the first whose impact has been emphasized. The main 
set of most commonly used institutional variables include compulsory voting, electoral 
systems, unicameralism, as well the availability of voting, vote age enfranchisement and 
similar variables. All these variables simultaneously also affect the number of voters that stop 
voting per country.  
It is conventional wisdom that compulsory turnout increases turnout. The majority of prior 
research has shown that compulsory voting boosts turnout by around 10 to 15 percentage 
points (Blais & Carty 1990; Blais & Dobrzynska 1998; Franklin 1996, 2004; Blais & Aarts 
2005, Blais 2006). Nevertheless, as Blais (2006) stresses in his research of systematizing and 
summarizing the determinants of the voter turnout among different countries, the effect of 
compulsory voting mainly depends upon whether it is followed by sanctions and in particular 
the nature of these sanctions.  
The effect of compulsory voting also differs between countries. Norris (2002) shows that 
compulsory voting increases turnout only in “older” democracies.  According to her 
assumptions, this might be a result of less strict enforcement of the law elsewhere or that its 
impact is conditional on the presence of broader norms regarding the desirability of obeying 
the law (Blais 2006). Additionally, Fornos et al. (2004), without controlling for the specific 
contribution of sanctions and their degree of enforcement, establish a four-point compulsory 
voting scale, which shows a strong impact of compulsory voting on turnout in Latin America, 
the region with the highest frequency of compulsory voting laws. On the other side, Blais et 
al. (2003), using a sample that includes established and consolidating countries, find that 
compulsory voting makes a difference only when there are sanctions. 
  Compulsory voting will also affect the number of new non-voters per country. The number 
of such voters that have stopped voting will differ among countries as a result of the existence 
of compulsory voting. It is expected that the number of these new non-voters will be lower in 
countries with compulsory voting than in countries where there is no legal obligation for 
voting. Additionally, in countries where there are sanctions for non-voters, the number of 
voters that have stopped voting will be even smaller compared to countries without sanctions. 
Furthermore, it is expected that the number of new non-voters will be smaller even in those 
countries where there is no longer compulsory voting, but where in the past there had been a 
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legal obligation to vote. The habit of voting of citizens in these countries is stronger 
compared to countries where there is no tradition of compulsory voting. While this effect is 
expected to be smaller, it can still drive some patterns. 
The electoral system has also shown a significant effect on voter turnout variation between 
countries. As Blais (2006) shows “studies that have been confined to advanced democracies 
(Blais & Carty 1990, Jackman & Miller 1995, Franklin 1996, Radcliff & Davis 2000) as well 
as one study of turnout in post- communist countries (Kostadinova 2003) have confirmed that 
turnout is higher in proportional representation (PR) and/or larger districts, whereas research 
dealing with Latin America reports no association (Perez-Linan 2001, Fornos et al. 2004), 
and an analysis that incorporates both established and non-established democracies concludes 
that the electoral system has a weak effect (Blais & Dobrzynska 1998)” (Blais 2006).  
The number of new non-voters per country should also be influenced by the electoral system. 
The expectation is that proportional representation will diminish the number of new non-
voters, while countries with majoritarian electoral systems will be characterized by higher 
numbers of new non-voters. The expectation is that the electoral system will have a low 
effect on the number of these new non-voters per country. 
While unicameralism is also widely considered as an important determinant of cross-country 
voter turnout variance, the findings are mixed and therefore somewhat confusing. As Blais 
(2006) summarizes, positive results are reported by Jackman (1987), Jackman & Miller 
(1995), and Fornos et al. (2004). On the other side, other research shows no effect (Blais & 
Carty (1990), Black (1991), Radcliff & Davis (2000), and Perez-Linan (2001)). “Siaroff & 
Merer (2002) find support for the hypothesis that “turnout is lower where there is a “relevant” 
directly elected president and where there are strong regional governments”. Blais & Carty 
(1990) and Black (1991) indicate that turnout is not higher in federal countries (Blais 2006, 
Cox 2015). 
The impact of this variable on the variance of the number of new non-voters per country 
should be very limited. Given that only first order elections will be taken into consideration, 
this variable should not have important explanatory power for the number of voters that have 
stopped voting.  
Various other institutional variables have been included in previous important research on 
voter turnout determinants. While Franklin (2004) considers voting age enfranchisement as a 
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main variable in explaining the variation in voter turnout over time, this variable should not 
influence the number of voters that have stopped voting per country unless there are some 
institutional changes over the period under analysis in this paper. Additionally, Franklin 
argues that the age of enfranchisement influences mainly new young voters who are supposed 
to develop their voting habit. The analysis of the reasons for voters to stop voting is not 
concerned with this phenomenon, since it analyses the moment when they have stopped 
voting and not when they first engaged in voting.  
The availability of voting is a considerably important factor influencing turnout, and it is 
expected that it could influence the number of new non-voters per country. Systems where 
the voting is easily approachable should be characterized by fewer new non-voters, while 
countries with more conservative methods of voting should have higher numbers of new non-
voters. However as Blais (2006) reports, “Norris (2002) examines the effect of specific rules 
(number of polling days, polling on rest day, postal voting, proxy voting, special polling 
booths, transfer voting, and advance voting), and she finds no significant effect, while Blais et 
al. (2003) created a summary scale that reflects the presence or absence of postal, advance, 
and proxy voting, and they find a rather strong positive association between the presence of 
such voting facilities and turnout” (Blais 2006).  
4.8.2. How socio-economic environment determinates the variation of new non-voters per 
country 
Blais (2006, 2015) shows that, while not to the same extent as institutional variables, socio-
economic environment has also been seriously considered as an explanatory factor of the 
turnout variation. The most explored socio-economic variable is the economic situation in the 
country. The majority of research has confirmed “relatively strong support for the hypothesis 
that turnout is higher in economically advanced countries (Blais & Dobrzynska 1998, Norris 
2002, Fornos et al. 2004). The relationship is not linear, the main difference being between 
the poorest countries and all others (Blais & Dobrzynska 1998)” (Blais 2006). No clear 
pattern has been found regarding economic downturns. While a certain number of voting 
behaviour scholars claim that economic downturns negatively influence turnout levels, others 
have shown that when the economy is faced with negative cycle, the turnout increases when 
there are high and low levels of welfare spending but goes down at intermediate levels 
(Radcliffe 1992). Previous research has shown that the most likely outcome is a “nil overall 
effect” (Blais 2006), and this is what has been confirmed in vast majority of studies which 
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include this variable (Arcelus & Meltzer 1975, Blais & Dobrzynska 1998, Blais 2000, 
Kostadinova 2003, Fornos et al. 2004).  
Considering only the number of new non-voters per country, it is expected that economic 
cycles will influence the cross-country variation. While economic growth should decrease the 
number of the new non-voters per country, a fall in GNP per capita compared with the 
previous year should increase the number of non-voters.  Economic downturns are expected 
to influence the variation of the number of voters that have stopped voting per country. 
Building on the economic voting theory, this paper will also test whether variation within the 
aggregated level of economic self-evaluation affects the number of these new non-voters. 
Furthermore, building on the Fiorina (1981) theory of retrospective voting, aggregated trends 
of the retrospective economic situation will be included in the econometric model. 
Additionally, the aggregated level of satisfaction with democracy will also be tested as an 
explanatory factor that may determine the variance of the number of new non-voters per 
country.  
A very significant amount of previous research has investigated the influence of country size 
on turnout rates. Since Powell (1982) has shown that “turnout tends to be higher in smaller 
nations, but that the relationship is not statistically significant”, the most influential analyses 
thereafter have neglected this line of inquiry, especially Jackman (1987) and Franklin (1996, 
2004) Blais 2006). Nevertheless, Blais and Carty (1990), Blais and Dobrzynska (1998), and 
Rose (2004) have indicated that the highest turnout rates are among the smallest countries 
(Malta, Luxemburg) and that this is a result of “stronger social networks in smaller 
communities and the fact that smaller countries have fewer electors per elected member, 
which makes it easier for candidates and parties to mobilize the vote” (Rose 2004). 
4.8.3. The influence of party systems and electoral outcome on the number of new non-
voters per country 
Party systems and electoral outcome have been widely considered as variables that affect 
turnout, but analysis has mainly been focused only on two variables: the number of parties 
and the closeness of electoral outcome. The majority of previous research has brought 
contrasting findings regarding the effect of the number of political parties on voter turnout. 
The logical inference drawn is that turnout should rise with the number of parties because, 
firstly, voters have greater opportunity to choose the party they prefer, or that which is closer 
to their ideological or political standings; and, secondly, because there is a greater electoral 
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mobilization when there are more parties. However, this has not been empirically confirmed 
in most of the tested econometric models. 
One of the reasons for this can be found in the possible negative effects of the 
fractionalization of party systems, which makes it more likely that a government will be 
formed by a coalition of parties (Jackman 1987, Blais 2006). This makes elections less 
decisive and leaves voters little say in electing their government (Downs 1957). While the 
majority of research has found a negative correlation between the number of parties and 
turnout, as Blais (2006) has correctly summarized, the inverse argument that coalition-
government suppresses turnout has not been empirically confirmed. Therefore the 
relationship between the number of parties and turnout is contentious and may be highly 
influenced by context.  
The same intuition applies to new non-voters. The number of political parties should have an 
important impact on their decision to keep casting their ballot or not to participate at 
elections. If the party closest to the voter’s preferences “has betrayed” her expectations, it is 
more likely to expect that this voter would easily find a party that more closely represents her 
political attitudes or interests in a multi–party system than in a two-party system. Therefore, 
based on logical intuition, it is expected that the larger the number of parties, the lower the 
number of new non-voters. This assumption will be tested. 
The same controversy surrounds the most tested electoral outcome variable. While the fact 
that the closeness of electoral outcome boosts turnout is one of the most firmly established 
findings in the electoral participation research, with a positive effect in 27 out of 32 studies 
(Blais, 2000, 60), the debate still exists as to whether this is applicable to every electoral 
system and what the magnitude of impact is. Franklin (2004) claims that closeness boosts 
turnout only in plurality systems, while the effect does not exist in PR systems; Blais and 
Dobryzinska however have found the impact of this variable to be very small.  Another very 
important element should be the way this variable is operationalised.  
The number of new non-voters should be smaller in countries where the electoral outcome is 
very close. Based on previous research, the expectations are that this effect should be small, 
but with a clear direction. On the other hand, regarding the type of electoral system (and 
taking into consideration that the sample of analysis includes different electoral systems), the 
expectations are that the closeness of the electoral outcome will generally impact the number 
of the new non-voters, without further analysis of the type of the system.   
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In general, the research of the impact of the party system on the turnout or number of new 
non-voters is limited and therefore does not explore all the possible explanatory solutions. As 
I will attempt to show later, some of the important determinants of the number of the new 
non-voters should be the “ideologisation of the party system” and “ideological shifting of the 
party systems”. 
4.8.4. Established vs. consolidated democracies: Are there different patterns in the number 
of new non-voters per country? 
The patterns of voter turnout are different between established democracies and consolidated 
democracies. While turnout rates in established democracies are slowly declining, the trends 
are generally stable. In consolidating democracies and especially post-communist countries 
these trends are different. Turnout in post-communist countries in the first democratic 
elections after the fall of communism was characterized by very high rates, in several cases 
close to full participation, but instantly followed by dramatic decline. The current turnout 
rates are lower than in the majority of established democracies excluding the USA and 
Switzerland. There are several theoretical explanations for this phenomenon. 
The so-called ‘stakes-based’ hypothesis (Pacek, Pop-Eleches and Tucker 2009) is based on 
the claim that people participate when it matters more. At the beginning of a transition (i.e. 
when the authoritarian regime is breaking down), it matters the most because the form of the 
new political regime is to be decided. In contrast, once the new (democratic) regime is in 
place and consolidated, the stakes are no longer as high. The nature of the main political 
issues usually ceases to be constitutional (or constitutional-like) and the time of less 
mobilizing business-as-usual politics begins, which translates into lower turnout levels. 
Another popular ‘disenchantment’ hypothesis (Kostadinova and Power 2007, Kostadinova 
2004) considers the high initial participation rates rather as a result of generalized enthusiasm 
and citizens’ unrealistically boosted expectations of the new democratic regime. The 
subsequent voting decline is then due to a democratic disenchantment caused by the 
confrontation with ‘real’ democratic political life, where many of these expectations are not – 
and even cannot be – met. 
Other theories claim that the more the democratic regime is economically inefficient and 
corrupt, the higher the decline in turnout. On the other hand, lower turnout is also a 
systematic characteristic of the democratic transition no matter the context. Nevertheless, the 
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general conclusion based on the abovementioned theories, is that the electorate in 
consolidated democracies is not as stable as in established ones. This is an important feature 
that shapes the expectations about the number of new non-voters in consolidating 
democracies. Based on the theoretical and empirical implications, it is expected that the 
number of new non-voters in post-communist countries will be higher in comparison with 
established democracies.  The party systems are very volatile (Lewis 2005), the emergence of 
new political parties is a regular feature of these systems (Eneydi 2009) and the level of 
political trust in institutions is very low (Rose, 1995). On the other hand, the turnout decline 
rates were highest at the beginning of the democratic transition and after that the fluctuations 
are not so dramatic (Rose, 2003). This can also influence the number of new non-voters per 
country.  In order to control the effect of the different patterns of democratic consolidation, a 
dummy variable for the post-communist countries will be constructed in the econometric 
model.  
4.9. How many voters stop voting in different countries and why?  
The number of new non-voters differs per country. Different political and social 
circumstances or specific electoral contexts could influence voters to stop voting.   Table 4.1 
shows that the mean of the new non-voters per country is 9.14 taking into account 65 
different electoral studies. More than 9 percent of the voters who have participated at the 
previous elections stopped voting in the most recent one. This is a very important percentage 
of the electorate that has been demobilized between only two electoral cycles. Taking into 
account already elaborated problems of over-reporting and the social desirability effect 
(Schwartzer et al 2012), this finding sounds the alarm for the importance of studying these 
new non-voters. On the other hand, the difference between the country with the lowest 
number and highest number of new non-voters is also very interesting for analysis.  
Table 4.1 New Non-Voter: Summary Statistics 
 
New Non-Voter 
 
Obs 
 
Mean 
 
St. Dv. 
 
Min 
 
Max 
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9.14 
 
5.95 
 
1.09 
 
29.35 
 
Source: CSES Module II & III 2001-2011 
The percentage of new non-voters is only 1.09 at the elections in the Netherlands 2002, while 
the highest percentage of new non-voters exists in the Polish elections in 2001. While voter 
turnout in the Netherlands is considerably high, there has also been compulsory voting in the 
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past which could be one of the explanations for the high level of voting habits among the 
Dutch electorate. For Poland, on the other hand, as a post-communist country, it is also 
highly expected that the number of new non-voters be higher. Nevertheless, considering the 
fact that the elections have been organized in 2001, or one decade after the first founding 
elections after the fall of the communism, the very high number of new non-voters goes 
beyond the explanations of the “disenchantment” hypothesis.  
Taking into consideration the post-communist background of the countries, there are very 
important differences between these two groups of countries. Table 4.2 shows that the 
average percentage of new non-voters among post-communist countries is about 4.5 
percentage points higher compared with countries without a communist background. 
Table 4.2 New Non-Voters in Post-Communist Countries 
 
New Non-Voter 
 
Obs 
 
Mean 
 
St. Dv. 
 
Min 
 
Max 
 
Post-communist 
 
16 
 
12.44 
 
6.42 
 
5.78 
 
29.34 
 
Non-communist 
 
49 
 
8.07 
 
5.44 
 
1.09 
 
27.97 
 
Source: CSES Module II & III 2001-2011 
While the average percentage of new non-voters in post-communist countries is 12.44, this 
percentage is 8.07 among consolidated countries and even lower than the mean. The 
explanations are different. Firstly, the stakes are not so high in each consecutive election 
during the transition and therefore voters do not see a high motivation to keep voting. On the 
other hand, the economic inefficiency, high level of corruption and high unemployment rates 
also demotivates voters to keep voting. Thirdly, the instability of the party system, high level 
of electoral volatility and constant emergence of new parties as well as ideological 
inconsistency and instable ideological definition of the parties contributes to voters feeling 
disaffected and to stop voting. The level of trust in politicians and institutions is lower than in 
consolidated democracies (Rose 1995).  In the end, after the almost full participation at the 
first elections after the fall of communism, citizens felt disenchanted by this democratic 
benefit. 
Compulsory voting has also been considered as an important determinant that affects voter 
turnout. The effect differs depending upon whether there is enforced compulsory voting with 
sanctions or there is no system of punishment for the ones that have not voted. While this 
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relationship is not always supported by the empirical findings, table 4.3 shows clear patterns. 
The countries with compulsory voting indeed have lower numbers of new non-voters and 
additionally the number of new non-voters is about 5 percent lower among countries with 
enforced compulsory voting than in those without. 
Table 4.3 Compulsory Voting 
 
New Non-Voter 
 
Obs 
 
Mean 
 
St. Dv. 
 
Min 
 
Max 
 
Enforced compulsory 
 
5 
 
3.98 
 
2.68 
 
1.16 
 
7.5 
 
Non-enforced compulsory 
 
6 
 
8.37 
 
7.75 
 
1.95 
 
1.18 
 
No compulsory voting 
 
54 
 
9.71 
 
5.80 
 
1.09 
 
29.34 
 
Source: CSES Module II & III 2001-2011 
While the number of observations for the first two categories is considerably low, the results 
have shown very clear patterns of the effect of compulsory voting on the number of new non-
voters. In this sense compulsory voting is a demotivating factor for voters to stop voting, 
regardless of other circumstances or whether parties are ideologically inconsistent or not.  
Table 4.4 Size of the country 
Size of the Country New Non-Voter Per Country 
 
Very small 
 
3.22 
 
Small 8.17 
 
Medium 9.25 
 
Large 10.37 
 
Very large 11.21 
 
 Source: CSES Module II & III 2001-2011 
While size has not been seriously considered as an important factor in explaining turnout, 
some scholars have reported that the larger the country the lower the turnout. Although not 
every study has come to the same conclusions, the results from Table 4.4 show that the size 
of the country gives some clear pattern about the number of new non-voters per country. The 
results clearly show that the larger the country, the higher the percentage of the new non-
voters.  
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The size, nonetheless, does not play a very crucial role when explaining why voters stop 
voting, but the findings below in the table could also influence the other independent 
variables, especially taking into consideration the limited number of observations. The 
difference in the number of new non-voters between the very small and very large countries 
is 8 percent, and the relationship is very linear following the increase of the size of the 
countries. 
The number of new non-voters differs among countries with different electoral systems. 
Table 4.5 shows that the percentage of non-voters is lower among countries with proportional 
representation in comparison with countries which have plurality electoral systems or, more 
concretely, “first past the post” systems. On the other hand, the number of new non-voters is 
lower when there is a mixed system, but slightly higher when compared with proportional 
representation. The number of observations for the other electoral systems does not leave a 
comfortable space for more broad interpretation of the numbers. Nevertheless, findings for 
the influence of the electoral systems once again confirm the expected direction.  
Table 4.5 Type of the Electoral System 
Electoral System New Non-Voter per Country 
 
FPTP 
 
 
11.25 
Single Transferable Vote 
 
5.53 
Single Non Transferable Vote 
 
6.03 
Proportional Representation 8.59 
 
Mixed systems 
 
 
10.71 
Electoral College 7.10 
Source: CSES Module II & III 2001-2011 
These results confirm that the majoritarian electoral systems have stronger de-motivational 
power compared with the others. This is a consequence of the fact that not all majoritarian 
districts are competitive and therefore political parties are not highly motivated to strongly 
compete in these areas. Regarding this, the way how political parties behave in these 
situations is an interesting phenomenon. On the one hand, they can try to implement a 
completely different strategy and to change their ideological standings or to nominate a 
71 
 
candidate with opposite ideological standings to the formal party positions, or they may 
simply abandon any interest in ideological or cadre shift because they do not expect an 
electoral victory. Therefore, their voters can be easily demotivated to participate at elections 
no matter the fact that they have cast their ballot previously.  
Ideology is one of the crucial mobilizating factors for political parties. Citizens choose the 
party they will vote for according to how close that party’s ideology is to their personal 
beliefs (Downs 1957). Consequently, when a party changes its ideological standings, many 
voters will no longer feel represented by it. Voters have two choices: while certain voters 
may shift their votes, becoming swing or floating voters (Mayer 2008, Battaglini, Morton & 
Palfrey 2008, Klaasen 2007), an important number of voters may decide not to vote any more 
and to become new non-voters.  
Table 4.6 Direction of the Ideological Shift 
Direction of the Ideological Shift New Non-Voter per Country 
 
Left 
 
9.80 
 
Slightly left 
 
8.19 
 
Same 
 
14.39 
 
Slightly right 
 
8.65 
 
Right 
 
3.53 
Source: CSES Module II & III 2001-2011 
Another very important ideological shift indicator is the direction of the shift. Additionally, 
this indicator can be an even stronger explanatory factor than the quantity of the shift, taking 
into consideration the fact that voters consider predominantly only the shift of the political 
party they supported at the previous elections. Therefore, the direction of the ideological shift 
of the party system is also dependent on the ideological standings of new non-voters. 
Measuring the average scores of the self-placing on the Left-Right scale in the CSES Datasets 
Module II & III 2001-2011, the ideological positions of new non-voters are slightly more on 
the right comparing with voters that kept voting who self-placed themselves closer to the 
center than the new non-voters. Table 4.6 shows the percentage of new non-voters is higher 
when the ideological shift of the party is more towards the left compared with when the 
ideological shift of the party system is on the right. These findings correspond with the fact 
that the average ideological standings of new non-voters are more to the right than those of 
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other voters. While from the results in Table 4.6 it can be concluded that the relation between 
the number of new non-voters and the direction of the shift is an inverted “U” curve, the 
subsamples for every category are too small for such a general conclusion, and secondly the 
direction of the shift does not capture the shifts of the individual parties, especially when their 
scores and directions are neutralizing as in this case.   
4.10. Conclusion 
The aim of this chapter was to emphasize the importance of the new non-voters in a broader 
electoral context. On one hand, studying a different category of citizens will contribute to 
better understand the electorate, reasons why some voters stop and the others continue to vote 
and last but not the least how many voters stop voting and do they differ significantly from 
habitual voters and non-voters. The contextual analysis of the relationship between the 
percentage of the new non-voters and (i) the overall turnout rates, (ii) the differences between 
turnout rates in two consecutive elections and (iii) the closeness of the electoral outcome 
shows that the number of the new non-voters can significantly influence the level of 
participation and the outcome of the elections. There is a clear strong negative correlation 
between the percentage of the new non-voters and the turnout levels which goes in line with 
my claim that this group can influence the participation levels on aggregate level.     
Analysing the differences of the percentage of the new non-voters among different countries, 
results show that the countries that have a higher percentage of new non-voters are those with 
a communist past and those that do not have compulsory voting. The size of these countries is 
larger and the number of new non-voters is higher among countries with majoritarian 
electoral systems. While new non-voters are ideologically self-placed more on the right than 
other voters, the ideological shift of the party system to the left causes higher number of 
voters not to cast their ballot. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
Why voters stop participating at elections? – How parties influence this 
decision? 
 
5.1. Introduction 
A shrinking number of citizens are exercising their right to vote (Abramson and Aldrich, 
1982; Cassel and Luskin, 1988; Jackman, 1987). The golden age of voter participation has 
long finished, but the crisis of the participation (Almond 1960) in contemporary democracies 
is exacerbated by even more concerning parameters. A significant number of voters have 
stopped voting. Citizens, instead of shifting their vote from one party to another, increasingly 
decide to simply stop voting altogether. 
The aim of this chapter is to discover which factors influence voters to decide not to 
participate at elections despite their previous habit of voting. The individual, party and 
country level variables will be taken into consideration when explaining the reasons for 
voters to stop voting. Additionally, this chapter argues that political parties and their 
ideological inconsistence are a reason why voters feel unrepresented, disaffected and lacking 
in a sense of social trust. Therefore, the research will focus particularly on political parties 
and how their behaviour contributes to the fact that citizens stop participating in elections. An 
important aspect of the research is dedicated to party ideology and how a change in the 
ideology of the parties, measured by their manifestos and electoral programs, influences the 
increase in the number of the new non-voters. 
While voting behaviour literature has been more deeply dedicated in investigating the factors 
that influence why voters do not vote and the consequences of the non-voting on the country 
level turnout, very few research has been focused on discovering the factors why voters that 
have already voted at elections, at one point decide to stop participating. Some of the main 
and leading approaches like Rational Choice Theory and Habitual Voter Theory fail to give 
an adequate explanation about the behaviour of this category of new non-voters. They differ 
from the habitual voters or non-voters because they used to participate at previous elections 
and decided not to vote in the next elections. Their behaviour has been changed as a result of  
certain factors that this chapter attempts to investigate. The rational choice theory of 
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irrationality of voting also is not able to explain why a person voted and after then stopped 
participating. This chapter offers a model where individual-level, party-level and country-
level variables are taken into consideration as explanatory factors for shifting from voting to 
non-voting. 
The chapter is organized in seven sections. The following section presents the puzzle and 
explains the author’s starting position in the conceptualization, the theoretical and statistical 
model. The following section of the chapter offers a theoretical explanation of the voters that 
stopped voting followed with a brief review of the literature that analyses the turnout, and a 
theoretical overview of the party transformation and their ideological and policy 
inconsistence. In the fourth section, I will present my research question and hypotheses, 
before I discuss the dataset, the statistical model that is tested and its variables. The main 
findings of my analysis and interpretation of the results are shown in section five. The paper 
ends with concluding remarks on the results and a discussion of methodological aspects. 
5.2. The Puzzle  
The problem of low voter participation in democratic societies is very prominent. The last 
several decades are characterized by a decline in voter turnout. On the individual level, 
citizens also demonstrate a very high level of dissatisfaction with governmental performance. 
The distrust in the social and political institutions in the last two decades is significantly 
higher than in the eighties (Norris 2005). 
On the party level, the decline of the political parties, as I have illustrated previously, is also 
very significant. The “golden era” of political parties finished a long time ago (Rueda 2007) 
and political parties have since suffered losses of membership and public support. Political 
parties have passed through a process of transformation, the old traditional social cleavages 
have diminished (Franklin 1992), and from mass parties (Sartori 1967) they have evolved to 
catch-all parties (Kirchheimer 1966), drifting from a society oriented to a state oriented cartel 
party system (Katz and Mair 1995). Parties on the ground as membership organizations and 
part of the electoral arena are diminishing in comparison with the other two faces of the 
parties: in public office and in the central office (Mair 1994). This period was characterized 
by dramatic shifts in party ideologies (Rueda 2007, Kriesi 2008, Volkens and Klingeman 
2001). On the left – right spectrum, this has resulted in a convergence between traditional left 
wing and right wing parties moving toward the political center, where the concentration of 
median voters can be found. 
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The aim of this chapter is to discover the precise relationship between these processes. The 
chapter is focused on showing which factors influence voters to stop voting and which are the 
characteristics of the new non-voter. A large-N-country analysis that includes only two-time 
series will be used in this chapter. Additionally, in the following chapters findings from the 
large-N Analysis will be tested on in depth panel analysis of the voters that have stopped 
voting in the United States and also the party-level and country-level consequences of the 
new non-voters on the voter turnout.     
This research, therefore, tries to contribute in solving the puzzle of voter turnout, by 
analyzing the new non-voters, their socio-demographic characteristics and their voting 
behaviour. The aim of the research, is to contribute in solving the “grand enchilada of puzzles 
in political science” (Franklin 2004), by adding specific aspects to the investigation of 
electoral participation. 
5.3. The voters that stopped voting – Theoretical explanations of the reasons for decline 
of electoral participation 
5.3.1. Party Ideology shifts: The importance of party ideologies in the electoral arena  
Understanding the role of the ideologies for the voting decisions has been a challenge for 
voting participation scholars since Downs (1957) and his spatial theory of voting (Downs 
1957). This model emphasizes the importance of political parties and ideological closeness 
with voters in explaining the voter participation and vote choice. The basic postulates on 
which Downs develops his theoretical model are that the distribution of voters’ preferences 
and the relative positions of the parties on a one-dimensional scale – explain parties’ policy 
shifts (Downs 1957). The optimal strategies for political parties thus  become that of taking a 
more centrist position, as the proportion of median voters is the highest in the electorate.  
This initial research, which has been a matter of numerous testing in various environments, 
has caused a substantive debate on the role of the ideologies as determinants of electoral 
participation. The theoretical assumptions of abstention because of indifference and/or 
alienation have been confirmed and challenged through the last decades, leaving us with 
contested conclusions. As I have shown in chapter 2, there are certain limitations of the 
spatial model of voting which are not taken into consideration by Downs and this limits the 
explanatory capacity of the theory. For instance, as Adams (202) claims “the scholars of 
spatial models base their research on the assumptions that all voters have identical 
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perceptions of every party’s policy positions”, but also that “voters instantly update these 
perceptions—along with their party evaluations—in response to changes in the political 
statements issued by the party’s elites” (Adams 2012). When the relationship between parties 
and voters is concerned, the spatial model of voting is based on the assumption that political 
parties completely control the perceptions voters have about their policy positions or more 
concretely that voters’ perceptions of each party’s policy position correspond exactly with the 
policy promises the party elites issue to the public (see, e.g., Hinich & Munger 1994, Roemer 
2001). 
The most important contribution of the spatial model of voting, despite numerous limitations, 
is the emphasis of the significant role of the party ideology positions in determining vote 
support and vote participation. Besides the level of ideological extremeness which 
determinates more rigid positions, other variables such as the salience of both policy and 
partisan issues in voters’ utility functions, the polarization of the electorate, the size and the 
position of a partisan constituency, the opposition/government, the number of competing 
parties and the relative (small) share of independent voters also appear crucial in explaining 
the voter participation levels and more concretely the demobilization of the voters who have 
participated in the electoral processes. 
Party ideology shift varies among the subjects at the political spectrum. Carroll et al (2013) 
shows that extremists are more ideologically rigid while moderates are more likely to 
consider influences that arise outside liberal-conservative conflict (Carroll et al 2013). At the 
same time, the effects are different for the political parties. Starting with the ideological bias 
of turnout, numerous research studies have shown that a lower participation hurts the leftwing 
parties as a result of the lower participation rates of the lower socioeconomic groups (Aguilar 
and Pacek, 2000; Campbell, 1960; Gallego, 2010; Ham and Smets, 2013). Nevertheless, 
Rodon (2015) highlights how different party strategies such as shifting ideological positions 
can hurt the political parties differently. By compiling a new large dataset (197 country 
elections in Europe), Rodon (2015) shows that centrist abstention is higher than leftist or 
rightist abstention. The findings of Rodon tell us that the traditional approach based on the 
socioeconomic context is not sufficiently efficient to understand the reasons for lower 
participation of citizens, but that party strategies also play a key role.  
Furthermore, that the ideological shift is not costless but might affect the voters and parties 
differently has been shown in several cases. In her analysis of the UK, Green (2013) argues 
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that convergence towards the centre during Tony Blair’s leadership especially affected 
leftwing abstention patterns. Additionally, Karreth et al. (2012) also examine the electoral 
consequences of moving towards the centre in Germany, Sweden and Great Britain. They 
find that convergence changed voting patterns. Nevertheless, their study has an important 
limitation in that it fails to consider abstention, which is a key factor to understand as 
concerns the recent losses of the catchall parties in these countries. 
Lidvall and Rueda (2014) argue that center-left parties face a dilemma regarding the policies 
they propose and their effects on their traditional supporters or insiders. If they propose 
policies that benefit insiders, they may push outsiders to exit politics or support radical 
parties. If they propose policies that benefit outsiders, they risk losing support among 
insiders. In the case of Swedish politics, Lidvall and Rueda show that shifting ideological 
positions influences the vote shares of individual parties and electoral participation. 
The intensity of the ideological shift is also important in influencing the number of voters to 
stop voting. Rapid and/or dramatic policy change may prompt internal divisions that damage 
the party (Przeworski & Sprague 1986). As Przeworski and Sprague have shown, when the 
ideological shift is bigger, political parties face a more dramatic electoral loss. They, 
nonetheless, do not offer more comprehensive evidence as to whether this is a result of the 
voter demobilization of the previous supporters of the party, or a result of their supporters 
shifting voting for other political parties.  
Furthermore, the ideology shift is a result of a voting seeking strategy of the parties. As 
Curini (2015) highlights, “as long as partisan loyalties correlate with voters’ policy positions 
(such that, for example, all voters who display a partisan identification for a leftist party also 
have a leftist position on the underlying left–right scale), then, ceteris paribus, vote seeking 
parties are motivated to offer policies in the direction of voters who are favourably disposed 
toward them, precisely for non-policy reasons” (Merrill and Adams 2001). If partisan 
salience increases above a given threshold, then vote-seeking parties should target 
independent voters because independents are the only bloc whose support is truly in play 
(Curini 2015).  
The number of political parties also plays a very important that influences the levels of 
electoral participation and consequently the incentives to drop out of participation, but also 
influences the ideological shift strategies of the parties. According to Cox (1990), this is the 
electoral phenomenon of ‘‘squeezing’’. That is, when the number of parties contesting an 
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election increases, not all parties will move toward a centrist position because some parties 
will always be squeezed by others converging from either side (Curini 2015). Also the higher 
number of political parties increases the number of neighboring and family parties which, at 
the end determines different party ideology strategies (Adams and Somer-Topcu 2009b). At 
the same time, a higher number of political parties enable a bigger offer of policies which can 
influence the decision of the voters to stop voting.  
The role of the political party in the government can also influence the party ideology shift. 
Somer, Topcu and Williams (2014) argue that opposition parties should distance themselves 
from the government parties to show that they are different from the incompetent government 
and to compete for the votes that the government is likely to lose. Using a sample of 19 
advanced democracies from 1970–2007, Somer Topcu and Williams show that opposition 
political parties are encouraged to move their positions away from the government’s position, 
especially in the presence of reinforcing negative signals as to government performance. 
These results not only have important implications for the understanding of opposition party 
policy change, for the economic voting literature, and for the spatial and valence models of 
party competition, but also play a role in explaining the ideological inconsistency of political 
parties which can influence voter demobilization of their party supporters. 
The spatial model of voting identifies two very important patterns: on the one hand, “there is 
extensive empirical evidence that political parties systematically shift their policy positions in 
response to the factors that scholars of spatial model of voting emphasize).  On the other 
hand, empirical studies that analyse the consequences of parties’ policy shifts identify only 
weak and inconsistent evidence of voter reactions to these shifts and empirical findings that 
are at odds with a central assumption of the spatial model of elections, namely, that citizens 
perceive and react to parties’ policy shifts” (Adams 2012). I argue that this is result of the 
lack of focus to the voters who stopped voting and the wrong assumption about the role of the 
ideological shift on voter’s behaviour. This is exactly what this chapter will attempt to 
theoretically conceptualize and empirically test. 
To sum up, an ideological convergence and constant shift of party ideologies has been a 
characteristic of the political parties in the previous decades (Volkens and Klingeman 2001, 
Kriesi 2008). According to the spatial model of voting, the ideological shifts are reactions of 
parties to maximize vote support and it is influenced by the number of parties, the role of the 
party in the government and the distribution of the median voter. At the same time, numerous 
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research studies show an overall decline of electoral participation, the decline of the feelings 
of partisanship even more severely than initially thought (Dalton 2000), and Mair and Van 
Biezen (2001) report that party membership has declined over time. Parties appear to lose 
grip on society and the weight of parties seems to be eroding (Blondel 2002). This research 
attempts to show that, contrary to the spatial model of voting, party ideology shift is harmful 
for the electoral participation and the number of new non-voters are strongly correlated with 
the party ideology shifts 
5.4. Research question, data and methods 
5.4.1. Research Question and Theoretical Model 
This chapter seeks to answer the question as to which factors influence voters to stop voting.  
A complex multi-level model with variables on individual, party and country level, is 
therefore utilised to test the theoretical assumptions for the influence of party ideology shift 
on citizens to stop voting. I argue that the spatial model of voting which is based on the claim 
that voters vote for the party which is the closest to their position on the ideological spectrum, 
and thus every shift of the party demands a vote swing of the voters and the opposite, has its 
limits to explain the behaviour of the new non-voters.  Based on the standard revealed 
preference argument and building on the exit, voice and loyalty models, I argue that voters 
instead of deciding to shift voting for other party once the party shifts its ideological 
positions, they decide to exit participation and that way to react to a party’s inconsistency. 
Therefore, party ideology shift as a variable is particularly instrumental in order to test the 
theoretical model. The greater the ideological shift of the party, the higher probability that 
certain party supporters will abandon voting at elections, as they may begin to feel as if their 
interests are no longer accurately represented on the party platform. While the theoretical 
model takes into account the rational choice approach which holds that political parties shift  
Theoretical Model 1 
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their ideology or programmatic position with the purpose of maximizing their profit, i.e. to 
increase the number of votes that the party wins during the elections, this assumption is not 
crucial for the model that will be tested.  
 Despite any utility maximizing mechanism behind the parties’ decision to change their 
position, I argue that this party ideology shift has its price. Thus, this investigation’s core 
position is that the shift of ideology can result in non-voting of significant number of party 
supporters or voters, which as a result of an ideological change within the party, can lose 
interest in the party and consequently cease participation in the elections. The central research 
question seeks to understand the effect of the shift over two time periods on the individual 
level pattern of voting behaviour. Therefore, individuals who reported non-participation 
during the last elections and voted for the party on the previous elections are used as a 
dependent variable. 
5.4.2. Hypotheses  
From the research questions the next main hypotheses can be constructed: 
H1 The ideology shift of political parties will cause supporters of the political parties that 
vote for the party to stop voting. 
H1a The effect of the ideological shift on non-voting is higher in post-communist 
democracies than in the established democratic regimes because of the higher level of 
political distrust, party system vulnerability and ideological inconsistence in these countries. 
H1b The younger and the less educated citizens are more influenced by the ideological shifts 
of their parties than the older and more educated, and therefore will stop voting more readily 
than the latter.  
5.4.3. Data and Operationalization of the Data 
The purpose of this chapter is to measure how the party ideology shift influences the voting 
behaviour of individuals. It will also include an analysis on the aggregate (party and country) 
level. For the purposes of this research, the database from the Comparative Study of Electoral 
Systems (CSES) Module 2 2001-2006 will be used. The limitations in the operationalisation 
of other variables will cause a reduction of the data. Individuals who reported non-voting on 
the previous elections will be excluded from the sample. With the first case selection, the 
number of cases decreased from 64,256 to 47,888. Additionally, because the sample of 
countries that is included in CSES Database does not fit completely with those in the CPM 
Database, the next phase of case selection included elimination of all cases where the 
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countries, parties, or years of the survey are not compatible in both databases. After the final 
case selection, the sample is consisted of 18,465 cases, and 97 parties in 15 countries. 
For the operationalisation of the variable of ideology shift, the author uses the Comparative 
Party Manifesto (CMP) Database from 1990 to 2008. The variable for ideology shift will be 
constructed by subtracting the score for ideology in one election cycle with the score from the 
previous cycle. The ideology shift variable will include all seven domains measured in the 
CPM Database including foreign policy such as external relations and freedom and 
democracy, a political dimension covered by the political system, an economic and social 
dimension covered by economy, welfare and quality of life, and social and cultural issues 
covered by the dimensions: fabric of society, and social groups. All of these domains consist 
of the most important variables for determining ideology shift of political parties. 
Furthermore, a detailed, theoretical justification for the selection of these components is 
discussed below, in a subchapter where the party ideology shift variable will be explained. In 
general, these components express crucial political phenomena and they are the most 
important components in which parties and voters distinguish each other. 
5.4.4. Methods 
For the purposes of this investigation, the individual level can be defined as the way in which 
certain variables influence the voting behaviour of individuals. On the party level, the thesis 
investigates which variables influence the change of total number of votes that the party won 
during the elections. Additionally, this research will measure the influence of the ideological 
shift on the issue of most importance for the individual citizen as regards ones voting 
behaviour. Therefore, different statistical models will be used for the three different levels. 
The hypothesis for the influence of the ideology shift on individual level will be tested with 
Multi Level Modeling (Mix Effects or Hierarchical) (MLM). 
5.4.5. Control variables 
Taking into account the previous theoretical findings as well as the important to offer a better 
specified model , a corpus of control variables will be included not only with a purpose of 
assessing the theoretical prepositions and their effects on the dependent variable, but also to 
control their effects when the results are evaluated. The model will include the socio-
demographic variables as control variables. Age, gender, occupation, urban-rural dwelling, 
and income are the standard and common used socio-demographic variables that can 
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influence the models. Apart from the utilisation of these control variables, the multilevel 
model also includes variables for membership in trade unions and interest in politics. The 
assumption surrounding the trade union membership variable is that members of these 
organizations usually vote for leftwing or social democratic parties, and that membership 
affiliation would mean that these voters would continue to vote for the party even if an 
ideology shift occurs.  
The interest in politics variable is a control variable which gives information about the 
individual’s level of knowledge for the party actions. The assumption is that the higher the 
interest in politics, the greater the chances that an individual will notice an ideological shift 
within the political parties. This variable indirectly controls the level of information for 
politics. Therefore, based on the previous assumption, interaction between political 
information and party ideology shift is employed. This variable controls the chance party 
ideology shift to be noticed. The last control variable that will be included will address how 
individuals evaluate the performance of the Government overall. A negative evaluation can 
be one of the reasons for non-voting or a shifting preferences from the parties in power, no 
matter the effects of the ideology shift. 
On the country level, a dummy variable for post–communist countries will be created. The 
purpose of this variable is to test whether there are differences between voters as a result of 
being citizens of post-communist countries or established democracies. Electoral system 
variables will also be introduced as a result of the theoretical explanations that in countries 
with proportional representation system the voters are more motivated to participate as a 
result of the more competitive elections. The change of the economic growth measured by the 
GDP of the countries will also be included followed by the access to the ballot for the citizens 
as one of the factors that can simplify the voting procedure and therefore motivate voters to 
participate at elections (Trechsel 2007).   
5.5. Who are the New Non-Voters? What are their characteristics? 
Little is known about the voters who used to participate at elections and have stopped voting. 
The only limited research which deals with heterogeneity of the non-voters is focused on US 
presidential and congressional elections (Doppelt and Shearer, 1999, Hilty 2013, Ragsdale 
and Rusk 1993). Even this limited amount of research is focused on non-voters without being 
able to clearly differentiate the citizens who used to vote and stopped voting for the habitual 
non-voters. For instance, Ragsdale and Rusk (1993) differentiate clusters with the following 
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labels: politically ignorant, indifferent, selectively aware, conditionally inactive, and 
dissatisfied. From the clusters it is hard to identify the voters who have been voting and 
stopped participating at elections and reasons for their demobilization to be tested. Therefore, 
a better understanding of the new non-voters is crucial, before analysing the factors that 
influence these citizens to stop voting. This section offers an overview of the main 
characteristics of the new non-voters. It attempts to identify the differences between voters 
and new non-voters.  This will help in offering a more precise picture about the individuals 
who decide to shift voting with non-voting. Some of the most commonly used variables will 
be used to find the patterns of the new non-voters. Using CSES Module II (2001-2006), I 
control for gender, age, education, socio-economic status, religiosity, marital status, 
urban/rural, closeness to a political party and satisfaction with democracy of the new non-
voters. 
A descriptive and demographic screening of the new non-voters is important for several 
reasons. First and foremost, it is very important to identify whether there is a substantive 
difference between voters and new non-voters. Secondly, how significant and important this 
difference is and additionally whether these new non-voters differ from habitual non-voters. 
Thirdly, a descriptive overview of the characteristics of the new non-voters is instrumental in 
a better theoretical conceptualisation of the statistical model that will be tested. I argue that 
their characteristics are neither the same with habitual voters not with the habitual new non-
voters. The main difference between new non-voters and both abovementioned 
characteristics is their attachment with the political party they used to vote for.  
Table 5.1 presents the tests of significance of the mean differences for habitual voters and 
new non-voters. The findings are very valuable in order to better understand the 
characteristics of the new non-voters. There is important significant difference between these 
two categories of citizens. The difference in the means between these two categories is 
statistically significant for all the variables except the place of living. The education is 
another variable where the difference is on the borderline of statistical significance.  All the 
other variables show statistically and substantive difference between the habitual voters and 
the new non-voters. 
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Table 5.1 The Differences between Voters and New Non-Voters 
Variables
5
 Voters New Non-voters T-value sig. 
 
Gender (Male = 1) 
 
0.49 (0.004) 
 
0.44 (0.01) 
 
2.61 
 
*** 
 
Age 
 
53.9 (0.43) 
 
48.1 (1.30) 
 
3.66 
 
*** 
 
Education 
 
5.93 (0.05) 
 
5.66 (0.21) 
 
1.28 
 
* 
 
Socio Economic Status 
 
3.24 (0.02) 
 
3.58 (0.03) 
 
-3.68 
 
*** 
 
Religiosity (No Religious =1)     
 
2.31 (0.009) 
 
2.15 (0.03) 
 
4.30 
 
*** 
 
Urban/Rural 
 
2.55 (0.009) 
 
2.58 (0.03) 
 
-0.92 
 
 
 
Marriage (Married =1) 
 
1.68 (0.009) 
 
1.99 (0.03) 
 
-8.97 
 
*** 
 
Satisfaction with Democracy 
 
2.47 (0.009) 
 
2.67 (0.03) 
 
-5.64 
 
*** 
 
Government Support 
 
2.90 (0.012) 
 
3.01 (0.05) 
 
-2.23 
 
** 
 
Party Closeness 
 
1.66 (0.009) 
 
1.87 (0.03) 
 
-6.03 
 
*** 
 
Campaign Participation 
 
1.94 (0.004) 
 
2.03 (0.01) 
 
-5.31 
 
*** 
 
N = 18463 
 
17119 
 
1346 
  
Source: CSES Module II (2001-2006) Level *** p < 0.001; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.10. 
The results show that females are more likely to stop voting than males. The new non-voters 
are on average younger for more than five years than the habitual voters and this shows clear 
patterns of distinction between new non-voters and voters. The new non-voters are less 
religious than habitual voters and they are less likely to be married. The level of satisfaction 
with democracy is significantly lower among the new non-voters and they feel less close to a 
political party. Still, a very large number of the new non-voters feel close to a political party, 
which shows that there has been an attachment and political identification with that certain 
political party. This is instrumental for my theoretical model that will be statistically tested 
further in the chapter.  
The literature has offered very different explanations as to the factors that influence voters to 
taking part in the electoral process. Many researches have shown that women are less likely 
to vote than men (Teixeira 1984, Piven and Cloward 1987, Blais 2009). Different scholars 
                                                          
5
 Education is coded from 1 to 8 with 1 being the lowest level of education. The Socio-Economic Status variable 
is coded: 1 – White Collar, 2 – Worker, 3 – Farmer, 4 – Self-employed. The variable Campaign Participation is 
coded with 1 meaning participation. The higher mean, thus means lower level of participation of the group  
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have stressed different factors that cause women to vote less than men.  Some authors have 
stressed that women vote less than men as a result of the late franchise and hence still not 
achieved habit of voting (Franklin 2004). The others has found that the reasons for this lie in 
the more traditional role of the women even in the established societies and their closer 
attachment with the family which causes a disinterest in politics.  
Table 5.2 shows the percentage of male and female voters that have stopped voting. The 
results are not very varying from the expected. Women are more eager to quit voting than the 
men. Although the percentages do not differ dramatically, the almost 9% percentage gender 
gap is a very interesting finding. Despite the lack of unanimity in the literature as to what 
causes differences in the voting patterns of the males and females, these results show that 
females are more eager to shift voting to non-voting.  
Table 5.2 Gender and the New Non-Voters 
Gender Percentage 
 
Female 
 
45.54 
 
Male 
 
54.46 
 
Total 100 % 
Source: CSES Module II (2001-2006) 
 
Age has been considered as one of the most important explanatory variables of the voter 
turnout at individual level. There are two leading competing hypotheses as to the influence of 
age on voting.  According to one group of authors there is a linear relationship between age 
and voting. Younger citizens tend to vote less as a result of not achieving a habit of voting, 
while older people are casting the ballots most frequently. The other competing hypothesis 
claims that the relation between voting and age is not linear and has an inverted “U” letter 
shape. This actually means that the youngest and oldest categories of citizens vote less, while 
all other categories are participating at elections more frequently. Consequently, my 
assumption as to the group of the new non-voters is that younger voters should be the ones 
that easily decide to stop voting because they still have not achieved a habit of regular voting, 
in addition to the oldest categories of citizens who stop voting as a result of their age, while 
the groups of voters between these two categories have more regular voting history. Table 5.3 
confirms these claims. Comparing the percentage of the citizens between the group of the 
new non-voters and regular voters, we can see the percentage of the young people among the 
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new non-voters is more than twice as large as that among voters, or as compared with the 
whole sample. This shows that younger voters more easily decide to stop voting. The same 
pattern can be noticed among the voters who have between 27 and 35 years. The percentage 
of these citizens among new non-voters is greater than 7 percent compared with the voters 
that have remained as voting. On the other hand, the percentage of the citizens between 51 
and 65 is much bigger among the voters when compared with the new non-voters. This only 
confirms that the citizens that are in their middle-age period are  more constant in their voting 
habits and are less eager to decide to stop participating at elections. The same can be said for 
the oldest category of the citizens. The percentage of these citizens among the new non-
voters is smaller than 5 percent than amongst the regular voters. Older people are more 
reluctant to stop voting than the younger ones, and this could be a result of a different group 
of factors such as the mobility of younger categories of the citizens, or the fact that younger 
citizens are more sensitive to political parties’ inconsistencies and policy shifts. 
Table 5.3 Age and the New Non-Voter 
Age The New Non-Voters Voters All 
 
Younger than 26 
 
11.22 
 
5.41 
 
5.83 
 
Between 27 and 35             
 
20.95 
 
13.91 
 
14.43 
 
Between 36 and 50 
 
31.87 
 
30.83 
 
30.90 
 
Between 51 and 65 
 
20.06 
 
29.64 
 
28.94 
 
Older than 66 
 
15.90 
 
20.21 
 
19.90 
 
Total (N=18465) 
 
100% 
 
100% 
 
100% 
 
Table 5.4 shows the education of the voters that have stopped voting. These are again 
interesting findings. A majority of the voters that have stopped voting belong to the groups of 
citizens with incomplete or a completed secondary education. Cumulatively, almost 53% of 
the voters that have shifted voting with non-voting have attended or graduated from 
secondary school. The findings are even more interesting when comparing with the voters 
and the whole sample. 
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Table 5.4 Education and the New Non-Voter 
 
Education 
 
The New Non-Voters 
 
Voters 
 
All 
None      0.15 0.27 0.26 
 
Incomplete Primary 
 
2.01 
 
2.05 
 
2.05 
 
Primary Completed 
 
15.3 
 
12.92 
 
13.10 
 
Incomplete Secondary 
     
    19.24 
 
15.21 
 
15.51 
 
Completed Secondary 
 
33.58 
 
27.52 
 
27.97 
 
Post - Secondary/ Vocational                              
 
12.26 
 
16.81 
 
16.48 
 
Incomplete University 
 
2.15 
 
2.75 
 
2.71 
 
Completed University 
     
    14.49 
 
21.7 
 
21.26 
 
Post-Graduate Degree                                           
 
0.15 
 
0.09 
 
0.10 
 
Missing 
                 
                 0.67 
 
0.57 
 
0.51 
Total (N= 18465) 100% 100% 100% 
  
The number of voters that remain voting and have attended or completed secondary 
education is almost 43% or around 10 % less than the new non-voters with the same level of 
education. Also, compared with the whole sample, we can conclude that the citizens with a 
university degree are less likely to stop voting, as the Table 3.4 indicates, 14.5 % of voters 
that decided not to vote have a higher education degree in comparison with the 21.7 percent 
of these citizens among the voters and 21.26 % in the whole sample. These findings are 
interesting and in some sense are correspond with the commonly accepted claim (Tenn 2005, 
2007), that the more educated vote more. In this case, from the data we can see that the more 
educated are less likely to stop voting than the citizens with secondary education, where there 
is a largest difference between the new non-voters and citizens that remain voting.      
Socio-economic status is another very commonly measured factor that can influence voting. 
A majority of the voting behaviour research agrees that wealthier people are more likely to 
vote than the people that belong to the lower classes. According to this postulation, the 
expectation would be that wealthier people are less likely to shift voting than the people with 
lower socio-economic status. 
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Table 5.5 Socio-Economic Status and the New Non-Voter 
Socio Economic Status                 The New Non-Voters Voters        All 
 
White Collar 
 
38.41 
 
45.70 
 
45.17 
 
Worker 
 
23.92 
 
19.05 
 
19.41 
 
Farmer 
 
2.53 
 
2.18 
 
2.21 
 
Self Employed 
 
9.58 
 
9.84 
 
9.82 
 
Missing 
 
25.55 
 
23.23 
 
23.39 
Total 100% 100% 100% 
 
Results from Table 5.5 confirm this assumption. Comparing the two different groups of new 
non-voters and the voters, we can easily conclude that workers are those who decided not to 
vote on the next elections while voting on the previous. The percentage of workers between 
new non-voters is almost 5 % bigger than among the voters or 4.5 percent in comparison with 
the whole sample. On the other hand, the percentage of the white-collar workers among the 
new non-voters is lower for 7.3 percent than among the voters or almost 6.8 percent in 
comparison with the whole sample. This could be a result of the fact that the white-collar 
workers are better educated, but also have achieved a better social status and therefore are 
more enthusiastic about political participation, hence they are more likely to remain voting. 
In contrast, blue-collar workers are less satisfied with their status in society and hence they 
might feel less pressure to show loyalty and to consider voting as moral and social duty. 
Nevertheless, important differences between the new non-voters and citizens that remain 
participating in elections are worthwhile analysing in the statistical models in the following 
chapters. There are no large differences among farmers and self-employed within different 
groups. However, the big percentage of the missing responses which differs around 23% 
among the groups can cause misinterpretation of the findings.  
Employment status has also been taken into consideration among the factors can influence 
voters to participate at elections or stop voting. Table 5.6 shows some interesting findings. 
The percentage of the full-time employed citizens is for 4 points higher among the new non-
voters in comparison with voters and additionally with the whole sample. Also, the 
percentage of unemployed citizens and students that have stopped participating at the last 
elections is significantly higher in comparison with voters. As would be expected, the 
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percentage of the retired persons that have stopped voting is lower than the percentage of the 
ones that remained voting, confirming the already established hypothesis as to regular 
participation of the pensioners at elections. The higher percentage of housewives amongst the 
new non-voters is an additional conformation as to the gender gap that has been detected in 
Table 5.2. 
Table 5.6 Employment Status and the New Non-Voter 
Current Employment Status The New Non-Voters Voters All 
 
Employed (Full-time) 
 
46.51 
 
42.51 
 
42.80 
 
Employed (Part-time) 
 
9.44 
 
9.28 
 
9.29 
 
Employed (less than 15 hours) 
 
1.11 
 
1.46 
 
1.44 
 
Helping family member 
 
0.82 
 
0.74 
 
0.74 
 
Unemployed 
 
4.98 
 
3.62 
 
3.72 
 
Student 
 
3.49 
 
1.90 
 
2.01 
 
Retired 
 
17.90 
 
19.80 
 
19.66 
 
Housewife 
 
7.88 
 
6.58 
 
6.67 
 
Permanently disabled 
 
1.78 
 
1.72 
 
1.73 
 
Others 
 
1.11 
1.09 1.09 
 
Missing 
 
4.98 
 
11.32 
 
10.86 
 
Total (N=18465) 
 
100% 
 
100% 
 
100% 
 
Religiosity has also been considered as a variable that explains voting behaviour of the 
citizens (Teixeira 1992). The religious attachment has been considered as a strong indicator 
of social embeddedness, and hence the citizens who are more religious and attend religious 
events frequently, are more likely to vote. Again, comparing the different groups in Table 6, 
we can see that the difference is mainly among the extreme categories. The non-religious 
citizens are more likely to quit voting and in contrast, the percentage of very religious citizens 
is higher among the voters for almost 3 percent in comparison with the new non-voters.  This 
leads us to the conclusion that the less religious are more likely to decide to stop participating 
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at elections in comparison with very religious citizens who remain faithful to their 
commitment to vote.  
Table 5.7 Religiosity and the New Non-Voter 
Religiosity The new Non-Voters         Voters All 
 
Have no religious beliefs 
 
18.53 
 
15.20 
 
15.43 
 
Not very religious 
 
17.24 
 
15.04 
 
15.20 
 
Somewhat religious 
 
20.28 
 
20.54 
 
15.53 
 
Very religious 
 
3.79 
 
6.30 
 
6.13 
 
Missing 
 
40.34 
 
42.91 
 
42.72 
 
Total (N=18465) 
 
100% 
 
100% 
 
100% 
 
A part of the socio-demographic variables that influence voters to stop voting, the following 
tables will offer an overview of the characteristics of the new non-voters regarding their 
political party affiliation, participation in campaign activities or satisfaction with democracy. 
These political variables will give an additional explanation of the voters that have stopped 
voting. The starting position of this chapter is precisely that the political parties and citizens’ 
attitudes as to the political situation are the main reasons why voters decide not to vote at the 
next elections despite their participation at the previous elections. Political parties as main 
actors in the political arena and decisive holders of the political transformation as constitutive 
terms of the countries’ executive bodies are at the same time the most effective mobilisers 
and de-mobilisers of the voters. In order to earn more popular support at elections, political 
parties have shown high level of ideological inconsistency and constant shift of their 
ideological stands and policy positions. 
Table 5.8 Closeness to a Political Party and the New Non-Voter 
Closeness to Political Party             The New Non-Voters Voters All 
 
Yes 
 
33.95 
 
50.48 
 
49.28 
 
No 
 
62.70 
 
46.79 
 
47.95 
 
Refused 
 
1.78 
 
1.51 
 
1.53 
 
Missing 
 
1.56 
 
1.22 
 
1.25 
Total (N=18465) 100% 100% 100% 
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This ideological inconsistency can be a reason for voters to feel unrepresented and stop 
voting. The results from Table 5.10 show that the percentage of the citizens that are close to 
some political party is dramatically smaller among the new non-voters than in comparison 
with the voters. Only 33.95 of the new on-voters are closely affiliated to certain political 
party and the percent of these citizens among the voters is more than 50 %. These results are 
important from two aspects. First, as would be expected, citizens who are close to a political 
party are more eager to keep voting at elections. Second, however, the number of these 
citizens is very large. This means that a very significant number of voters and sympathisers of 
a certain political party decide to stop voting despite their affiliation with that party. The 
reasons for this abundance of the loyalty to the party should be searched for in the party’s 
behaviour. 
Participation in the political campaigns has been considered as a very strong affiliation with a 
certain political party. While the voting can be seen as a social and civic duty (Riker & 
Ordeshook 1968: 28; Campbell et al. 1960: 105-10), a campaign volunteer suggests a very 
close relationship and affiliation with the citizen and the political party. Table 5.9 confirms 
that the citizens that have been actively involved in campaign activities are more eager to 
continue voting. Nevertheless, again an important number of citizens (almost 20% of the new 
non-voters) decide to stop voting, even though they have been taken part in the political 
mobilisation of others.    
Table 5.9 Participation in Political Campaign and the New Non-Voter 
Participation in Political Campaign      The New Non-Voters Voters All 
 
Yes 
 
19.54 
 
25.50 
 
25.06 
 
No 
 
79.79 
 
74.16 
 
74.57 
 
Missing 
 
0.67 
 
0.35 
 
0.37 
 
Total (N=18465) 
 
100% 
 
100% 
 
100% 
 
Finally, the level of satisfaction with democratic processes also confirms similar pattern seen 
previously in the other tables. The percentage of the satisfied or fairly satisfied citizens 
among the new non-voters is smaller than among the voters or the whole sample. There is 
almost a 7% difference between the groups of new non-voters and voters. The citizens that 
are more satisfied with the democratic processes are also more motivated to keep voting. On 
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the other side, 34.4% of the citizens that are not very or not at all satisfied with the 
democracy decided not to vote on the nest election, while there 27.72% or close to 7 % less 
citizens that are not satisfied with democracy among the regular voters. 
Table 5.10 Satisfaction with Democracy and the New Non-Voter 
Satisfaction with Democracy The New Non-Voters Voters All 
 
Very Satisfied 
 
7.58 
 
11.73 
 
11.43 
 
Fairly Satisfied 
 
51.34 
 
55.00 
 
54.74 
 
Not very satisfied 
 
27.79 
 
21.84 
 
22.27 
 
Not at all satisfied 
 
6.61 
 
5.88 
 
5.93 
 
Don’t know 
 
3.27 
 
5.31 
 
5.39 
 
Refused 
 
3.12 
 
0.05 
 
0.05 
 
Missing 
 
0.30 
 
0.19 
 
0.19 
 
Total (N=18465) 
 
100% 
 
100% 
 
100% 
 
In sum: the analysis shows us there are certain substantial differences between the new non-
voters and the voters. Comparing the differences between these two groups we could see, 
women, younger people, less educated, working class and the less religious citizens are more 
confident to stop voting. Nevertheless, the very large percentage of the voters that are 
affiliated with political parties and actively participate in political campaigns still decide to 
stop voting even while they have shown a certain closeness to a political party. Therefore, the 
following sections will give the answer of the question which factors actually influence 
voters that used to participate at elections to stop voting. 
5.6. Main findings and interpretation of the results 
Table 5.11 contains the results from the first three two-level hierarchical models including 
individuals nested in parties they supported at the previous elections. The models fit with the 
theoretical explanation and the overview of the factors that influence voters to stop 
participating at elections. Multilevel Logit Modeling is used on a representative sample of 
18465 individuals and 98 political parties. Model 3 in the Table 5.11 includes two 
interactions. The first interaction is between the level of political information and party 
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ideology shift. The main reason for this interaction is the theoretical explanations that voters 
have limited knowledge about politics in general and specially about the manifesto of the  
Table 5.11 Multi Level Logiit Models with Two Levels of Analysis 
Dependent variable:             Did not vote while having voted last time 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 
Party Ideology Shift                                         
 
1.027**(0.09) 
 
1.03**(0.10) 
 
1.01(0.13) 
 
Age   
 
0.99*** (0.16) 
  
0.99***(0.18) 
 
Gender      
 
0.95(0.87) 
  
0.99(0.82) 
 
Education     
 
0.99(0.88) 
  
0.99(0.91) 
 
Marriage          
 
1.12***(0.21) 
  
1.13***(0.23) 
 
Union Membership                                           
 
1.01(0.96) 
  
1.04*(0.34) 
 
Socio Economic Status                                     
 
1.05*** (0.22) 
  
1.06***(0.21) 
 
Religion 
 
1.003(0.89) 
  
1.002(0.90) 
 
Urban / Rural                                                     
 
0.98(0.67) 
  
0.979(0.71) 
 
Political Campaign Activities                            
 
1.07**(0.21) 
 
1.06*(0.18) 
 
1.07**(0.22) 
 
Governmental Performance                               
 
1.02(0.78) 
 
1.02(0.79) 
 
1.02(0.83) 
 
Satisfaction with Democracy                             
 
1.08***(0.14) 
 
 1.09***(0.16) 
 
1.08***(0.15) 
 
Party Performance Evaluation                           
 
1.09***(0.22) 
 
1.09***(0.21) 
 
1.09(0.21)*** 
 
Party Closeness                                                 
 
1.08***(0.10) 
 
1.08***(0.09) 
 
1.08(0.09)*** 
 
Ideological Self Placement                                  
 
1.004***(0.00) 
 
1.004***(0.00) 
 
1.003**(0.01) 
 
Number of Political Parties                                 
 
0.99***(0.05) 
 
0.99***(0.07) 
 
0.99**(0.06) 
 
Political Information                                                                                                                         
   
1.00(0.97) 
 
PIDL Shift* Ideological SF 
   
1.00(0.87) 
 
PIDL Shift* Pol. Information                                                                                                            
   
1.00(0.69) 
 
Number of Observations                                    
 
18465 
 
18465 
 
18465 
 
Number of Groups  
 
98 
 
98 
 
98 
Level *** p < 0.001; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.10. Coefficients are presented as odd ratios 
political parties. The basic assumption is that the higher the level of political information, the 
higher the probability that the citizens will be aware about the ideology shifts of the parties 
for each they voted for at the previous elections. The second interaction in the Model 3 
includes Party Ideology Shift and Ideological Self placement of the voters. The ratio behind 
this interaction is that voters that have placed themselves on the more extreme end of the 
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scale of 1 to 10, and have more strong ideological preferences and, therefore, they will react 
on the ideological shift of the political party they supported at the elections. The voters that 
place themselves at the middle of the scale are more indifferent about ideologies and they are 
less likely to stop voting because of the ideological shift of their party. They would rather 
choose to vote for another party close to the center than to stop voting.  
Model 1 in Table 5.11 includes a list of socioeconomic, social embeddedness, political 
disaffection, political and ideology variables that can influence voters to stop voting. The 
results from this model show some interesting patterns. First of all, the Party Ideology Shift 
variable is statistically significant with level of significance p < 0.05. The odd ratio 
coefficient of this variable shows that an increase of the ideology shift for one unit increases 
the probability of stopping to vote. This is an important and significant finding besides the 
low odd ratio value, especially if we take into account the ideology shift is measured on a 
table from -100 to 100. The Model 1 provides enough evidence for confirmation of the main 
hypothesis for the influence of the party ideology shift on voter’s decision to abandon 
participation at elections. The ideological inconsistence of political parties causes voters to 
stop participating at the elections. These results show that instead of deciding to shift voting 
for another party, a certain number of voters are more eager not to cast the ballots and in that 
way punish the party they used to support.  Results confirmed that ideological shift can cause 
supporters of the political party to stop casting the ballot. This implies that ideological 
inconsistency is not a costless strategy for the political party and every ideological shift 
causes voting demobilisation among its own supporters.  
Age is statistically significant with level of significance p < 0.0001 and the odd ratio shows 
that when an individual is getting older he is less eager to stop participating at elections. This 
finding corresponds with previous academic research which indicates that the older citizens 
are more regular in voting. This is a result of the already established habit of voting to the 
older voters, and therefore a certain change of party ideology or influence of other factors is 
insufficient to result in their stopping voting than amongst younger ones.    
Gender is statistically not significant. The gender differences have not any influence in the 
decision to stop voting. And while the findings regarding gender are expected, the fact that 
education is not statistically significant is contrary to the expectations and previous 
theoretical findings. The results show that education does not affect the decision of voters to 
stop voting. Another variable that, contrary to expectations, is statistically insignificant is 
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trade union membership. The theoretical expectations were that the individuals that are more 
socially embedded are less likely to stop participating at elections. Nevertheless, the decrease 
of the importance of the trade unions for the workers as a result of the decrease of their 
membership, but also as traditional supporters for the leftwing parties (Rueda 2007) is 
confirmed with the lack of influence among voters as to their decision for electoral 
participation.     
The results from Model 1 confirm the influence of the socioeconomic status as a variable that 
explains the voting behaviour. This variable is statistically significant (level of significance 
p<0.001) and the odd ratio show that this variable has an influence of greater  than 5% on the 
decision of the voters to stop voting. Another statistically significant variable with stronger 
explanatory power (odd ratio = 12%) is the marriage status of the voters. Religious 
denomination as well the urban/rural variable are not statistically significant. These results 
confirm the claims for the decrease of the importance of the religion for the individuals in 
general and particularly in their voting behaviour. 
The results show another interesting finding. The evaluation of government performance is 
not statistically significant, while the evaluation of the performance of the party that voters 
supported has statistical significance (p<0.001) and odd ratio of 8 %. These findings, 
although not reported by the previous academic research, show that voters are more affiliated 
to their political parties than to the government. One of the explanations for this pattern is 
that voters feel the party that they supported as closer to them, and that they are more 
interested in evaluating their performance than of the government; this is the case as if they 
have not supported the party or parties that constituted the government after the elections than 
they do not feel close to this government and they do not have higher expectations. This goes 
strongly in line with the theoretical expectations of the model. 
The statistical significance of party performance evaluation and ideological self-placement 
(p<0.001) together with the party ideology shift variable are also in favour of the claims for 
the importance and influence of the ideologies and parties in general for the decision of the 
voters to stop voting. These findings show that ideology in general has to be considered as a 
relevant variable that explains the voting behaviour of individuals. The number of political 
parties is also statistically significant indicator and the coefficient is negative.  
Model 2 emphasizes the so-called political variables. The socioeconomic variables are 
excluded in order the emphasis to be put on the political and mobilization factors as 
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determinants of dropping out of voting. In this way I intended to exclude the possible 
spurious effect of the “fundamentals” on the political variables.  The results do not differ 
dramatically in comparison with the Model 1, but there are still certain interesting findings to 
be discussed. The odd ratios of almost all variables are higher in this model that in the 
previous except in the case of the “political campaign activity” variable and the number of 
political parties. The level of significance of the campaign variable is also decreased, which 
means that only when political variables are taken into consideration does the involvement in 
political campaign activities have less importance for the decision of the voters to stop 
voting. Under these circumstances this variable loses its importance. 
The most surprising and at the same time most confusing findings can be seen in Model 3. 
Model 3 includes two interactions which have the aim to control the political knowledge 
about party ideology shift, as well as the effect of the ideological self- positioning and the 
shift in the ideology of party for which the voter use to vote at the previous elections. The 
results show that not only do neither of the two theoretically based interactions prove 
statistically significant, but also party ideology shift loses the level of significance after the 
introduction of the interaction in the model. While almost all of the variables keep similar 
odd ratio values and level of significance, there is change in the trade union membership 
variable. This variable is statistically significant with p<0.1 in Model 3 and in addition the 
odd ratio is four times higher than in the previous two models. The “political information” 
variable, which was introduced as a constitutive term of one of the interactions, is not 
statistically significant. This is contrary to expectations, but nevertheless the explanation for 
this finding can be found in the limited capacity of this variable. The way this variable was 
coded in the CSES Dataset actually does not provide the necessary level of information that 
can explain the nature and the character of the level of political information among the 
individuals. This was the reason why the variable was not taken into consideration in the 
previous two models that were tested. 
In order to offer a more fully specified model that explains why voters stop voting, two Multi 
Level Mixed Logit Models with three levels of analysis were additionally developed. The 
country level variables are included in these models and voters are additionally nested in their 
own countries’ political systems. Table 2 presented these two models. As with the first table, 
the last model integrates the interactions that were previously theoretically elaborated.  
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Table 5.12 Multi-Level Mixed Logit Models with Three Levels of Analysis 
               Dependent variable:             Did not vote while having voted last time 
Variable                  Model 1 Model 2 
 
Party Ideology Shift                                         
 
1.01*(0.16)    
 
1.01(0.21) 
 
Age   
 
0.99***(0.18)    
 
0.99(0.23)   
 
Gender      
 
0.99(0.76)       
 
 
Education     
 
0.99(0.83) 
 
0.99(0.84)   
 
Marriage          
 
1.12***(0.07) 
  
1.12***(0.08) 
 
Union Membership                                           
 
1.02(0.78) 
 
1.02(0.79)    
 
Socio Economic Status                                     
 
1.03***(0.07) 
 
1.03**(0.08) 
 
Political Campaign Activities                            
 
1.07**(0.23) 
 
1.07**(0.24)   
 
Governmental Performance                               
 
1.02(0.88)     
 
1.02(0.89) 
 
Satisfaction with Democracy                             
 
1.07***(0.14) 
 
1.07***(0.15) 
 
Party Performance Evaluation                           
 
1.14***(0.06) 
 
1.13***(0.07) 
 
Party Closeness                                                 
 
1.08***(0.12) 
 
1.07***(0.14)    
 
Ideological Self Placement                                  
 
1.005***(0.01) 
 
1.004***(0.01) 
 
Number of Political Parties                                 
 
0.99***(0.05) 
 
0.99***(0.06) 
 
Post Communist 
 
2.54**(0.11) 
 
2.53**(0.11)    
 
Ballot Access 
 
0.90(0.78) 
  
1.00(0.81) 
 
Electoral System 
0.93(0.86) 0.89(0.88) 
 
GDP 
 
1.00(0.00) 
 
0.968(0.00) 
 
Political Information  
  
1.04**(0.23) 
 
PIDL Shift* Ideological SF 
  
1.00(0.77) 
 
PIDL Shift* Pol. Information                                                                                                            
   
0.99(0.56) 
 
Number of Observations                                    
 
18465 
 
18465 
 
Number of Groups  
 
98 
 
98 
 
Number of Countries 
 
14 
 
14 
  
Level *** p < 0.001; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.10   Results are presented as odd ratio coefficients 
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The results from Model 1 in Table 5.12 show some specific findings. The model that includes 
almost the same individual level variables, plus four additional country-level variables shows 
that the majority of the latter are not statistically significant and they do not influence the 
individuals in their decision to stop voting. The type of electoral system and the access to the 
ballot have been confirmed by the previous research as an important variable that explain 
electoral participation at aggregate level, but when individuals matter the effect of these 
variables disappear. The results also have shown that when introducing the country level 
analysis, the effect of the party ideology shift on the individuals to stop voting decreases 
statistical significance to a level p < 0.1. The ideological shift still plays an important role in 
explaining the reasons for stopping voting, but its effect decreases once the country level 
variables are introduced to the model.  
The most interesting finding from the Model 1 in Table 5.12 is the post communist variable. 
Table 5.12 shows that this variable is statistically significant (level of significance p<0.05), 
but also it has strong explanatory power in explanation why voters stop voting. The citizens 
of the post- communist countries (in the sample Hungary and Czech Republic) are more 
likely to stop voting than the citizens from established democracies. This finding is in favour 
of the third hypothesis and the previous research, which has shown a lower level of electoral 
participation in the post-communist countries as a result of the high level of distrust in 
political parties and the state (Rose 1995). The number of political parties is also significant 
in this model with the expected direction of influence.  The individual level variables that 
were included in this model show the same patterns as in the previous analysis. Age, 
marriage status and socio-economic status are again statistically significant and work in the 
same manner as in the previous models. The political variables too retained the same level of 
significance and explanatory power even in this model. The evaluation as to government 
performance, gender and membership in a trade union are statistically insignificant in this 
model too. 
Model 2 in Table 5.12 includes the above-explained interactions. Both interactions again are 
not statistically significant, but as a part of the Multi-Level Logit Model in Table 5.11, the 
political information variable shows statistical significance in this model. All other variables 
that were included in the previous models keep the same direction and their odd ratios are 
slightly lower than in the Model 1 in Table 5.12. The party ideology shift variable is not 
statistically significant in this model either. The included interaction did not help in the 
explanation of the factors that influence voters to stop voting and additionally hurt the 
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influence of the ideological shift of the parties which was shown in the first two models in 
Table 5.11.  Once again, to a large extent this can be seen to be a result of the poorly 
operationalized variable in the CSES Dataset. 
5.7. Conclusions 
While the levels of overall electoral participation have been declining over the last several 
decades, the conventional approach of studying the voter turnout patterns has been proven to 
be inefficient. This chapter takes a componential approach, focusing on understanding the 
factors that determinate lack of participation of just one category of voters: the ones who used 
to participate at elections and stopped voting at the most current electoral cycle.  Little is 
known about the new non-voters. Before this theoretical and empirical attempt, there was not 
systematical and comprehensive research that focused particularly on this category of 
citizens. Additionally, this chapter tests the theoretical contribution that contests the basic 
postulates of the spatial model of voting. The party ideology shift is put on the centre of 
emphasis as a demobilizing factor from voting. The interaction and the attachment with the 
political party caused a significant ideological shift to be found by the voter, with their 
dropping out rather than their shifting vote preference for another political party.  
All previously theoretical approaches that have analysed voting behaviour have shown that, 
firstly, that there are various factors and determinants that influence low voter participation 
and that the precise nature of these factors has yet to be determined. Second, political parties 
are already considered as important factors that influence low level of participation, but party 
ideology shift as a variable that can potentially influence the low turnout is not adequately 
considered and its importance is underestimated. Third, there is a lack of research on the new 
non-voters who stopped voting. The chapter tests the theoretical assumptions on a large 
comparative sample with variables on three different levels. 
The originality of this approach was precisely in that it introduced party ideology shift as a 
variable that influences voters to stop voting. In order to test the above elaborated theoretical 
model the author constructed statistical models that consist of different levels of analysis. The 
Multi-Level Logit Models 1 and 2 in Table 3.11 provide enough evidence for confirmation of 
the main hypothesis for the influence of the party ideology shift on voter’s decision to 
abandon participation at elections. The ideological inconsistence of political parties increases 
the probability that the voters will stop voting instead of shifting a vote preference for another 
party. These results show that instead of deciding to shift voting for another party, a certain 
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number of voters are more eager not to cast the ballots and in that way punish the party they 
used to support. These findings contest the spatial model of voting directly in the 
fundamental theoretical basis. Elections do not function the same as the pure market 
mechanisms but, furthermore, as Hirschman has argued, voice and loyalty shape the exit too.  
The result confirmed that ideological shift can cause costs for political parties and thus that 
they have to be much more careful before deciding to change their ideological positioning.  
Nevertheless, the influence of this variable disappears when the interactions are included in 
the models. The included interactions in the models did not help in the explanation of the 
factors that influence voters to stop voting, but additionally hurt the influence of the 
ideological shift of the parties which was shown in the first two models in Table 2.  The 
majority of the country level variables are not statistically significant and they do not 
influence the individuals in their decision to stop voting. The type of electoral system and the 
access to the ballot have been confirmed by the previous research as an important variable 
that explain electoral participation at aggregate level, but when individuals matter the effect 
of these variables disappear. 
The results have also shown that citizens of the post-communist countries (in the sample 
Hungary and Czech Republic) are more likely to stop voting than the citizens from 
established democracies. This finding is in favour of the third hypothesis and the previous 
research which has shown a lower level of electoral participation in the post-communist 
countries as a result of the high level of distrust in political parties and the state (Rose 1995). 
The number of political parties is also significant in this model with the expected direction of 
influence.        
In sum: this chapter offered a theoretically based investigation of the variables that influence 
voters to stop voting at individual level. The results are for the most part in favour of the 
offered hypothesis. The chapter includes a comparative multi-level analysis of the theoretical 
model on the reasons why voters have stopped voting by adding the party ideology shift 
variable as an explanatory factor for the citizens to decide not to participate at elections. The 
theoretical assumptions have been tested in pluralistic party systems with different electoral 
systems and a strong ideological voter alignment. In this sense, this has been the most 
conservative environment for testing the theoretical assumptions. Thus, the hypothesis 
validation has even bigger importance. On the other hand, the statistical model included only 
two time points which disables us to make more profound conclusions for the nature of the 
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participation exit.  A panel data utilised to understand the temporality and the nature of the 
dropping out of voting will be tested in the following chapter on the US two-party system. 
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APPENDIX A 
Table 5.13 Summary of the Variables in the Model 
Variable                                              Obs             Mean         Std. Dev.        Min     Max 
 Age                                                    18465             53.53          56.61            18        999 
 Male                                                  18465                0.49           0.52              0            9 
 Education                                           18465                5.91           7.28              1          99 
 Marriage                                            18465                1.70           1.24              1            9 
 Union Member                                   18465                1.74           0.97              1            9 
 Socio Economic Status                        18465                3.27           3.04              1            9 
 Religiosity                                          18465                5.15           3.39              1            9 
  Urban Rural                                       18465               2.55            1.24              1            9 
 Political Persuading                             18465               1.77            0.60              1            9 
 Political Campaign Activity                 18465               1.95            0.62              1            9 
Government Performance                        18465                2.91             1.68                1             9  
Democracy Satisfaction                        18465               2.48            1.26              1            9 
Party Performance                                18465               3.97            2.98              1            9 
Party Closeness                                   18465               1.67             1.21              1            9 
Ideological Self-Identification              18465               19.76          33.88              0          99 
Source: CSES Module II 2001-2006  
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CHAPTER SIX 
Why do American voters stop voting? 
 
6.1. Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to conduct an in-depth analysis, using panel data, of voters that 
have stopped voting in the US. A Large-N Analysis of the voters that have stopped voting has 
shown that party ideology shift contributes to why some voters stop participating at elections. 
The ideological inconsistency of political parties causes voters to feel less represented, 
abandoned and to lose trust in the political party that they supported. Party closeness, party 
performance evaluation, ideological self-placement and the number of the political parties 
also have a significant effect on why voters stop participating. These findings provide a very 
important explanation of some of the reasons why voters have stopped voting. These findings 
have also shown that the behaviour of political parties and the perception of citizens of said 
behaviour are very strong demobilizing factors for electoral participation.  Whilst in the 
previous chapter I offered an empirical overview of the socio-economic and main political 
characteristics of new non-voters, the large-N analysis of two electoral cycles does not offer 
an explanation of the durability of the decision of voters to stop participating at elections. The 
previous approach does not show whether voters have stopped voting permanently or whether 
their decision is only temporary and based on the specific context of the specific electoral 
race. 
Therefore, an in-depth panel data analysis of the American new non-voters from the period of 
1984 to 1996 will provide additional substantive information as to new non-voters, and will 
put to test the main claim regarding the influence of party ideological inconsistency on the 
decision of voters to stop voting. Although electoral participation in US has attracted an 
enormous amount of attention of voting behaviour scholars, there is a lack of research on 
voters that have stopped voting. Consequently, party ideology and ideological and policy 
inconsistency has also not been investigated as reasons why voters stop voting, in a way that 
this chapter attempts to do.   
This chapter aims to answer the question of “why have American voters stopped voting at 
elections and is this decision permanent or temporary?”. It will provide evidence of why 
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voters who used to vote have decided to stop voting. Moreover, this chapter will investigate 
whether these new non-voters have converted from habitual voters to habitual non-voters or 
their decision is intermittent and related to other factors related to a specific electoral cycle.  
As I will show below, American voting behaviour scholars have focused mainly on trying to 
explain voter turnout decline in the US by analysing the main socio-economic factors such as 
the generational gap (Franklin 2004), gender gap (Norris 2008), ethnic and racial turnout 
differences (Citrin and Hugton 2002), campaign effects (Alvarez 1997, Popkin 1991, Gerber 
and Green 2000, 2005) or demobilisation factors of political parties (Avey 1989, Leighley 
and Nagler 2014). Yet these studies have neglected to analyse the influence of the voters that 
have stopped voting on the aggregate level of turnout decline. In this chapter I attempt to 
show that research on these new non-voters is not only necessary but that the turnout damage 
that they can cause by no longer voting can offer a very strong explanation as to the decline 
of turnout also. 
Using the US as a case study has multiple advantages. First, the American electoral context 
provides the most adequate conditions for testing my theoretical model. Second, American 
media discourse is focused on the ideological standings of the parties and their nominees, 
which constitute a very important part of campaigns. Third, the lower levels of voter turnout 
in elections in the US in the past emphasises the necessity of a different approach to analyse 
the reasons why voters stop voting. Fourth, and very importantly, the US is the most 
appropriate case study for methodological reasons. Complex data for many electoral cycles 
over a significantly long period of time has only been gathered in US. Specifically, in order to 
answer my research question I am using Youth and Parents Socialisation Panel data from 
1984-1997. Although this panel data does not include the most recent elections, it is still the 
most appropriate and longest longitudinal data that includes variables crucial for the testing 
of my hypotheses. 
The chapter is organized in ten sections. The following section of the chapter offers a 
theoretical explanation of voters that stopped voting in US elections followed by a brief 
review of the literature on voting behaviour, and a theoretical overview of the policy 
transformation and ideological inconsistency of American parties. The next section presents 
the differences between the new non-voters and others in the US regarding (i) socio-
demographic characteristics, (ii) political trust and information and (iii) party and ideological 
engagement.  In the following sections I present my research question and hypotheses, before 
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I discuss the dataset, statistical model that I am testing and its variables in section five. The 
main findings of my analysis and interpretation of the results are shown in section nine. The 
chapter ends with concluding remarks on the results and a discussion of methodological 
issues. 
6.2. Theoretical Framework: Why do Americans vote less and less? What influences 
Americans to stop voting? 
American voters have shown less interest in participating in elections during the last five 
decades. The aggregate turnout in US presidential elections is among the lowest average 
turnout rates in general elections in established and/or populous democracies (Wattenberg 
2002: 15). Although, as MacDonald and Popkin (2001) have shown, the reported turnout 
decline is US in the period after 1972 is a consequence of utilization of the Voting age 
population (VAP) as a category to calculate the levels of electoral participation, contrary to 
them, Paulsen demonstrates that the aggregate rates have also shown a pattern of the almost 
linear decline of turnout from 63.11 % at US presidential elections of 1960 to the lowest 
point of 49 % at the presidential election of 1996 (Paulsen 2007: 32-33). Since then, there are 
signs of a rebound of the electoral participation of American citizens and a higher turnout. 
Even though Macdonald and Popkin (2001) disentangled the myth of vanishing American 
voter (Patterson 2003, Teixeira, 1992) by offering calculation of the turnout rates on voting 
eligible population (VEP), their research still shows that reduced voter participation is caused 
by different factors and the lowering voting age at 18 explains only one fourth of the 
reduction of the participation levels (Macdonald and Popkin 2001).   
Empirical and theoretical explanations of the trend of lower participation, as shown with the 
above-mentioned cases, are not unanimous. There are many different approaches among 
American voting behaviour scholars that explain why voters participate less, and why they 
have stopped voting. The following sections will offer an overview of the main theories and 
concepts that drive the decision of voters to vote and also to stop participating at electoral 
processes. This will offer a better explanation for the starting position of this chapter and the 
theoretical model about hypothesised reasons for voters to stop voting. 
6.3. The main explanatory factors of voting and non-voting: Literature review 
The controversies over why voters vote at elections and what causes low voter turnout are 
present from the very beginnings of voter behaviour research. The major voting behaviour 
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literature has offered a comprehensive explanation of factors that influence voter 
participation at elections, but with contradictory results concerning the main reasons why 
voters vote at all, and why they decide to stop participating at elections. 
6.3.1. The psychological approach of voting behaviour 
Campbell, Converse, Miller and Stokes in The American Voter, published in 1960, offer one 
of the most comprehensive and seminal explanations of the reasons why citizens decide to 
vote. Campbell et al. (1960) argue that the funnel model of causality is the best predictor of 
whether one individual will decide to vote and for which party. Hence, party ID is the 
strongest factor that shapes and the decision of an individual to vote and their vote choice. 
According to Campbell et al, party ID is learnt in adulthood through parents and 
socialization. Every individual forms a psychological attachment to a certain party and this 
affiliation shapes the development of their own attitudes for societal issues. These attitudes 
are adopted from the party positions and they are the result of the emotional attachment that 
one has with the party. Personal attitudes are reflected in six attitudinal dimensions: the 
personal positions about the capacities of the (i) Democratic and (ii) Republican candidate, 
(iii) groups involved in politics and the questions of group interest, (iv) the issues of domestic 
policies, (v) issues of foreign politics and (vi) the comparative effort of two parties in 
managing the affairs of government. The authors show that this psychological approach 
predicts vote decisions with very high accuracy and is a better predictor than the self-reported 
intention of the party choice of a voter. Nevertheless, the theory does not explain all of the 
vote choice (Campbell et al, 1960: 137). 
Party ID is treated as a psychological force or lens through which voters interpret political 
issues on each of the six dimensions. Campbell et al. note that: "Identification with a party 
raises a perceptual screen (i.e. selective perception) through which the individual tends to see 
what is favourable to his partisan orientation." Therefore, the party can be understood as a 
supplier of cues by which the individual may evaluate the elements of politics. Nevertheless, 
Campbell et al. show that a specific issue can affect the citizen’s decision whether to vote or 
not for a given party only if three preconditions are fulfilled: (i) the citizens must be 
cognized, i.e. to have certain knowledge and awareness of the issue, (ii) the individual must 
care about the issue or the issue has to have certain importance for the individual (Campbell 
et al, 1960; 172) and (iii) the individual has to know the positions of the political parties and 
especially the position of the party that citizens are closely affiliated with. The authors argue 
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that the party ID of an individual is quite stable over time, but that changes in party ID are 
possible. These changes result from either personal forces (usually changes in the social 
milieu of an individual) or social forces (usually the result of experiences related to great 
national crises or those experiences related to progress through the lifecycle, as older voters 
tend to be more conservative). 
Campbell et al. also find that policies and issues play a certain role in most voter decisions, 
and that around 12% of the electorate does not display anything resembling an ideology, and 
that some people when asked about their positions on specific policy issues do not have a 
consistent pattern of responses in terms of a liberal-conservative dimension. There are also 
voters that are frequently uncertain which party stands for what. These findings cast doubt on 
the efficacy of voting as a mechanism of democratic control of government. 
6.3.2. Retrospective vs. prospective voting of American voters 
Conversely, although not directly focused on studying and explaining turnout, Fiorina (1981) 
offers an opposite view of the reasons why voters have decided to vote and, consequently, 
why they stop voting. Fiorina challenges the social psychology approach, and provides a 
rational choice theory that explains not only why party ID is so stable but also why it 
changes. This builds on the work of Downs (1957), whose theory implies little or no 
independent role for partisanship. For Fiorina, party ID is instrumental and therefore partially 
endogenous.  
Fiorina says that retrospective voting is based on expectations about future welfare guided by 
evaluations of past policy end-states. According to him, retrospective voting (as opposed to 
prospective voting) is important and is based on a reward-punishment theory. He claims that 
(i) reliance on retrospective voting vs. prospective voting could lead to differing electoral 
outcomes (ii) retrospective voting presumes that citizens are more concerned with policy 
outcomes than policy instruments, and (iii) retrospective voting presumes that public policy 
formation is not constrained by voters. 
Fiorina’s model allows party ID to change continuously because it is a result of the past 
evaluations of government performance incorporated with the effect of socialisation. He 
claims that apart from employing issue voting and examining party platforms, citizens can 
also base their decision to vote or not on their evaluation of how the party in power has 
performed, and whether the party in opposition would have performed better.    
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Two types of retrospective voting have been identified by Fiorina (1981): (i) simple 
retrospective evaluations (SRE) which are based mainly on personal finance, war, civil rights 
and other issues that directly affect citizens lives and how the media or some external factors 
frame or construct such issue, and (ii) mediated retrospective evaluations (MRE) which are 
mainly a result of the media and how media provides information about some events or 
phenomena and thus shapes the personal evaluations of citizens. SRE can also be a source of 
a mediated retrospective evaluation when voters form opinions on the situation of their 
country based on personal experiences.  
The empirical tests that Fiorina conducts show some interesting patterns. Using SRE as 
dummy variables on a panel study on 1956, 1958 and 1960 elections show that Republican 
ID increases with a positive perception of the domestic and foreign situation, and evaluation 
of the financial situation has a smaller and less statistically significant effect. Another 
empirical test on the 1972, 1974 and 1976 elections has shown that MRE are in part a 
reflection of SRE. 
6.3.3. Habitual voting 
Voting in certain electoral cycles seems to be facilitated by the repetition of this behaviour in 
subsequent elections. Elections in this sense function in a seemingly mechanistic manner, 
whereby a repeated behavioural response to the same contextual stimulus gives rise to a 
formation of a habitual engagement (Green and Sachar 2000, see also Plutzer 2002, Gerber et 
al 2003; Denny and Doyle 2009). According to the habitual voting theory, the voters learn 
how to vote at their first election/s and after that maintain this habit for the following cycles. 
Therefore, a very important moment for the new cohort of voters for getting the habit of 
voting is the first electoral cycle (Franklin 2004). In the case of second-order elections 
without great importance and media coverage, the new young voters are less motivated to 
cast a ballot and can easily adopt this behaviour at the next electoral processes (Franklin 
2004).  
Gerber, Green, and Sachar (2003) in a more elaborated argumentation of the Green and 
Sachar (2000) thesis, demonstrate that randomized experimentation can show whether "habit" 
plays a causal role or whether it simply masks omitted variables. At least in the short run, 
voting in one election influences turnout in the next. Past voting appears to boost the 
probability of current voting by 47 percentage points. Their findings also contrast with 
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Wolfinger and Rosenstone's (1980) results that those with a postgraduate education are 26 
points more likely to vote than those with a high school education or that those in their 80s 
are around 30 points more likely to vote than those in their 20s, as well as the large effect of 
habit. The results suggest the importance of considering possible long-term effects (e.g. 
habit) when studying the behavioural consequences of campaigns. 
Nevertheless, the habitual theory of voting is unable to explain why voters that have already 
decided to vote at some point decide to stop participating at the next elections. Their 
established habit of voting is therefore contested. There are some other factors that have a 
stronger effect on voters and cause them to shift from voting to non-voting. This chapter 
attempts to offer an explanation of this phenomenon. 
6.3.4. The Mobilisation/Demobilisation Theory of voting 
The resource model of political participation in later years has been joined by the 
mobilisation model that centres around the idea that citizens are mobilised to participate in 
politics by parties, candidates, interest groups and new social movements (Rosenstone and 
Hansen, 1993). Mobilisation/Demobilisation Theory presents an alternative empirical theory 
of voter turnout (Avey, 1989). Avey focuses on analysing the levels of voting participation of 
different segments of the voting age population. He is particularly focused on exposing the 
different barriers created to prevent participation and efforts to stimulate participation for 
different groups of voters. In this sense, Avey (1989) opposes the theory that the 
characteristics of non-voters, low levels of education and political apathy are the root causes 
of poor voter turnout among persons of low socioeconomic status (SES). The 
Mobilisation/Demobilisation Theory argues instead that non-voting results from the 
behaviour of politicians, political elites, and the political system and not from the 
characteristics of the poor and working class. The study suggests that voter turnout for 
national elections could reach an 80 per cent level if a major party focuses on these two 
groups. Statistical evidence is given to show why the poor and working class do not vote 
when neither party represents them” (Avey 1989).  
Piven and Cloward (2000) have also tried to answer the question of why Americans continue 
to vote less frequently and whether or not politicians in fact benefit from this system. Again 
favouring the mobilisation/demobilisation approach that institutional factors influence low 
turnout and thus cause political apathy, the authors assign greater importance to the factors 
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connected with political parties. They claim that party competitiveness, party constituencies, 
their linkage to party elites, and voter registration requirements determine the composition of 
the body of voters. 
6.3.5. The swing voting curse 
Voters often selectively abstain in the same election. This phenomenon is famous as “the 
swing voting curse” Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1996).  As Battaglini, Morton and Palfrey 
(2008) point out “a poorly informed voter may be better off in equilibrium to leave the 
decision to informed voters because her uninformed vote may go against their choice and 
could decide the outcome in the wrong direction. The voter, therefore, may rationally 
“delegate” the decision to more informed voters by abstaining even if voting is costless” 
Battaglini, Morton and Palfrey (2008). In a pioneering and one of the most comprehensive 
studies of swing voting, Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1996) show that voters choose to cast 
the ballot on certain electoral race while abstaining from voting on other important issues 
listed at the same ballot. They show that in the 1994 Illinois gubernatorial contest almost 1 
million voters participated and voted to elect a governor, but abstained from the state 
constitutional amendment listed on the same ballot, even though the amendment was listed 
first. In another study, Crain, et al. (1987) report that “in the 1982 midterm elections turnout 
levels averaged 3% higher for the Senate contests in those states with such contests than the 
House races that were on the same ballot” (Crain et al 1987). Their analysis shows that in 
seven of the 219 races they studied, the difference in turnout was larger than the margin of 
victory in the House race, suggesting that voters were abstaining even in close contests. 
Assuming that voting is virtually costless when already in the ballot booth, this seems 
irrational. Additionally, Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1996) show that these large abstention 
rates can be explained even if the cost of voting is zero, if there is asymmetric information, 
thereby rationalizing such behaviour. They draw an analogy between the voters’ problem and 
the “winner’s curse” observed among bidders in an auction (see Kagel and Levin (2005) and 
Thaler (1996)).  
This theory explains “some empirical facts but it remains, along with rational theories of 
voting more generally, highly controversial (see Feddersen (2004) for a more recent 
discussion). Empirical evidence has indicated both support of and against rational voter 
theories, especially when compared to the assumption that voters act naively and ignore 
strategic considerations” (Battaglini, Morton and Palfrey 2008). According to Battaglini et al 
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(2008) these results should be taken with a high level of caution, mainly due to the quality of 
field data sets which consist of insufficient information to identify all the variables that may 
affect voter decisions. “This is especially true for tests of rational theories of voting based on 
asymmetric information, such as the swing voter’s curse” (Battaglini, Morton and Palfrey 
2008). 
6.3.6. Socio-demographic factors that influence voting 
The socio-demographic variables have been the dominant explanatory factors that shape the 
voting behaviour of individuals over a long period. Although contested by contemporary 
theories, the importance of these factors in explaining why voters vote and why they stop 
voting is still very significant.  
Empirical evidence points to the influence of socio-demographic factors (i.e. education, 
income, age, see Verba et al. 1995; Lassen 2005; Solt 2008). In short, citizens who are better 
educated, wealthier, older, more interested in politics, and have a strong sense of civic duty, 
strong social networks and have voted in past elections are more likely to participate. 
Nevertheless, much contemporary research has shown that this relation is not as linear as 
often assumed. The relationship between age and participation at election is not linear but 
instead has the shape of an inverted “U” with youngest and oldest generations participating 
less. Gender is less important and continues to be a less significant factor explaining citizens’ 
voting habits, and the effect or the direction is mainly contradictory to the previous findings 
(Norris 2008, Leighley and Nagler 2012). The same pattern applies for education (Tenn 2005, 
2007, Sondheimer and Green 2010). 
6.3.7. How campaigns influence voters to vote and to stop voting 
In How Voters Decide, Lau and Redlawsk attempt to present additional determinants of 
voting behaviour in general election presidential campaigns but also primaries and thus to 
unpack the “black box” of the role of campaigns in voter mobilisation and demobilisation.. 
As Goren (2009) stresses, Lau and Redlawsk begin with a series of sketches of various 
decision-making strategies that voters might follow: rational choice, early 
socialisation/cognitive consistency (i.e., the Michigan Model); fast and frugal decision-
making; and bounded rationality/intuitive decision-making. Next, they lay out an extensive 
information-processing model of voter decision-making, grounded heavily in behavioural 
decision theory. “They utilize a novel dynamic process tracing methodology to track voter 
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information-processing in real time. The methodology works as follows: experimental 
subjects stationed at personal computers are exposed to discrete bits of campaign information 
that scrolls steadily across the computer screen. Subjects click on whatever information they 
wish to explore (e.g. party labels, economic or social philosophy, group endorsements, and so 
on), which opens up a new dialogue box. Since the background information continues to 
scroll on by, the subjects miss other potentially useful information. In this way, Lau and 
Redlawsk seek to mimic the dynamics of political campaigns” (Goren 2009). 
In The Persuadable Voter, Hillygus and Shields also analyse the influence of political 
campaigns on voter behaviour. Goren (2009) identifies several important contributions to this 
research: “First, they show that during the 2004 presidential election an average of 26% of 
partisans (independent leaners excluded) hold issue positions that conflict with those 
embraced by their party, indicating that millions of persuadable voters reside within the 
electorate. Second, the more cross-pressured these partisans are, the more likely they are to 
defect and vote for the other party. Third, successful persuasion is a function of exposure to 
the campaign, campaign intensity, and direct contact. Fourth, a pair of survey experiments 
demonstrates that cross-pressured partisans are more likely to defect when the opposite party 
targets them explicitly on issues they care about. In conjunction, these findings strongly 
suggest that political campaigns use wedge issues to siphon off support from the opposition’s 
base. In short, many American voters are persuadable” (Goren 2009). 
Popkin (1991) in his seminal work on political information has shown that citizens make their 
decisions about political events based on informational shortcuts that they get from media 
and during campaigns. Alvarez (1997) also shows that a tremendous amount of information 
about candidates, their profiles and offered policies and ideological stands are offered during 
electoral campaigns that are widely covered by the media. Prior (2005) using a representative 
opinion survey of 2,358 U.S. residents, develops a measure of citizen media content 
preference and analyses its influence on whether these citizens will vote or not. His analysis 
confirms his assumption that content preference indeed becomes a better predictor of political 
knowledge and turnout as media choice increases. Additionally, he shows that the exposure 
to different television programs influences voting behaviour. Cable television and the Internet 
increase gaps in knowledge and turnout between people who prefer news and people who 
prefer entertainment. 
113 
 
Regarding the attitudes of voters towards political parties, Wattenberg (2006) offers 
substantial input to the state of the art by showing that the nature of the relationship between 
voters and their perceptions regarding parties have been shaped by the raise of the 
prominence of the individual candidates rather than political parties. Thus, while individual 
candidates become more important part of the political process when deciding to vote or not 
to vote, the confidence in the parties has not eroded, but the voters’ attitudes toward the 
parties are becoming neutral rather than negative (Wattenberg 2006). 
6.4. What about political parties and their ideological positions? 
American political parties have been widely seen as empty vessels (Katz and Colodny 1994, 
Whiteley 2011). The fact that only two political parties have controlled the American 
political space for centuries is a result, as Katz and Colodny claim, of their capabilities for 
adaptation. They passed through dramatic shifts and changes in their ideological positions 
(Katz and Colodny 1994: 23), and also as a result of the nature of the American electoral 
competition, they are more candidate-orientated instead of building stronger party affiliation. 
Consequently, American party scholars are divided as to whether the American party space 
has consisted of two parties, six parties (Democratic and Republican conferences/ caucuses in 
each house of Congress) or one hundred parties referring to the different characteristics of 
each state branch of Democrats and Republicans.  
Whether ideologies matter and how they divide the American population, Morris Fiorina 
(2005) in one of the seminal works on political polarisation in US, showed that while the 
attitudes on the political elites have been polarised, this is not the case with the majority of 
Americans who remain tolerant and moderate, and the most important issues of their interest 
are not moral values, but leadership and security. Fiorina disentangles the myth of culture war 
and shows that the view of a divided America is simply false, although he admits and 
recognizes that political elites have shaped their ideological and policy preferences more to 
the extremes and shifted their positions further from each other. In contrast to Fiorina, Noel 
(2014) in a thorough analysis of the history of political ideologies in America highlights that 
conservative and liberal ideas have a long-lasting tradition in American political life even 
independent of the political parties. He claims that the current polarisation of the ideological 
spectrum in the US is a result of the fact that these opposite ideologies have captured the two 
dominant political parties perhaps for the first time in the history of electoral competition in 
US (Noel 2014).  
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Although the American ideological spectrum has been defined as monolithic and that “there 
isn't a dime's worth of difference between the two parties" (George Wallace for the 1968 
campaign), the American media constantly reports about the ideological positions of the 
certain candidates and their ideological inconsistency. The Republican primaries for the 
presidential election of 2016 once again confirm the obsession of the American public with 
the different ideological positions of the candidates and differentiating between moderate and 
more socially conservative candidates.   
The consistency—or lack thereof—of the position of candidates is, as Tomz and van 
Houweling stress, a perennial issue in political campaigns. When candidates change positions 
over time, competitors often expose the inconsistency and attempt to exploit it for electoral 
advantage (Tomz and Van Houweling 2011). Tomz and Houweling offer several examples of 
ideological change, such as the Democratic presidential candidate John Kerry being accused 
of “flip-flopping” from supporting the war in Iraq to opposing the war. Similarly, in the 2008 
Republican presidential primaries, candidates attacked John McCain for embracing the very 
tax cuts he had opposed in 2001 and 2003, and they criticized Mitt Romney for shifting from 
the pro-choice position he held as Governor of Massachusetts to an anti-abortion position that 
was more popular among Republican voters (Tomz and van Houweling 2011). 
However, the shifting of party ideological positions is a very constant characteristic of the 
American politics. This is a result of the candidate-oriented parties, but as said above, also a 
result of the constant necessity of adaptation. By offering some of the most comprehensive 
studies of American party ideologies, Gerring (2000) analyses and identifies the most 
important factors that influence shifts in party ideologies. Gerring critically discusses and 
offers an evaluation of the five theories that have been proposed: (i) a classical theory 
involving polarities between aristocracy and democracy; (ii) a cash–capitalist "investor" 
theory proposed by Thomas Ferguson and Joel Rogers; (iii) the social class theory placed on 
the professional agenda by Charles Beard and others; (iv) an ethnocultural theory (Paul 
Kleppner et al.); and (v) realignment theory. He finds all of them important and, in general, 
makes a credible case.   
Consequently, Tomz and Houweling (2008) based on the three main theories of voting, point 
out three main strategies for political parties for changing their ideological positions. The 
first, proximity theory, assumes that citizens prefer candidates whose positions are closest to 
their own. The more the position of a candidate diverges from the voter, “the less satisfied the 
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voter will feel.” The presumed positive relationship between proximity and satisfaction, or 
utility, underlies the dominant framework political scientists have used in models of voting 
and electoral competition for more than half a century (Downs 1957; see Grofman 2004 for a 
review of this voluminous literature)” (Tomz and van Houweling 2008).  The second theory, 
according to Tomz and Houweling is the discounting theory, which “posits that candidates 
cannot fully deliver on their promises. According to this theory, voters “discount” campaign 
pledges and judge each candidate based on the policies they expect the government to adopt 
if the candidate wins office (e.g., Adams, Bishin, and Dow 2004; Adams, Merrill, and 
Grofman 2005; Fiorina 1992; Grofman 1985; Kedar 2005)”. Directional theory, the third 
leading logic of issue voting, says that voters perceive political issues as two-sided and want 
candidates who take their side or “direction” (Rabinowitz and Macdonald 1989). “Directional 
theory offers two related hypotheses. First, citizens prefer candidates on their own side of an 
issue to candidates on the opposite side. Second, given a choice between candidates on their 
side, voters support the most intense candidate because they regard intense candidates as 
more reliable and more committed to their cause” (Tomz and Van Houweling 2008).  
David Karol’s (2008) key theoretical contribution is the development of a typology that 
explains how, when and why US political parties take and change issue positions. Unlike 
many past studies, Karol defines parties as coalitions of groups or “a self-aware collection of 
individuals who share intense concerns about a particular policy area”. He claims that parties 
primarily cater to the preferences of groups, rather than the median voter, because groups 
provide resources that individuals do not, and that with time groups become entrenched in the 
parties’ coalitions and affect their decision-making. 
As Bishin (2012) stresses, Karol’s central thesis is that position-taking is largely driven by 
the desire to maintain and expand a party support among groups. “In coalition maintenance, 
the party takes new positions or changes existing positions in order to keep a particular group, 
whose preferences may have changed with time, in the coalition. In coalition group 
incorporation, parties take positions in order to draw new groups into the coalition. Finally, in 
coalition expansion, parties take positions designed to appeal to the public more broadly on 
issues where groups may not yet exist” (Bishin 2012). 
Nevertheless, very little previous research has focused on the effect of this ideological 
inconsistency on the aggregate voter turnout, and especially on the decision of individuals to 
vote or to stop voting because of this ideological shifting. Tomz and Van Houweling’s (2008, 
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2010) contribution in diagnosing this issue via experimental design is a noble attempt at 
investigating this phenomenon, but their research is mainly concentrated on the following 
point: firstly, on vote choice in general, but only including the decision to stop voting as one 
of the alternatives and, second, based on a manipulated hypothetical environment on the 
internet caused through experimental methods instead of real data.  
This chapter, focusing on analysing why American voters have decided to stop voting after 
previous electoral participation, utilizes observational panel data from the period of 1984 to 
1996 to investigate whether and to what extent party ideological and policy inconsistency 
causes voters to feel unrepresented and consequently shift from voting to non-voting.  
6.5. The theoretical model 
The previous section of this chapter offered an extensive overview of the main and leading 
theoretical concepts and models that shape the decision of voters to vote or not. As  has been 
stated previously, the literature is not unanimous, and also different theories offer divergent 
and often very contradictory explanations. As a consequence of the lack of any extensive and 
contemporary investigations of voters that have stopped voting, this chapter offers a 
theoretical model that will attempt to answer the question of why Americans stop voting. The 
model is based on some of the previously elaborated theoretical contributions but departs 
from scholars who contend that voter decisions are constant and not subject to change as a 
result of different factors. 
As it has been stressed above, this approach goes beyond the simplistic understandings of the 
rational choice theory of the “irrationality” of voting (Ricker and Othershook 1968), or the 
habitual theory of voting that voters keep and repeat as an already learnt habit of electoral 
participation.  The voters that used to vote and have stopped neither became rational all of a 
sudden, and found out that it was irrational that they previously used to participate at 
elections, nor have lost their habit of voting. The reasons for their decision have to be found 
elsewhere. Building on the mobilisation/demobilisation theory, I construct a theoretical 
model based on the party variables but also including socio-demographic, socialisation, 
psychological and political context determinants that can explain why voters have stopped 
voting.  
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6.6. Research question and hypotheses 
The main research question of the chapter is why voters in US have stopped voting. The 
chapter aims to determine the factors that influence voters to change their habit of voting and 
decide to stop participating at the next electoral cycle. As I have shown previously, the voting 
behaviour literature is not unanimous concerning the reasons for a shift to non-voting, and 
different approaches stress different aspects. Additionally, mutually exclusive findings exist 
regarding the influence of same variable in different theoretical and statistical tests. Also, 
there is a lack of a systematic study of voters that have stopped voting. This chapter argues 
that political parties are the main reasons why voters decide not to vote anymore. Special 
emphasis is put on party ideological inconsistency, and the fact that political parties often 
shift their ideological and thus policy positions. These shifts make citizens feel 
unrepresented, abandoned and therefore they decide not to vote at the next electoral cycles. 
This is even more typical with a party system dominated by only two political parties as in 
the case of the US. 
A part of the ideological inconsistency, the direction of the ideological shift also matters. As 
previous research has shown the median voter is concentrated around the centre of the 
political ideological spectrum. Therefore shifts toward left or right from the centre can also 
influence voters to stop voting for the party they used to support. Parties have to choose 
whether to move towards the centre where the concentration of the voters is more highly 
concentrated or towards the poles of the spectrum and this way to focus on voters with more 
extreme positions. In this research, as a reference category for the directional shift I take the 
previous position of the party or more concretely its presidential candidate. 
Additionally, I test whether and how voters’ perception about differences in the ideological 
positions of parties also influences their decision to participate or not in the electoral process. 
In this way I also disentangle the issue of the perception of substantial ideological differences 
between parties and how this drives the voting behaviour of the citizens. 
Last but not the least, as the majority of the previous literature on political knowledge has 
shown, voters have limited knowledge about political phenomena and consequently about 
ideological positions of the parties and candidates, but still based on the informational 
shortcuts (Popkin 1991) are able to develop a coherent judgment and make  a correct 
decision. Additionally, the discounting theory of ideology change says that voters discount 
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promises and judge their candidate based on the policies they expect the government to adopt 
if the candidate wins office. Therefore the ideological standing for certain issues can have 
more influence on the voters’ decision about vote choice or whether to vote or stop voting.  I 
argue that more salient and more polarized issues which are more frequently present in the 
media and everyday life of the citizens such as issues that deal with rights of minorities, 
abortion or religion will have stronger influence on voters decision to stop voting compared 
with more issues on the periphery.   
Hence, from the main research question, the following hypotheses will be tested:   
H1 The ideological shift of political parties and candidates has a stronger influence on new 
non-voters than on habitual and intermittent voters. 
H2 The direction of the ideological shift more strongly influences vote choice than voter’s 
decision to stop voting. 
H3 The perception of the ideological difference between parties influences voters to stop 
voting. 
H4 Ideological shifts of the positions of the more salient issues such as traditional values and 
human rights are stronger demobilising factors than the ideological shift of less contentious 
issues such as social welfare or security issues. 
 
6.7. Methodology, data and operationalization of the variables 
6.7.1. Data 
In order to measure which variables influence voters in the US to stop voting, the database 
from the Youth and Parents Socialization Panel Study Wave IV 1984-1996 is utilised. This 
database is most appropriate for this study because it includes a longitudinal survey of 
individual decisions to participate at presidential elections in the USA. On the other hand, the 
measurement of ideology shift is also a complicated process. There are several main 
alternatives for measuring the ideological shift of candidates and parties. As some of the most 
acceptable indicators for measuring party ideology, programmes cover a wide range of 
political issues and themes and therefore can be taken as a “set of key central statement of 
party positions” (Budge, Robertson, Hearl 1987). Nevertheless, it has been reported that the 
Comparative Party Manifesto (CMP) which represents the most comprehensive attempt for 
measurement of ideology faces serious indications of systematic coder error (see Benoit, 
Laver, Mikhaylov 2008). The experience has shown that the US political parties’ dataset is 
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particularly problematic because of less significance of the party manifestos. Therefore, for 
the main hypothesis I use the aggregated perceptions about the ideological positions of the 
candidates from American National Electoral Studies (ANES) Dataset for the period of 1980-
1996. For measurement of the ideological positions of different issues, I am forced to return 
to the CMP 1980-1996 Dataset, because it is the only data that allows the measurement of the 
positions of eight different political issues.  
6.7.2. Methods 
As I have pointed out in the chapter 3, this paper aims to investigate why voters stop voting, 
whether ideological inconsistency influences this decision, but also purposes to show whether 
there is a difference between new non-voters on one side and habitual voters and others 
groups of voters on the other side. Hence, the most appropriate method for testing the 
theoretical model is multinomial logistic regression. I have chosen mlogit because the 
dependent variable includes more than two categories and it falls into any one of a set of 
categories which cannot be ordered in any meaningful way. Also, multinomial logit enables 
me to better discern the differences between these categories of citizens and to show whether 
independent variables differently affect different categories.  Taking into consideration that 
the ideological variables are higher (party) level variables, I am using clustered standard 
errors (Moulton 1990; Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan 2004). This way I am avoiding the 
problem of mis-specification, which can lead to standard error which are seriously biased and 
can cause a spurious regression as a result of this mis-specification (Moulton 1990). 
6.7.3. Variables 
6.7.3.1. The new non-voter variable 
As I have explained in the chapter 3, when operationalizing the dependent variable, Youth 
and Parents Socialization Panel Study Wave 1984 - 1996 is used. The “New Non-Voter” is 
constructed as three category variable and has values “1” for voters that used to vote but have 
stopped voting on a permanent basis, “2” for habitual voters that have regularly participated 
at all four electoral cycles and “3” for all other categories. The data covers four electoral 
cycles of presidential elections starting with 1984 and finishing with 1996 US elections. 
Therefore, the “New Non-Voter” is coded as “1” for the voters that voted at the 1984 US 
presidential elections but afterwards have stopped voting.  The same principle is used for 
voters that have voted at the elections in 1984 and 1988 but have stopped casting ballots at 
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consecutive electoral cycles. As I said above, all other individuals that have shown permanent 
voting habits are in a separate category which is used as a base category in the statistical 
models, while permanent non-voters as well the intermittent voters are coded into one 
category.  
6.7.3.2. Party ideology shift score and Policy Shift Score 
The party ideology shift variable will be constructed by subtracting the score for aggregated 
perceived values of the presidential candidates ideology on the scale from 1 (extremely 
liberal) to 7 (extremely conservative) from the ANES Dataset during an election from the 
score for the party  candidate’s ideology in the previous election, when the voters voted for 
the candidate’s party. 
Besides party ideological shift, variables for eight different policy areas are constructed by 
subtracting the ideological scores from the manifestos of two parties. The policy areas 
include: economic, international and security; social welfare issues; human rights, 
multiculturalism; shift in traditional values; labour rights, and minority rights. From the 
manifestos of Democratic and Republican parties for the period of 1980 to 1996, ideological 
scores for every policy area are constructed and that score is subtracted from the score for the 
same policy in the party manifesto for the next electoral cycle.  
6.7.3.4. Control variables 
The model will include socio-demographic variables as control variables. Gender, occupation 
and income are the standard and commonly used socio- demographic variables that can 
influence models. Another control variable included will address the level of political trust 
among individuals. A negative evaluation may be one of the reasons for non-voting or 
shifting preferences to the parties in power, despite ideology shift. 
The change in education and mobility are also considered as factors that can influence voters 
to stop voting. Voters that have continued with their education are more likely to show 
interest in politics and to follow political events and campaigns; therefore their interest to 
participate at elections can increase. Mobility, on the other hand, is one of the most serious 
obstacles for voting. Although institutional registration requirements are simplified and postal 
and absentee votes legally allowed (Leighley and Nagler 2014), citizens who change their 
address are still less likely to keep voting.  
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6.8. Who are the new non-voters in the US? 
The characteristics of the new non-voters in the US are instrumental in order to better 
understand the reasons why these citizens have decided to stop voting. In the same time, the 
limited knowledge we have about these citizens needs to be upgraded with further 
investigation and hence, this section attempts to offer an overview of the most important 
features of the new non-voters in the US. Besides the fact that the number of the new non-
voters is quite limited (for more details, see Appendix B, Table 6.11.1) and it is based on a 
survey data with self-reported turnout, the descriptive statistics of the new non-voters can 
help us better understand the main differences between the new non-voters and other citizens, 
mainly voters.  
First and foremost, using information on electoral participation at four consecutive 
Presidential elections in the US in the time period of 1984 to 1996, I have identified 5.8 % of 
the respondents as new non-voters who have stopped participating at elections on more 
permanent basis. While, we cannot speculate about the nature of the their participation exit in 
the time period before and after the analysis, the fact that they have stopped voting in three 
consecutive elections while participating at the elections in 1984, features them as US new 
non-voters. Although, absolutely small, the number of new non-voters is very significant 
having in mind the closeness of the electoral outcome in the United States Presidential 
Elections and the overall trends of turnout rates at the elections included in the analysis (for 
more information see Appendix C, Table 6.15).  
In order to better understand the characteristics of the new non-voters, I test the differences 
between these citizens and others using the Youth and Parents Socialization Panel 1984-
1996. The t-tests of significance of the differences between new non-voters and voters are 
utilized. Three groups of factors are analysed: (i) socio-demographic variables, (ii) political 
trust and information and (iii) party and ideological attachment. Additionally, these results 
will enable me to compare the findings with the comparative chapter which includes cross-
national comparative sample with large number of respondents. Table 6.1 shows some very 
interesting patters. While, most of the results correspond with the comparative findings, there 
are some interesting differences. The gender difference among the voters and new non-voters 
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Table 6.1 The Differences between Voters and New Non-Voters in the USA 
Variables
6 Voters New Non-voters t-value Sig 
 
Gender (Male) 
 
1.53 (0.01) 
 
1.48 (0.06) 
 
0.75 
 
 
 
Union Membership 
 
3.92(0.05) 
 
4.77(0.12) 
 
-3.51 
 
*** 
 
Employment Status (Working=1) 
 
15.66 (0.52) 
 
21.66 (3.21) 
 
-2.56 
 
** 
 
Church  (Religious =1) 
 
3.62 (0.05) 
 
4.00 (0.20) 
 
-1.55 
 
** 
 
Home Ownership 
 
1.08(0.01) 
 
1.18(0.07) 
 
-1.60 
 
** 
 
Regional Affiliation (South =1) 
 
0.45 (0.018) 
 
0.41 (0.07) 
 
0.57 
 
 
 
Marriage (Married =1) 
 
1.38 (0.009) 
 
1.94 (0.23) 
 
-3.25 
 
** 
 
Mobility 
 
0.64 (0.03) 
 
0.98(0.16) 
 
-2.13 
 
*** 
 
Political Trust 
 
2.58(0.03) 
 
2.53 (0.13) 
 
0.33 
 
 
 
Political interest 
 
1.75 (0.03) 
 
1.82 (0.10) 
 
-0.50 
 
 
 
Government Support 
 
3.93 (0.35) 
 
4.14 (0.135) 
 
-2.23 
 
** 
 
Party Identification (Rep=1) 
 
2.45 (0.06) 
 
3.92 (0.35) 
 
-5.16 
 
*** 
 
Party ID Strength (Dem=1) 
 
4.58 (0.10) 
 
2.75 (0.57) 
 
2.51 
 
** 
 
N = 996 
 
942 
 
54 
  
Source: Youth and Parents Socialization Panel 1984-1996   Level of significance *** 0.01, ** 0.05, *0.1 
is statistically not significant in the case with the United States. While this might be a result 
of the smaller sample, it could also be related with the duration of the electoral participation 
exit. Furthermore, while in the comparative analysis, the females are the ones that drop out 
more in comparison with their male compatriots, the number of the new non-voters is higher 
among men in the United States. This goes along with the findings of Leighley and Nagler’s 
(2014). (For more information see Appendix B, table 6.11.2). A part of the gender difference, 
the other very interesting findings regarding the differences between US new non-voters and 
other citizens include mobility, marital status, home ownership and church attendance. The 
citizens who have been mobile in the past, the ones who are divorced or not being married are 
                                                          
6
 The Gender variable is coded 1 = Male and Two = Female, Union Membership is coded with 1 being a 
member of the union. Thus, smaller value of the mean means higher percentage of union members among that 
category of voters. Similarly with the employment status: a smaller value of the mean means higher percentage 
of employed citizens. The means of the variable marriage show that the percentage of married citizens is higher 
among voters than among new non-voters. For more clear results see Appendix. 
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the ones that are more probably to drop out of voting than others. The difference between 
new non-voters and other citizens is statistically significant. These results are going along 
with the theoretical expectations. 
Mobility or moving houses can be a real obstacle for obtaining the right of vote. This can be a 
result of objective reasons, like the distance from the place of registration and the necessity 
for the individuals to go back to the old neighbourhood in order to cast the ballot in the 
polling station or a demand for additional efforts to register for postal voting and similar. The 
marital status has also been shown as important indicator for voting. Similarly, it plays a 
significant role in the citizens’ decision to stop participating at elections. Home ownership as 
one of the indicators for better socio-economic status also plays a role in dropping out of 
voting.  The difference in the house ownership is statistically significant with the higher 
number of home owners among voters and others rather than among new non-voters. 
Similarly, the strongly religious individuals drop out less than other citizens. Although, the 
difference between new non-voters and voters regarding regional affiliation is statistically not 
significant, the percentage of southerners among the new non-voters is bigger than among the 
voters that have remained voting.  The differences between new non-voters and other citizens 
in the level of political trust and political interest are not statistically significant. These 
findings are particularly important because they go along with my theoretical claims that the 
new non-voters are not less politically interested in comparison with others. Additionally, the 
level of political trust is not so low that it would cause indifference or resignation for the 
political processes. Contrary to these assumptions, I claim that these citizens have been 
interested in politics and this is confirmed with their previous record of electoral 
participation. Their trust in politicians and in politics in general is not that low that excludes 
them from the political life in the country. On the other hand, as the descriptive statistics 
show (for more details, see Appendix I), the new non-voters are fairly interested in politics. 
They follow political news quite frequently which enables them to adequately evaluate 
political processes and the behaviour of candidates and political parties. This also goes along 
with my theoretical expectations which are confirmed in comparative perspective (see 
chapter 5). The level of governmental support, on the other hand, is lower among the US new 
non-voters and this difference is statistically significant. 
Last, but not least the ideological self-positioning and party identification are also utilized in 
order to determinate the characteristics of the new non-voters. The differences between the 
other citizens and the US new non-voters are statistically significant. Substantially, the 
124 
 
findings show that while the percentage of Republicans is smaller among the new non-voters, 
the percentage of the new non-voters among Democrats is same with the percentage of 
voters.  According to expectations, the independents are more likely to shift from voting to 
non-voting; their percentage among new non-voters is 6 percentage points higher than among 
voters (for more details see Appendix I, Table 6.11.9).  
In sum, there are certain differences between new non-voters and voters. There are more new 
non-voters among men, divorced, southerners and people that follow political programs two 
to three times per week. When party ID matters, the number of the independents is higher 
among new non-voters compared with others, but the fact that still around 55% of new non-
voters have stressed party affiliation is a strong indicator of the role of party behaviour as a 
factor contributing to why voters stop voting. Nevertheless, Democrats in the 1984 and 1988 
US presidential elections were passing through a very hard period following three 
consecutive defeats. Hence, the motivation among Democrats to participate was higher in the 
1992 and 1996 US presidential elections as a result of the closeness of electoral results and 
perceived opportunity to overtake power, while Republicans were facing absolutely opposite 
circumstances.           
6.9. Main findings and interpretation of results 
Table 6.2 shows the results of the statistical model with the candidates ideology shift as the 
main independent variable. The model also includes the controls that have been explained 
above. Clustered standard errors are used. Habitual voters or voters who always vote are used 
as a base category. The results are strongly in favour of the claim for the influence of the 
ideological shift on voters’ decision to stop voting. Comparing the differences between new 
non-voters and others relative to the habitual voters, Table 6.2 shows that change of one unit 
of ideology dramatically increases the probability of the voter to stop voting. While the 
coefficients are surprising high, it should be taken into account that the ideological scale 
varies from 1 to 7 and that the scores for ideological shift in all the cases are smaller than 1. 
Also comparing the coefficients to the two different groups relative to the habitual voters, it is 
not only that the coefficient for the new non-voters is higher, but also that it is statistically 
significant. Results show that ideological shift strongly influences voters to stop voting, while 
their influence is neither strong nor statistically significant among the intermittent voters and 
habitual non-voters. 
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Ideological consistency matters and voters punish political parties that constantly shift their 
positions. The fact that ideological shift has such a strong influence on voters to relinquish 
voting is another confirmation that voters who already have voted and developed a certain 
relationship with the party they supported, are more likely to stop voting than to switch their 
vote to the opponent party. In the case of the US, this is even more expected because there are 
only two main political parties that regularly nominate candidates to participate at 
presidential elections. However, these results have an even higher value considering the 
strong influence of Ross Perot, who participated in two out of four presidential elections that 
are part of this analysis as a popular candidate of a third-party.   
Table 6.2 Multinomial Logistic Regression: The New-Non Voter 
Variables Model 1 
 The New Non-Voter Others 
 
Ideology Shift 
 
20.02*** (5.96) 
 
1.19(2.6) 
 
Political Information 
 
-0.80*** (0.14) 
 
0.38**(0.14) 
 
Political Trust 
 
1.27*** (0.48) 
 
0.14  (0.12) 
 
Mobility 
 
0.88*** (0.12) 
 
-0.02 (0.37) 
 
Gender 
 
3.19*** (0.88) 
 
0.15 (0.23) 
 
Income 
 
-0.01 (0.04) 
 
0.06(0.004) 
 
Employment Status 
 
0.04***(0.01) 
 
-0.003(0.006) 
 
Education Change 
 
0.57***(0.18) 
 
0.02(0.05) 
 
Party ID 
 
-1.01(0.85) 
 
0.99***(0.17) 
 
Constant 
 
-11.15***(4.70) 
 
-8.89***(0.70) 
 
Pseudo R Squared 
 
0.18 
 
 
N 
 
850 
 
Base Category: The Habitual Voter, Clustered standard errors,  *** 0.01, ** 0.05, *0.1 
Other than candidates’ ideology shifts, the results show substantial differences between two 
groups of comparison. Almost all of the controls are statistically significant and have the 
expected direction for the category of the new non-voters. Surprisingly, party identification 
and income are not statistically significant, but the direction of the coefficients is again 
expected. In the case with the intermittent voters, only party identification the strength of this 
identification and the level of political information are statistical significant.   
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Why do voters stop voting as a consequence of the ideological shift of a party? Some of the 
explanations lie in the fact that voters are attached to but not blind followers of a political 
party. While political parties shift their ideological positions to attract new voters, they easily 
lose some of their traditional voters. These citizens feel unrepresented, abandoned by their 
political party and therefore lose interest in voting at the next elections. Party ideology 
inconsistency is not a costless strategy for political parties and provides great risks for losing 
loyal voters combined with the uncertainty of attracting new ones. Furthermore, as results 
show, once voters decide to stop voting it is more difficult for them to get return to their 
earlier voting habits. 
Table 6.3 Multinomial Logistic Regression: The New Non-Voter and Drection of 
Ideological Shift 
Variables Model 2 
 The New Non-Voter Others 
 
Direction of Shift 
 
-0.11(1.1) 
 
-0.59**(0.27) 
 
Political Information 
 
-0.39*** (0.13) 
 
0.35**(0.13) 
 
Political Trust 
 
0.56** (0.18) 
 
0.07  (0.11) 
 
Mobility 
 
0.40** (0.15) 
 
-0.01 (0.31) 
 
Gender 
 
0.79 (1.02) 
 
0.06 (0.18) 
 
Income 
 
-0.14 ***(0.02) 
 
-0.08***(0.02) 
 
Employment Status 
 
0.03***(0.009) 
 
-0.003(0.006) 
 
Education Change 
 
0.48***(0.06) 
 
0.01(0.04) 
 
Party ID 
 
0.19(1.24) 
 
0.95***(0.22) 
 
Constant 
 
-5.3 (9.01) 
 
-6.69***(1.07) 
 
Pseudo R Squared 
 
0.11 
 
 
N 
 
850 
 
Base Category: The Habitual Voter, Clustered standard errors, *** 0.01, ** 0.05, *0.1 
Regarding the direction of the shift, results of the statistical model M2 in Table 6.3 are 
infavour of the hypothesis. Voters do care about the quantity of the shift, they are able to 
notify the change of the position of their party and this is enough information regarding their 
decision to punish the party by not voting for the party and not voting at all. The coefficient 
for the direction of the shift for new non-voters relative to habitual voters is small and 
negative and statistically insignificant. As we also see from the Table 6.2, the direction of the 
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shift plays more important role among the intermittent or swing voters. The voters who flip-
flop whether will vote or not, care more about the direction of the shift and this can further 
influence their vote choice.  
Table 6.4 Multinomial Logistic Regression: The New Non-Voter and Ideological 
Difference 
Variables Model 3 
 The New Non-Voter Others 
 
Ideological Difference 
 
-0.73**(0.29) 
 
-0.88***(0.10) 
 
Political Information 
 
-0.61*** (0.16) 
 
-0.06(0.10) 
 
Political Trust 
 
1.04** (0.35) 
 
0.39 ** (0.14) 
 
Mobility 
 
0.45** (0.15) 
 
0.11 (0.38) 
 
Gender 
 
0.81 (1.6) 
 
0.23 (0.24) 
 
Income 
 
-0.15 ***(0.03) 
 
-0.12***(0.01) 
 
Employment Status 
 
0.05***(0.01) 
 
-0.003(0.006) 
 
Education Change 
 
0.78**(0.28) 
 
-0.02(0.09) 
 
Party ID 
 
-0.34(2.12) 
 
0.37*(0.22) 
 
Constant 
 
-2.3 (19.01) 
  
-0.01(1.5) 
 
Pseudo R Squared 
 
0.25 
 
 
N 
 
850 
 
Base Category: The Habitual Voter, Clustered standard errors, *** 0.01, ** 0.05, *0.1 
The way how citizens perceive ideological differences between political parties can also 
influence their decision to vote or to stop voting. While voters who are attached to the party 
will have closer identification and will have offered support in the previous electoral cycles, I 
claim they are more likely to keep voting and swing their vote if the ideological difference 
between political parties is perceived as very small and insignificant. When voters consider 
that there is an essential difference between the parties and candidates, the chances to swing 
their vote choice is smaller. Table 4.4 shows results of the multinomial logistic regression 
with the perception for the ideological difference as main independent variable. There is not a 
large difference between the coefficients for the ideological difference between new non-
voters and intermittent voters. Both coefficients relative to the habitual voters are negative 
and statistically significant. Hence, the perception of the ideological difference between 
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political parties or candidates does not have a very crucial role in differentiating new non-
voters from other categories of voters.  
Citizens are not always aware of the ideological positions of the parties on the left-right scale. 
They do not read political manifestos with their full attention and frequently, but they create 
their opinion about party ideologies as a result of information shortcuts (Popkin, 1991). 
Moreover, not all citizens perceive political parties according to the left-right spectrum. They 
have different preferences and priorities and rather favour the political party closest to their 
position on a certain policy area/s or issue rather than on the entire left-right spectrum. 
Therefore, I will next test the effects of ideological shift on eight different policy areas or 
issues on voters to stop voting.  
These eight policy areas represent the most important and contentious economic, political, 
social and international issues in American politics. Welfare State, Free Economy and Labour 
rights represent three important economic issues in American politics. Security is one of the 
most important issues related to international relations, but also domestic politics in every 
American presidential campaign and very often serving as a decisive factor influencing the 
electoral outcome. Traditional values include the question of abortion, censorship and 
suppression of immorality and unseemly behaviour, maintenance and stability of family and 
religion and are also a very contentious part of campaigns and attract a lot of attention in the 
media. While these values are considered strong indicators of conservatism, on the other site, 
party positions regarding underprivileged minority groups, multiculturalism and human rights 
are strongly related to politicians and citizens with liberal ideological standings. 
Table 6.5 presents only the coefficients for the eight policy areas or issues. Eight different 
multinomial logistic regression models were tested including the same set of controls as in 
the previous models. There is not essential difference in the coefficients of the controls and 
therefore they are not reported here. The findings bring us to very interesting conclusions and 
recommendations for political parties. First, these results based on the American context from 
1984 to 1996 show that traditional, social topics have a very strong (de)mobilising power for 
electoral participation. Traditional values and human rights have a very strong impact on the 
on the voter decision to stop casting a ballot. Second, the statistically insignificant results 
concerning shifts in positions on labour rights may be result of the fact that these topics do on 
the voter decision to stop casting a ballot. Second, the statistically insignificant results 
concerning shifts in positions on labour rights may be result of the fact that these topics do 
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not play such a contentious role in the American politics as they do in Europe. These issues 
are valance issues, they are not contentious and political candidates rarely compete on this 
agenda. Third, party ideology inconsistency is not only costless but it also depends very much 
on the type of shifts made by political parties.  The data used for the American context 
indicates that shifts of party ideology in certain policy areas can mobilise and remobilise 
voters but also lead to dramatic loses of traditional voters when a shift occurs on other areas 
such as traditional values, human rights, and the free market and economy. Last but not least, 
there are significant differences in the coefficients between new non-voters and intermittent 
voters relative to habitual voters. These differences are more visible in the issues regarding 
human rights and traditional values. These areas include questions regarding abortion, rights 
of the underprivileged groups and religion and these are actually topics for which the vast 
majority of the population has a personal opinion and can easily notice the ideological 
standings and hence if any, the shifts of candidates and parties’ positions.  
Table 6.5 Multinomial Logistic Regression: The New Non-Voter and Policy Shifts 
Variables The New Non-Voter Others 
 
Model 4:  Welfare State 
 
-0.93*(0.48) 
 
-0.16(0.16) 
 
Model 5   Security Shift 
 
-1.11(0.74) 
 
0.37***(0.03) 
 
Model 6   Human Rights 
 
2.19***(0.71) 
 
-0.097(0.06) 
 
Model 7   Free Economy 
 
2.80*(1.64) 
 
1.032***(0.05) 
 
Model 8   Traditional Values 
 
1.71***(0.37) 
 
-0.38**(0.18) 
 
Model 9   Multiculturalism 
 
-3.44***(0.55) 
 
-0.41(0.39) 
 
Model 10  Labour Rights 
 
-0.060(2.4) 
 
0.096(0.84) 
 
Model 11 Minority Rights 
 
0.23(0.58) 
 
-0.74**(0.26) 
Base Category: The Habitual Voter, Clustered standard errors, *** 0.01, ** 0.05, *0.1 
 
6.10. Conclusion 
The aim of this paper was to scrutinize the reasons why voters stop voting by using panel 
data in the US. The panel data allows the opportunity to analyse why voters have stopped 
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voting in more than one electoral cycle. Despite the disadvantages of over-reporting turnout 
when using observational data, the fact that 5.79% of previously mobilized voters have 
stopped voting is a very important indicator that should be more seriously analysed. 
Moreover, the overall aggregate turnout in the period of 1984 to 1996 has declined from 
around 53% in 1984 to the lowest point of 49 % in 1996. This is a strong indicator of the 
importance of studying new non-voters and reasons why they stop voting. 
New non-voters differ from other participants in the electoral cycle. Using simple frequencies 
for analysing the group differences, I found that there are more new non-voters among men, 
the divorced, southerners and people that follow political programmes on television two to 
three times per week. When party identification matters, the number of independents is 
higher among new non-voters than with others, but the fact that around 55% of new non-
voters stress a party affiliation is a strong indicator for analysing party behaviour as a factor 
for voters to stop voting. 
Theoretical and empirical explanations for the reasons why voters stop voting are not 
unanimous. There are many different approaches among American voting behaviour scholars 
that explain why voters participate less and why they have stopped voting. Building on the 
demobilisation theory, I argue that party ideology inconsistency is one of the main reasons 
why voters stop voting. While political parties shift their ideological positions in order to 
attract new voters, they lose part of their supporters. These citizens that used to support a 
certain political party may feel unrepresented and abandoned as a result of the ideological 
shift of said party, but instead of swinging to another party, they decide not to vote. 
The empirical models that I have tested using multinomial logistic regression provide 
evidence in support of the hypothesis of the influence of ideological inconsistency on voters 
to stop voting. One unit change of the ideology of the parties and candidate voter used to vote 
for increases the probability for the voter to stop voting. This pattern is dramatically different 
among other categories of voters.  Going further, testing the ideological shifts in eight 
different policy areas, this chapter indicates that traditional topics have a very strong 
(de)mobilising power for electoral participation. Traditional values and opposing values 
regarding underprivileged minority group rights have a very strong impact on the decision of 
voters to stop casting a ballot. Also, findings show that while ideology inconsistency is not 
costless it is a matter of party strategy. Political parties should be very careful when deciding 
to shift their ideological positions.  
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The new non-voters in this paper are studied in a particular political context. While the 
findings are generalisable, the possible effect of the certain electoral context characteristic for 
the period of study should still be seriously taken into account. This paper shows that there 
are substantial differences between voters who have stopped voting and other categories of 
citizens. This is an important finding worthy of additional research. The fact that the problem 
of over-reporting turnout, particularly characteristic for Youth and Parents Socialisation 
Panel, directly goes against the design of this research and there are still findings in favour of 
the theoretical claims, makes this research even more valuable. The data collection is a 
particularly complex process not only regarding identifying the group of the new non-voters, 
but also in offering the most adequate measurement of the ideological positions of the parties 
and candidates. 
The results from this analysis give added value to the literature of voters that have stopped 
voting. While the majority of voting behaviour scholars have studied party ideologies, very 
few have focused on ideological inconsistency as a demobilizing factor for voting. Voters 
that have stopped voting are a very characteristic group of citizens and major theories such as 
rational choice theory or habitual theory of voting do not offer reasonable explanations as to 
why they decided to no longer participate at elections.  Therefore, the major contribution of 
this chapter is exactly so as to combine these two important phenomena and thus contribute 
to solving the ‘grand enchilada of puzzles’ in political science by analysing why voters vote 
at all, and why they decide to stop participating at elections during a certain period (Franklin 
2004). 
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APPENDIX B 
6.11. Who are the new non-voters in the US – Descriptive statistics 
This section offers an answer to the question as to who are the voters that stopped voting in 
the US during the four presidential elections from the period of 1984 to 1996. Before 
scrutinizing the reasons why voters stop voting, it is of a crucial importance that the main 
political and socio-demographic characteristics of these citizens be examined. Using Youth 
and Parents Socialization Panel wave IV data and running simple frequencies, I will show the 
differences between new non-voters in US and other citizens. Three groups of factors will be 
analysed: (i) socio-demographic variables, (ii) political trust and information and (iii) party 
and ideological attachment. 
Table 6.11.1 shows the number of new non-voters in the US in the Youth and Parents 
Socialization Panel Data. 5.79 % of the voters that participated regularly at previous elections 
have decided to stop voting during the four presidential election cycles from 1984 to 1996. 
Numerous previous research studies show that when taking into account observational survey 
data, two main problems arise. The first is that when dealing with self-reported turnout, over-
reporting is one of the serious problems because individuals tend to report voting for various 
reasons such as failing to remember or as a result of the social desirability bias (Holbrook 
2009). The second reason is that individuals with stronger political interests are mainly eager 
to participate in surveys, especially in ones that require numerous waves and repetitions such 
as panel data, and these citizens usually regularly participate at elections. Nevertheless, even 
taking these disadvantages of the observational data that deals with self-reported turnout, the 
number of citizens that have stopped voting is very significant. Taking into account that in 
the period of the four election cycles which are subject of the analysis of this chapter, the 
overall turnout declined from 53.11 % in 1984 to 49.0 % in the 1996 US presidential 
elections; the fact that 5.79% of previously mobilized voters have stopped voting is a very 
important indicator that should be more seriously analysed. This also confirms the 
importance of studying new non-voters. When all other factors remain constant, the turnout 
damage as a result of new non-voters can be a strong explanatory factor for the decline of the 
aggregate turnout.  Therefore, the further analysis of the new non-voter, their characteristics 
and factors that influence their decision to stop voting is very important. 
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Table 6.11.1 The New Non-Voter in the USA 
Type of American Voters 
New Non-Voters                      5.79 
Others                                     94.21 
Total                                       100% 
 
6.11.1. Socio-demographic factors  
When socio-demographic factors are taken into consideration, as I have stressed above, not only is 
there a lack of unanimity of the previous findings in the literature, they are often contradictory and 
opposing.  Table 6.11.2 shows the gender rates among the new non-voters and voters in the sample. 
These findings are very interesting for several reasons. First, there is a difference among new non-
voters and voters that kept voting. According to the sample, not only are women voting more, men 
are also more eager to stop voting in comparison with their female compatriots. Second, this is 
contrary to the findings from the Large N cross-country data presented in the previous chapter. 
While in the cross-country analysis, a gender gap of around 9% was observed and female 
citizens were much more eager to stop voting, the case of the US is different. Taking into 
consideration the fact that this might be only specific characteristics for the four election 
cycles, these findings correspond with most recent trends showing that women are voting 
more than men in the US (Leighley and Nagler 2014).   
Table 6.11.2 US New Non-Voters and Gender Distribution 
Gender                                         New Non Voters                                      Others 
Female                                               48.15                                                     52.22 
Male    51.85                                                     47.78 
Total (N=933)                                    100% 100% 
The “Southern Strategy” of the Republicans frequently used in the second half of the 
twentieth century has changed the political landscape in the US. “The “Solid South,” which 
historically was traditionally Democratic due to the Democratic Party's defence of slavery 
prior to the US Civil War, has become electorally realigned to the Republicans as a result of 
the stronger advocating of racist attitudes towards African-Americans and fears of 
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lawlessness among southern white voters, and appealing to fears of growing federal power in 
social and economic matters” (Hohenberg 1996).  
Table 6.11.3 Regional Affiliation of the US New Non-Voters 
Regional Affiliation                                New Non-Voters                Others     
South                                                           33.01                                29.63  
Others                                                          66.99                                70.37    
Total (N=987)                                             100%                                100% 
Nevertheless, the 1992 and 1996 US presidential elections were break points in the sense that 
Democrats exerted a significant effort to get back the southern states by nominating 
presidential and vice-presidential candidates from the region
7
.  Although, there is not a big 
difference between new non-voters and voters regarding regional affiliation, Table 6.11.3 
again shows that the percentage of southerners among the new non-voters is bigger than 
among the voters that have remained voting. 
Marital status may be an important factor driving the voters to vote or stop voting. Previous 
research (see Sandell and Plutzer 2005) has shown that family plays a very important role in 
the voting decision of citizens and that divorce has a negative influence, depressing turnout 
by 10 percentage points. Table 6.11.4 presents the differences in marital status among new 
non-voters and regular voters. Comparing the frequencies between these two groups, the 
findings also show the negative impact of the divorce on the decision of voters to participate 
at elections. Table 6.11.4 shows that the share of divorced citizens is 13 percentage points 
higher among new non-voters than with the voters who regularly participate at elections. 
Although, the simple frequencies only show patterns, and more in-depth analysis will follow, 
these results confirm that people disengaged from their family life are more eager to 
disengage from their already established tradition of voting. While the reasons for divorced 
people to stop voting may vary, including, for example, changing their place of residence, the 
above frequencies even show the higher depressing power of divorce than found by Sandell 
and Plutzer (2005). 
                                                          
7
 Democrats nominated Bill Clinton from Arkansas and vice–presidential candidate Al Gore from Tennessee in 
a possible effort to get back the support of the southern states. 
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Table 6.11.4 Marital Status of the US New Non-Voter 
Marital Status                                              New Non-Voters                           Others    
Married                                                                 75.93                                        89.65 
Living with partner of same sex                            1.85                                           0.80 
Divorced                                                              20.37                                           7.28 
Widowed                                 0                                            1.93 
Separated                                                              1.85                                            0.34                               
Total (N=987)                                                      100%                                          100% 
Religious affiliation has also been considered as an important factor influencing voters’ 
participation at elections (see Verba et al 1995, Jones-Correa and Leal 2001). Verba et al. 
stress close affiliation with religion as a factor that influences voting in a rural environment 
but also among African-Americans. Table 6.11.5 shows that the percentage of very active 
members of church organizations is almost half the size of new non-voters than among the 
voters. Also, the percentage of citizens who have defined themselves as a fairly active 
member of church communities is smaller among the new non-voters. On the other hand, 
non-church members are 9 percentage points higher among the new non-voters in comparison 
with their percentage still engaged voters. This again confirms that religious affiliation still 
plays a certain role in the decision to participate in elections. Citizens' evaluations of the 
political system and its actors affect their propensity to vote (Powell 1986, Gronlund 2007). 
Earlier theoretical and empirical research has shown that political trust and satisfaction are 
often explanatory variables that influence turnout.   
Table 6.11.5 Religious Affiliation of the US New Non-Voters 
Religious Affiliation                                          New Non-Voters                            Others 
Very active member                  9.62    16.95 
Fairly active                                                            15.38    20.68 
Not very active                  7.69      3.62 
Not a member 67.31    57.84 
Total (N=990)                                                          100%    100% 
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6.11.2. Political Trust and Information 
Political trust involves normative expectations towards political institutions and actors, 
whereas satisfaction may be regarded as an indicator of attitudes towards policy outputs.  In 
the analysis of the reasons for voters to stop participating I hypothesise that political trust has 
an important effect. As shown in the previous chapter, trust and satisfaction with political 
parties and with democracy influences voters to stop voting, while political trust in the 
government has no significant effect. The US is a specific case because of the multilevel 
system of governance. Therefore, I analyse the trust in the different levels of government 
among the new non-voters and regular voters as well as the trust in the national government. 
This subsection also compares the differences among new non-voters and voters in the level 
of political information measured by the frequency of watching politics on television. 
Table 6.11.6 demonstrates the differences in the trust in different levels of governance among 
the new non-voters and citizens that remained voting. Results reveal some interesting points. 
While trust in local government is highest among voters, around 40% of new non-voters have 
the highest trust in the state government. This shows that citizens who have a lower level of 
trust in either the highest or lowest levels of government are more likely to stop voting at 
presidential elections. 
Table 6.11.6 The US New Non-Voters and Trust in Political Institutions 
Trust in Institutions                                           New Non Voters                         Others 
National Government                                               20.37                                            16.38 
State Government                                                     40.74                                            22.55 
Local Government                                                    25.93                                            46.70 
Equal                                                                           3.70                                             9.79 
None                                                                            9.26                                            3.94  
Other                                                                                 0                                            0.64 
Total (N=994)                                                            100%                                           100% 
The number of new non-voters that have trust in the national government is higher than 
among the voters by 4 percentage points, but the most dramatic difference appears in the 
support of the state and local government. There is an obvious trade-off between two groups. 
The difference is around 20 percentage points and another very interesting finding is that 
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supporters of local governments are more eager to participate at national presidential 
elections. This is something that was not expected in the previous research. 
Table 6.11.7 The Level of Trust in the Government and US New Non-Voters 
Trust in Government doing right                    New Non-Voters                            Others 
Always                                                                               0                                         2.02 
Most of the time                                                               42.59                                    49.10 
Sometimes                                                                         57.41                                   48.88  
Total (N=995)                                                                     100%                              100% 
The percentage of citizens that have trust in the national government is significantly higher 
among voters than among the new non-voters. As table 6.11.7 shows, additionally the 
percentage of individuals that have no trust in the national apparatus is higher among new 
non-voters. These findings are to be expected and confirm the fact that less trustworthy 
citizens are more likely to shift from voting to non-voting.  Nevertheless, the very high 
percentage of citizens with a higher level of trust that government does a good job among the 
new non-voters once again indicates that the level of the trust in the national government is 
not among factors that contribute to why voters stop voting. 
Political information is one of the very important factors that drive the voter participation at 
elections. As Alvarez (1997) and Popkin (1991) find, a vast majority of citizens learn and 
absorb their knowledge about politics via television.  Consequently, people that spend more 
time watching political news and shows are more interested in politics, better informed and 
more likely to cast a ballot. Table 6.11.8 in a certain sense supports these expectations.  The 
percentage of the citizens that spend the most time watching political programs is 
dramatically lower among the new non-voters compared with voters. Accordingly, the 
percentage of citizens that still frequently follow political programming is very high among 
non-voters and almost twice as high  among voters, which also indicates that people with 
interested in and knowledge of politics decide to stop voting. Factors why these citizens stop 
voting will be investigated in the remainder of the chapter. 
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Table 6.11.8 Frequency of watching political program among US New Non-Voters 
Frequency of watching pol. program               New Non-Voters                         Others 
Almost every day                                             34.04                                             52.16 
Two or three times per week                           48.94                                              25.51 
Three of four times per month                         17.02                                             16.51 
Few times per week                                                0   5.81 
Total (N=995)                                                   100%                                             100% 
 
6.11.3. Party and ideological attachment 
Party identification and ideological standings of the citizens are arguably some of the most 
important explanatory factors affecting the decision of a voter to vote or not at elections. 
From Campbell et al (1960) and their funnel model, party ID is established as one of the 
strongest factors that explains voting. On the other hand, party ideology plays a very 
important role in the electoral process. Therefore, this subsection offers an overview of the 
differences between new non-voters and others regarding their ID and ideological positions 
on two issues, abortion and state intervention in the economy.  These two issues are taken 
into consideration because the ideological standings of citizens on the economy and society 
can most easily be discerned. Also a distinction between party ID and ideological self–
placement is made because there are differences and no necessarily overlap between these 
two categories. 
Table 6.11.9 demonstrates the differences between new non-voters and voters regarding party 
identification. The results show only small differences between the groups. While the 
percentage of Republicans is smaller among the new non-voters, the percentage of the new 
non-voters among Democrats is same with the percentage of voters.  According to 
expectations, the independents are more likely to shift from voting to non-voting; their 
percentage among new non-voters is 6 percentage points higher than among voters. 
Nevertheless, the table also shows that more than 55% of new non-voters express party 
affiliation. This shows that despite their close ID with a certain political party, they still 
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decide to discontinue voting. The reasons for this decline, as this chapter hypothesises, are 
most likely related to party behaviour.  
Table 6.11.9 Party Identification of the US New Non-Voters 
Party Identification                               New Non-Voters                              Voters 
Democrat      25.93 25.80 
Independent                                                             42.59 36.62 
No Preference                                                                 0   1.59 
Republican     29.63 34.29 
Other       1.85   1.70 
Total (N=996)       100%   100% 
There is a perceivable debate among scholars as to whether party ID automatically reflects 
liberal-conservative self-positioning. Previous research has shown that liberal - conservative 
self-placement acts as mainly a surrogate for partisanship (Butler and Stokes 1969, Inglehart 
and Klingemann 1976, Inglehart and Sidjanski 1976, Inglehart 1979, Converse and Pierce 
1986, Jagodzinski and Kuhnel 1994, Mazzoleni 2003) or in other words “the result of 
inherited party loyalties" (Inglehart and Sidjanski 1976: 240). However, empirical studies 
support the “classical view" that individual liberal - conservative self-placement basically 
reflects issue preferences or value orientations. In this view the liberal - conservative 
dimension fulfils the function of a “super issue" or an “overarching spatial dimension", which 
summarizes distinct value dimensions in one continuum (Sani and Sartori 1983, Huber 1989, 
Van Deth and Geurts 1989; partly: Sciarini and Finger 1991, implicitly Knutsen 1995a, 
1997). This view has recently received support from empirical findings of a “cognitive 
mobilization" (Dalton 1984, 2002), of partisan dealignment (Wattenberg 1998) and an 
increase of “issue voting" (Dalton 2002). 
Hence, Table 6.11.10 presents the differences in the liberal - conservative self-placement        
among the new non-voters and voters.  There are no great differences between these two 
groups. Nevertheless, contrary to the case with the party ID, the more conservative an 
individual, the more likely he or she will convert from voting to non-voting; therefore their 
percentage is higher among new non-voters. There is an almost equal distribution of 
moderate citizens among new non-voters and voters, which is contrary to the scholarly-driven 
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expectations that moderates are more likely to stop voting.  However, this is strongly related 
to the ideological positions of candidates, which will be stressed in further sections. 
Table 6.11.10 Ideological Self-Placement of the US New Non-Voters 
Liberal – Conservative Self Placement               New Non-Voters                 Others 
Extremely Liberal                                                                 0                            0 
Liberal   7.41                                   7.62 
Slightly Liberal 12.96   15.67 
Moderate                                                                             29.63  27.53 
Slightly Conservative                                                          24.07  26.88 
Conservative 25.93  20.78 
Extremely Conservative                                                        0                            1.52 
Total (N=973)                                                                      100%                            100% 
In sum, there are certain differences between new non-voters and voters. There are more new 
non-voters among men, divorced, southerners and people that follow political programs two 
to three times per week. When party ID matters, the number of the independents is higher 
among new non-voters compared with others, but the fact that still around 55% of new non-
voters have stressed party affiliation is a strong indicator of the role of party behaviour as a 
factor contributing to why voters stop voting. Nevertheless, Democrats in the 1984 and 1988 
US presidential elections were passing through a very hard period following three 
consecutive defeats. Hence, the motivation among Democrats to participate was higher in the 
1992 and 1996 US presidential elections as a result of the closeness of electoral results and 
perceived opportunity to overtake power, while Republicans were facing absolutely opposite 
circumstances.       
Ideological self-placement also shows some very interesting patterns worth testing in the 
further sections. The percentage of conservatives is higher among new non-voters than in the 
other category. Among liberals there are no big differences. Therefore, this thesis is 
concentrated on analysing the ideological and position shifts of parties, concretely 
presidential candidates. Conservatives are the traditional source of votes for Republicans, 
with Ronald Reagan widely perceived as a strong conservative and while George H. W. Bush 
intended to continue Reagan's policies, he also pledged a "kinder and gentler nation" in an 
attempt to win over more moderate voters. Conversely, Democrats, after devastating results 
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in the 1984 and 1988 US presidential elections, nominated Bill Clinton in the 1992 on a 
platform of more left wing and liberal policies.  
Finally, an analysis of the differences among new non-voters and voters is a starting point 
into a statistical analysis of the factors that influence voters to stop voting. While simple 
frequencies between new non-voters and voters have enabled us to observe the differences 
between these categories, statistical models above will allow us to identify the factors 
contributing to no longer voting. 
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APPENDIX C 
Table 6.12 Self-reported Turnout in the US Presidential Elections 1984-1996 
Year                                  Voted                         Did not Vote          Turnout                 Total 
1996 889 107 49.0                       996 
1992 844 150 55.2                       994 
1988   890 66 50.2                      956 
1984   869 63 53.3                       932 
Source: Youth and Parents Socialization Panel 1984-1996 
 
Table 6.13 Summary of Variables in the US elections 
   Variable                        Observations            Mean        Std. Dev.                    Min                Max 
New Non Voter                         996              0.054                  0.22                0                  1 
Left –Right Shift                        952               5.30                   3.34               1.02            19.31 
Political Information                  996               2.54                    0.94               1                   5 
Political Trust                            948              2.58                    1.19                1                   6 
House Ownership                      996              1.09                     0. 42               1                   7 
Income                                     921              15.24                    4.28                3                  23 
Employment Status                   996              15.98                   16.77               10                70 
Educational Change                  996               2.90                     1.99                1                   5 
Mobility                                   996                0.65                    1.14                0                   9 
Gender                                     996                1.53                    0.49                1                   2 
Party ID                                   861                2.52                    1.80                1                   7 
Party ID Strength                        608                 4.54                       2.50                1                     7  
Source: Youth and Parents Socialization Panel 1984-1996 
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APPENDIX D 
Table 6.14. The New Non-Voters and Shift in the Welfare State policy 
Variables           Model 4                 The New Non-Voter                               Others                                                                                                                                                                                         
Welfare Shift                                       -0.93* (0.48)                                           -0.16(0.16) 
Political Information                           0.57** (0.26)                                           0.15**(0.14) 
Political Trust                                      0.32* (0.18)                                             0.01 (0.11) 
Mobility                                              0.26*  (0.15)                                            -0.18* (0.09) 
Gender                                                -0.24. (0.43)                                              0.88*** (0.27) 
Income                                                 0.01 (0.05)                                               -0.06**(0.004) 
Employment Status                             0.02***(0.01)                                           0.002(0.007) 
Education Change                               0.00 (0.57)                                                0.02(0.06) 
Party ID                                               0.39***(0.11)                                           0.07 (0.07) 
Constant                                              -2.12 (1.79)                                              -1.30 (1.16) 
Pseudo R Squared                                0.20 
N                                                           775 
Base Category: The Habitual Voter, Clustered standard errors,  *** 0.01, ** 0.05, *0.1 
 
Table 6.15 The New Non-Voter in the Foreign Policy and Defense areas  
Variables            Model 5               The New Non-Voter                               Others                                                                                                                                                                                         
Security  Shift                                      -1.11(0.74)                                              0.28***(0.08)  
Political Information                             0.69*** (0.23)                                         0.26**(0.13) 
Political Trust                                       0.13 (0.16)                                              -0.09  (0.13) 
Mobility                                               0.16  (0.14)                                              0.17* (0.09) 
Gender                                                 -0.06 (0.39)                                              0.96*** (0.27) 
Income                                                -0.003 (0.04)                                            -0.06**(0.003) 
Employment Status                              0.07 (0.09)                                               -0.005(0.007) 
Education Change                                0.02(0.09)                                                 0.02(0.05) 
Party ID                                               0.52***(0.10)                                           0.19***(0.07) 
Constant                                             -7.85***(1.62)                                          -3.74***(1.13) 
Pseudo R Squared                                     0.12 
N                                                                775 
Base Category: The Habitual Voter, Clustered standard errors,  *** 0.01, ** 0.05, *0.1 
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Table 6.16. The New Non-Voters and Shift in the Liberal Market policy area 
Variables           Model 6                 The New Non-Voter                               Others                                                                                                                                                                                         
Free Market Shift                                 2.80*(1.64)                                            1.032***(0.05)    
Political Information                            0.81*** (0.25)                                         0.22 (0.14) 
Political Trust                                       0.16 (0.17)                                             -0.01  (0.11) 
Mobility                                                0.23 (0.13)                                              0.16 (0.10) 
Gender                                                   0.34 (0.48)                                             1.09*** (0.28) 
Income                                                 -0.05 (0.05)                                             -0.06**(0.03) 
Employment Status                              0.003 (0.10)                                            -0.003(0.007) 
Education Change                                0.14 (0.10)                                               0.05(0.06) 
Party ID                                               0.51***(0.11)                                           0.11*(0.07) 
Constant                                              -8.63***(1.92)                                        -2.96***(1.20) 
Pseudo R Squared                                0.20 
N                                                           775 
Base Category: The Habitual Voter, Clustered standard errors,  *** 0.01, ** 0.05, *0.1 
 
Table 6.17 The New Non-Voter in the Human Rights policy area  
Variables            Model 7               The New Non-Voter                               Others                                                                                                                                                                                         
Human Rights                                     2.19***(0.71)                              -0.097(0.06) 
Political Information                           -0.55*** (0.23)                                         0.21(0.13) 
Political Trust                                      0.11 (0.16)                                               -0.01  (0.11) 
Mobility                                              0.17*** (0.14)                                          0.17* (0.09)  
Gender                                                -0.10 (0.37)                                               0.83** (0.27) 
Income                                                -0.01 (0.04)                                              - 0.06(0.003) 
Employment Status                             0.01***(0.08)                                          -0.003(0.007) 
Education Change                               -0.01 (0.09)                                               0.06(0.06) 
Party ID                                               0.34***(0.10)                                            0.08 (0.07) 
Constant                                              -7.11***(1.50)                                           -3.15***(1.10) 
Pseudo R Squared                                0.12 
N                                                           775 
Base Category: The Habitual Voter, Clustered standard errors,  *** 0.01, ** 0.05, *0.1 
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Table 6.18 The New Non-Voters and Shift in the policy area of Multiculturalism 
Variables           Model 8                 The New Non-Voter                               Others                                                                                                                                                                                         
Multiculturalism                                  -3.44*** (0.55)                                  -0.41(0.39) 
Political Information                             0.77*** (0.25)                                        0.27**(0.13) 
Political Trust                                       0.26 (0.17)                                               0.007 (0.14) 
Mobility                                               0.16 (0.14)                                               -0.16** (0.09) 
Gender                                                 -0.14  (0.42)                                              0.87*** (0.27) 
Income                                                 0.03 (0.04)                                               -0.06*(0.004) 
Employment Status                             0.01 (0.009)                                              -0.002(0.007) 
Education Change                               -0.05 (0.09)                                                0.03(0.06) 
Party ID                                              -0.59***(0.10)                                            0.17**(0.07) 
Constant                                              -5.21***(1.26 )                                          -2.52**(1.06) 
Pseudo R Squared                                0.15 
N                                                           775 
Base Category: The Habitual Voter, Clustered standard errors,  *** 0.01, ** 0.05, *0.1 
 
Table 6.19 The New Non-Voter in the Labour rights policy areas  
Variables            Model 9               The New Non-Voter                                  Others                                                                                                                                                                                         
Lobour Rights                                     -0.060(2.4)                                               0.096(0.84) 
Political Information                           0.71*** (0.23)                                          0.26**(0.14) 
Political Trust                                      0.10  (0.15)                                              -0.08  (0.11) 
Mobility                                              0.17   (0.15)                                              0.18** (0.09) 
Gender                                                -0.21 (0.37)                                              0.88*** (0.27) 
Income                                                -0.01 (0.04)                                               0.07**(0.004) 
Employment Status                             0.01***(0.01)                                          -0.002(0.006) 
Education Change                               -0.03 (0.18)                                               0.01(0.05) 
Party ID                                               0.51***(0.10)                                           0.15***(0.07) 
Constant                                              -5.68***(1.46)                                         -2.57***(1.07) 
Pseudo R Squared                                0.09 
N                                                           775 
Base Category: The Habitual Voter, Clustered standard errors,  *** 0.01, ** 0.05, *0.1 
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Table 6.20 The New Non-Voters and Shift in the Traditional Values  
Variables           Model 10                 The New Non-Voter                               Others                                                                                                                                                                                         
Traditional Values                               1.71***(0.37)                                        -0.38**(0.18) 
Political Information                           0.62*** (0.14)                                         0.26**(0.14) 
Political Trust                                      0.12 (0.16)                                               0.14  (0.12) 
Mobility                                              0.15  (0.14)                                              -0.02 (0.37) 
Gender                                                -0.01 (0.08)                                              0.88*** (0.27) 
Income                                                -0.01 (0.04)                                              0.06**(0.004) 
Employment Status                             0.04***(0.01)                                          -0.003(0.006) 
Education Change                               -0.01(0.18)                                               0.02(0.05) 
Party ID                                              0.41***(0.10)                                           0.13*(0.06) 
Constant                                              -6.59***(1.49)                                        -2.84***(1.09) 
Pseudo R Squared                                0.12 
N                                                           775 
Base Category: The Habitual Voter, Clustered standard errors,  *** 0.01, ** 0.05, *0.1 
 
Table 6.21 The New Non-Voter in the Minority Rights Policy area  
Variables            Model 11              The New Non-Voter                               Others                                                                                                                                                                                         
Minority Rights Shift                           0.23(0.58)                                              -0.74**(0.26) 
Political Information                           0.67*** (0.23)                                         0.38**(0.14) 
Political Trust                                      0.09(0.48)                                               0.14  (0.12) 
Mobility                                              0.88*** (0.12)                                         -0.02 (0.37) 
Gender                                                -0.02 (0.88)                                              0.15*** (0.23) 
Income                                                -0.01 (0.04)                                              0.06***(0.004) 
Employment Status                             0.04**(0.01)                                           -0.003(0.006) 
Education Change                               0.57 (0.18)                                               0.02(0.05) 
Party ID                                               0.48***(0.10)                                          0.24***(0.07) 
Constant                                              -11.15***(4.70)                                       -8.89***(0.70) 
Pseudo R Squared                                0.12 
N                                                           775 
Base Category: The Habitual Voter, Clustered standard errors,  *** 0.01, ** 0.05, *0.1 
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CHAPTER SEVEN  
Do parties lose some of their supporters because of ideological shifts? 
 
7.1. Introduction 
A significant number of voters decide to stop participating at the next electoral cycles despite 
their regular previous participation. The majority of the previous research on the voters’ 
behaviour has shown that citizens support the political party with which they closely identify 
(Campbell et al, 1960). This party identification is a result of the process of socialisation, it is 
inherited from the parents and it becomes a habit which voters tend to repeat in the future 
while casting the ballots (Campbell et al, 1960). Nevertheless, this close relationship between 
the voters and the political party they have supported is taken for granted. The voters that 
used to regularly participate at elections and stop voting at the next electoral cycle are 
opposing this commonly accepted wisdom. Opposite of their previous habit of voting and 
their party identification which drive their decision to continue voting, this category of voters 
stop participating at elections. 
The aim of this chapter is to analyse how parties are influenced by the number of voters that 
have stopped voting and whether parties and their electoral strategies cause voters to stop 
voting. This chapter hypothesises that ideological inconsistence of political parties is one of 
the main reasons why voters lose their attachment with the political party, they feel they are 
not adequately represented anymore and therefore stop voting at the next electoral cycle. This 
paper attempts to show that while the change of the ideological positions of the party is 
considered by parties as an efficient strategy for attracting new voters, it can also cause 
serious damage to the already existing supporters for the party and influence on their decision 
to stop voting at next elections.  
Political parties have different incentives to shift their ideological positions. As I will show 
below there are several main theories which explain why political parties lack of ideological 
consistence, why they are not staying coherent and “flip-flop” their ideological positions. As 
part of the shift of the party ideology, this paper will also examine whether and how other 
party characteristics such as being part of the government or being in opposition, change of 
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the party leadership, different party family, size and number of competing party opponents 
influence the number of their previous voters that have stopped voting at the next elections.  
The chapter is organized in six sections. The next section analyses the current development of 
the political parties and how they influence the decline of the political participation. The 
following section of the chapter offers a theoretical explanation of the parties’ electoral 
strategies followed with a brief review of the literature that analyses parties’ transformation 
and their ideological and policy inconsistence. In the fourth section, I will present my 
research question and hypotheses, before I discuss the dataset, the statistical model that I am 
testing and its variables. The main findings of my analysis and interpretation of the results are 
shown in section five. The chapter ends with concluding remarks on the results and a 
discussion of methodological aspects. 
7.2. How political parties create new non-voters?  
Political parties are very important political actors without which democratic life could not be 
imagined (Schattschneider 1937), but at the same time parties are no longer what they once 
were (Schmitter 2001). While political parties were traditionally seen as channels between 
civil society and the state, they now seem to be moving towards the state and away from civil 
society (Katz and Mair 1995; Dalton 2000; Van Biezen 2004). Political parties today seem to 
be in decline. Empirically, this decline claim has been supported by several studies. Dalton 
(2000) shows that feelings of partisanship have declined even more severely than initially 
thought, and Mair and Van Biezen (2001) report that party membership has declined over 
time. Mair (2005) combines several indicators of involvement in parties and reports that 
turnout, electoral volatility, party identification, and membership have all declined over the 
past few decades in a number of democracies, which points to a general decline in 
involvement in political parties (Van Biezen, Mair, Poguntke 2009, 2011). Parties seem to 
lose their grip on society and the weight of parties seems to be eroding (Blondel 2002). 
The transformation of political parties has undoubtedly and predominantly caused a change in 
their ideological positions (Mair and Castles 1984, Budge 1994, Volkens and Klingemann 
2001). This change is dependent on their strategy as well as political circumstances. When 
there was a greater degree of electoral competitiveness, the parties were more “vote seekers”; 
when there is greater certainty for accurate conversion of the votes into seats, then parties will 
place more value on electoral objectives (Strom 2000). 
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During the period in which elite parties dominated, political ideologies, goals and conflicts 
largely revolved around the distribution of privileges, and the parties competed on the basis 
of the ascribed status of their adherents. As the mass party developed, the key opposition in 
party ideologies was focused around the question of social reform, and parties competed in 
terms of representative capacity. With the emergence of the catch-all party, the ideology of 
parties revolved around the question of social improvement rather than wholesale reform, and 
the parties competed on the basis of policy efficiency rather than on the basis of 
representative potential. With the emergence of the cartel party, the goals of politics became 
more self-referential, with politics becoming a profession in itself. The now limited inter-
party competition takes place on the basis of competing claims of efficient and effective 
management (Strom 2001). Declining levels of satisfaction with core democratic institutions 
and politicians, the apparent withdrawal of people from the political process in general, the 
ideological convergence and the disappearing popular component of democracy through 
political parties in specific all seem to point to deeper problems with democracy itself. 
Ideologies and issues adopted from the parties are centrally important in representative 
democracies. Parties should respond to citizens’ preferences by offering policy packages; 
they should realise these pre-election promises after coming to power.  If this package is 
distinguishable, then the voters will support the political parties in the elections (Volkens and 
Klingeman 2001). 
The main theories/hypotheses explaining the decline in ideological distances between parties 
are “cleavage theory contagion processes”, rational choice theory, “end of ideology” catch-all 
parties as well as the Europeanisation of political parties (Nanou, Han Dorussen 2009). 
Catch-all practices and contagion processes have induced whole party families to move 
towards the center of the political spectrum (Rueda 2007), enabling new parties to emerge at 
the left or right ends of the pole. Catch-all parties have consequently taken up new issues that 
are neither left nor right. On a cross-country average, the distance between political parties 
decreased during the 1940’s to 1960’s, increased from the 1970’s to 1980’s and again 
decreased between the 1980’s and 1990’s. The degree of polarisation and level of range was 
bigger in the 1940’s than in the 1990’s (Volkens and Klingeman 2001). 
As a result of political internationalisation and globalisation, the parties in communist, 
socialist, green, Christian Democratic and regional party families have moved closer to each 
other on an ideological basis (Kriesi 2008). Convergence processes from the 1940’s to 1960’s 
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between party families were the result of the stronger movement leftward of the Christian 
Democratic, liberal and regional parties rather than the socialist party families, which drifted 
in the opposite direction. (Volkens and Klingeman 2001). Divergence processes from the 
1970s to 1980s are result of the opposite movement: the leftward party families moved more 
strongly to the right. 
The Europeanization of the political parties as a result of European integration also caused a 
decline of the differences between the political parties. The influence of Europeanisation on 
the party ideological shift is particularly significant in Central and Eastern post-communist 
countries where the integration into the EU has caused a further ideological congruence of the 
political parties (Nanou 2009) Additionally, testing for ideological convergence of party 
families as a result of the Europeanisation, Camia and Caramani (2012) indicate high and 
persistent long-term ideological cohesiveness at both elite and electorate level, especially on 
the economic left–right dimension pointing to a Europeanised party system (Camia and 
Caramani 2012).  
To sum up, the above review shows that the constant decline of political representation and 
responsibility and the decline in the voter turnout were followed by convergence and a 
constant shift of party ideologies. This research attempts to show that the decline of voter 
turnout and increasing number of new non-voters are strongly correlated with party ideology 
shifts. 
7.3. What about political parties and their ideological positions? 
Political parties change their ideological positions in order to better achieve their goals. No 
matter whether they are policy -, office – or vote-seeking (Muller and Strom 1999), they 
expect to benefit from their ideological move. Political parties are left to make the choice 
between two main strategies: to freeze the party system and to keep their ideological 
positions very stable or to act as an adaptive agent in search of votes and hence to change 
their positions where the median voter belongs. When making their decisions parties have to 
be aware of the reaction from the risk-averse voters and their core supporters. These voters 
may penalise parties that drastically shift their policies. If political parties want to keep their 
support they need to freeze the party system (Alvarez and Nagler 2002; Adams, Merrill, and 
Grofman 2005; Budge 1994; Stokes 2001). On the other hand, several studies argue that 
parties are adaptive agents in search of votes. Parties are not necessarily optimally positioned 
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in the ideological space, and this gives some parties an incentive to constantly shift their 
positions in the hope of gaining votes (Adams et al. 2004; Kollman, Miller, and Page 1992; 
Laver 2005). Additionally, when considering Laver’s model of types of political parties and 
party competition (2005, 2012) in which he distinguishes four types of parties: hunter, 
aggregator, predator and sticker, the three of these types are continually changing their 
positions with the goal of achieving better electoral result. The forth type – the sticker party - 
is an ideologically constant party, and thus keeps the same positions and, in general, is 
orientated toward keeping their stable voters and supporters. 
Nevertheless, this ideological incoherence can cause different outcomes. The Labour party in 
Great Britain, especially in the period between the early 1980s to the middle of the 1990s, 
illustrates how a party ideology shift can influence electoral outcomes, and also cause many 
supporters to stop voting. At the beginning of the 1980s, after the electoral defeat in the 
parliamentary elections in 1979 and with the change of the leader of the party and the 
inauguration of the writer Michael Foot, this resulted in an enormous move of the party 
toward the left (Crines, 2010). The new party manifesto that was introduced was considered 
to be a strong socialist move (Jenkins, Owen, Williams Rodgers, 1981) and resulted in the 
worst electoral outcome for the party since 1918. As a result of this dramatic ideological 
shift, significant numbers of voters decided not to vote, while simultaneously a substantial 
number of voters shifted their support to the new-formed Social Democratic Party. In the end 
the Labour Party captured only 27.6% of the votes.  
The changes that the Labour Party undertook in the 1990s demonstrate how party ideology 
shift can cause an increase in the number of votes for the party and, thus, an electoral win. 
The continuous transformation of the Labour Party, starting with Foot’s successor Neil 
Kinnock, and resulting in the publication of the new manifesto in 1996, called “New 
Labour”, under the leadership of Tony Blair, produce success in the elections and resulted in 
the party gaining power. This manifesto was another example of the ideology shift of the 
party, but in this case the new votes received as a result of the shift overtook the votes lost as 
a result of political apathy and brought about an electoral win.  Now, after an electoral defeat 
at the UK general elections of 2010 and the election of Ed Miliband as the new Labour 
leader, the party is once again moving towards the left. The election of the Jeremy Corbyn as 
leader of the Labour in 2015 after the defeat of the party at the UK general elections of 2015 
represents a decisive move to the party towards the party positions during the era of Michael 
152 
 
Foot. Even media has portrayed Jeremy Corbyn as the “same ideologically extreme, and 
maybe even less electable than Foot”. 
Contrary to the Labour case, in one of the most systematic empirical attempts to analyse party 
ideologies, Budge (1994) analysed and tests alternative decision rules that the leadership of 
parties can practice when deciding how to adjust party policy positions – by shifting to the 
left or the right–between elections. His findings show that while there is substantial temporal 
stability in parties’ ideologies, different political parties implement different decision rules to 
decide the direction of their inter-election policy shifts.  According to Budge, this ideological 
stability is a result partly of the uncertain political environment that elites confront in which 
they cannot accurately forecast how their ideologies will affect their electoral fortunes 
(Adams et al, 2005).  
Building on Budge (1994), Adams et al, (2005) differentiate ideological shifts as a result of 
(i) shifts in public opinion and (ii) past election results. They show that when a political party 
finds itself in a disadvantaged position regarding the shift of the public opinion, i.e. when the 
public opinion has significantly shifted towards left, the rightwing political parties are forced 
to adjust their ideological positions in order to remain competitive at elections (Adams et al 
2005). The past electoral results do not play any significant role in ideological shifts of 
political parties. Adams et al (2005) show that political parties do not adopt their ideological 
standings as a result of the success or failure at the previous elections. The adaptation takes 
place only as a result of the public opinion shifts. Additionally, similar to Budge, these 
authors show that party ideologies are relatively stable and parties are reluctant to alter their 
ideologies. Parties display no systematic tendency to respond to public opinion except when 
it clearly shifts away from their positions (Adams et al. 2005). 
Nevertheless, an important issue regarding ideological changes of the parties is the directions 
and size of the changes. Budge and Klingemann (2001) show that over time, change 
sometimes results in party positions overlapping or in parties ‘leapfrogging’ each other, but 
by and large, such leapfrogging only occurs between parties that are ideologically close to 
one another (Budge and Klingemann, 2001). Another important issue raised mainly in the 
works of Adams and his co-authors (2005, 2012, 2014, 2015) shows that voters’ perceptions 
of ideological changes in party manifestos is low on average and if a party changes its left-
right position in terms of its manifesto, the mean of respondents does not position the party 
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significantly more to the left or right than the mean of respondents in the previous election 
(Adams and Somer-Topcu, 2014). 
Thus, Adams (2012) reveals a paradox: “on the one hand, empirical studies conclude that 
parties systematically shift their policy positions in response to the factors that spatial 
modelers have identified. On the other hand, there is only weak and inconsistent empirical 
evidence that voters actually perceive parties’ policy shifts, and/or that these shifts have 
significant electoral consequences” (Adams 2012).  
Additionally, the shifts of the ideological positions are not the same for mainstream parties 
and niche parties. Adams et al. (2004, 2006) and Ezrow et al. (2011) conducting empirical 
analyses on the ideological shifts of parties from various party families show that while all 
political parties in western European party systems show ideological inconsistency and 
shifted the left-right positions in their policy manifestos in response to shifts in public 
opinion, these tendencies were only substantively significant in the case of mainstream 
parties such as Labour, Social Democratic, Liberal, Christian Democratic, and the 
Conservative parties (Adams 2015).  
Regarding the niche parties which are defined as small parties with ideological clienteles 
including green, communist, and radical right parties, Ezrow et al (2011) in their analyses of 
shifts in the policy positions of 15 western European political parties over the period 1973–
2002, identified no substantively significant relationship between public opinion shifts and 
shifts on the left-right dimension of niche parties’ election manifestos. There are several 
explanations to this.  Ezrow et al (2011) argue that “niche parties’ policy stability in the face 
of public opinion shifts reflects the niche party elites’ belief that their core supporters are 
more ideologically oriented than are the supporters of mainstream parties and will react badly 
to policy shifts in their party’s election program because these supporters view such shifts—
especially those that moderate the niche party’s policies—as a betrayal of the party’s core 
values” Ezrow et al (2011).  They suggest that “niche party elites were disproportionately 
responsive to the policy preferences of their current supporters, in the sense that when their 
supporters’ policy preferences shifted in a direction that differed from the direction of 
opinion shifts in the wider electorate, these niche parties tended to follow their supporters as 
opposed to the public as a whole” (Adams, 2012). 
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Tavits (2007) argues that whether party policy shifts are damaging or rewarding depends on 
whether the shift occurs in the pragmatic or principled issue domain. On pragmatic issues, 
voters value “getting things done.” Policy shifts in this domain signal responsiveness to the 
changing environment and are likely to be rewarded. Principled issues, however, concern 
core beliefs and values. Any policy shift in this domain is a sign of inconsistency and lack of 
credibility, which is likely to lead to voter withdrawal. 
Finally, the ideologies and policy preferences play strong role in the American elections. As I 
have shown in Chapter 4, the consistency—or lack thereof—in candidates’ positions is, as 
Tomz and van Houweling stress, a perennial issue in political campaigns. When candidates 
change positions over time, competitors often expose the inconsistency and attempt to exploit 
it for electoral advantage (Tomz and Van Houweling 2011). Just as parties are seen as less 
credible and committed when they attempt to takeover an issue that some other party “owns” 
(Budge and Farlie 1983; Petrocik 1996), they lack credibility and appear uncommitted when 
they shift their original stances on a principled issue (Tavits 2007). The primaries in the 
Republican campus for the presidential elections in 2016 have shown a great shift towards 
more conservative positions and lack of moderate candidates who will articulate the interests 
and preferences of the moderate voters. Similarly in the Democratic campus, the presence of 
the self-proclaimed democratic socialist Bernie Sanders has influenced ideological shifts and 
adaptations from the front-runner candidate Hillary Rodham Clinton, who is consequently 
accused for inconsistency and adopting her positions in line with the public opinion shifts. 
Nevertheless, very few previous researches have been focused on the effect of this 
ideological inconsistency on the decision of the individuals to vote or to stop voting. Tomz 
and Van Houweling (2008, 2010) contribution in diagnosing this issue via experimental 
design is a novel attempt of investigating this phenomenon, but their research is mainly 
concentrated on the following: first, on the vote choice in general only including the decision 
to stop voting as one of the alternatives and, second, on a manipulated hypothetical 
environment on the Internet using experimental methods and not on a observational data.  
7.4. Do ideologies still matter?  
As I have shown above, numerous previous research studies have pointed out that political 
ideologies lose their importance. Political parties do not compete on the same social 
cleavages and voters do not make their decision based on their class, social or racial division. 
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The new circumstances have brought us to what is considered as the phenomenon of electoral 
dealignment (Dalton et al., 1984; Franklin et al., 1992). Economic and social changes, often 
referred to as the process of social modernisation (Thomassen, 2005), have reduced the 
impact of social-structural factors and long-term predispositions on how a citizen votes. 
Contrary to this, Hill and Leighley (1993), analysing statewide levels of turnout in the US by 
using aggregate level data, investigated the relative importance of organization, party 
ideology and competitiveness as factors that influence participation in U.S. gubernatorial 
elections. They find that party ideology as well as party competitiveness has a significant 
effect on the turnout, unlike party organization. Their findings show that party ideology is an 
important determinant of voters’ behaviour, a part of the financial spending of the candidates, 
and also differentiates depending on the level of restrictiveness of a state voter’s registration 
requirements. Logically, a less restrictive registration law increases the influence on party 
ideology. 
On the other hand, although not unanimously, many previous research studies discuss and 
show evidence as to the increase of the party system in polarisation. A higher level of 
polarisation has been shown to strengthen ideological voting (van der Eijk et al. 2005; Ensley 
2007; Lachat 2008a), value voting (Knutsen and Kumlin 2005), and issue voting (Alvarez 
and Nagler 2004). “Greater polarization means that parties’ issue positions diverge more 
strongly, which should incite parties to emphasize their issue positions. The increased 
salience of issues, in turn, should motivate voters to rely on more substantial criteria and 
make it easier to do so” (Lachat 2008). 
Political parties often stake out left-right positions that deviate from mean positions of their 
voters. Against the conventional wisdom, a significant number of previous research studies 
have shown that political parties stand more extreme positions than supporters. According to 
the directional theory of voting (Rabinowitz and MacDonald, 1989) political parties tend to 
take a stronger ideological position because voters care not only about the direction of 
political positions, but also the intensity of that position. In multi-party system, if more 
political parties are positioned on the same side of the left-right spectrum, then they tend to 
differentiate among each other based on the intensity of position. In this sense, according to 
directional theory, political parties are forced to intensify their ideological positions, to shift 
their previous ideological standings and to adapt to the needs to attract more votes. 
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Ideological inconsistency results from the shifting of party positions, and is  part of the 
strategies of political parties to attract more voters. 
Ideology strongly matters and influences the electoral outcome (Lewis-Back and Chlarson 
2002). In the case of the French presidential elections of 1995, Lewis-Back and Chlarson 
(2002) show that left-right ideological identification is even stronger explanatory factor of the 
vote choice than party identification. Party identification strongly drives the electoral 
outcome in the first ballot, while left-right ideological identification is more crucial for the 
second ballot.  
More contemporary studies of the ideological positions of Conservatives under Cameron 
during 2010 Parliamentary Elections show “ideology and ideological difference remain 
central features of modern British politics, and that ideological positioning is an important 
concern for political parties” (Buckler and Dolowitz 2012). According to this study, the 
Conservatives engaged in a process of ideological repositioning and lacked clarity and 
ideological consistency. As Helm (2010) and Walters (2010) show, the failure of the 
Conservatives to win a majority in the Parliament, which was followed with criticism from 
within the party as well as outside it, for inconsistency in terms both of policies and ideas, 
shows that a lack of clear ideological positioning or repositioning in the light of political 
problems can only help such problems to sustain or be exacerbated (Buckler and Dolowitz 
2012). 
The Hungarian party system is another example of a highly polarized system. Todosijevic 
and Enyedi (2008) claim that the right-wing parties have a Christian-nationalist and 
anticommunist orientation, while the "left" is associated with the socialist-communist legacy 
and (at least within the social elite) with a libertarian-cosmopolitan orientation. “The cultural 
issue dimension (nationalism, libertarianism, clericalism, etc.) is much more decisive from 
the point of view of party competition than economic issues” (Enyedi, 2005; Markowski, 
1997; Toka, 2004).  
Furthermore, Todosijevic and Enyedi show that “the left regards the right as antidemocratic, 
nationalist, and, sometimes, even fascist. The right identifies the left with communism and 
regularly questions the loyalty of left-wing politicians to the nation. Observers often refer to 
the situation as a "cold civil war" between the left and the right (cf. Enyedi, 2006). Thus, 
under these conditions it is difficult to speak about a "dominant ideology” (Todosijevic and 
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Enyedi 2008). The Hungarian case shows that there is a strong competition of mutually 
exclusive ideologies. 
The US Presidential Elections in 2012 are another strong case of evidence in favour of the 
decisive role of the ideology for the electoral context (Feldman and Zaino 2012). These 
elections have confirmed the exceedingly polarized state of the political system. And contrary 
to the “conflict displacement” process literature which suggests that increasing the party 
conflict on certain issues on the agenda results in a decline of party conflict on another issues, 
the United Stated experienced what Layman and Carsey (2002) call “conflict extension” with 
two parties growing more polarized on cultural, racial and social welfare issues.  Some of the 
most important issues that brought a clear political division were the health care reform and 
the legal recognition of the same-sex marriage.  “Forty-nine percent of voters in the CBS exit 
poll want all or part of the 2010 health care law repealed, and 83 percent of them voted for 
Romney. 44 percent want the health care law left as is or expanded, and 87 percent of them 
voted for the president” (Feldman and Zaino 2012). Regarding same-sex marriages, Obama 
received almost three-quarters of the votes of those who favour same-sex marriage, and 
Romney won the same fraction of those opposed, while slight majority of voters were in 
favour of the marriage equality.  
These presidential elections brought another important segment of the role of the ideology, 
and that is ideological inconsistency. In order to win the Republican primaries, Mitt Romney 
significantly changed his positions on several important and salient issues as health care 
reform, same-sex marriage, gun control and abortion. Romney’s pragmatism to appeal the 
more conservative corpus of republican voters brought him to series of serious accusations of 
his opponents for constant “ideological flip-flopping” and being “consistently inconsistent”. 
Mitt Romney offered different ideological strategies for different electorates, which brought 
him to success inside the party, but at the same time it cost him losing the political credibility 
and confidence in the eyes of voters. Numerous previous research have shown that candidates 
appeal more extreme ideological positions during primaries and then they shift towards 
moderation during electoral campaigns and, in the case with Republicans for the 2012 
presidential election, this strategy did not bring the party success.  
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7.5. What motivates parties to shift their ideological positions? 
Political parties are goal-oriented entities. Their goals can be differentiated. Vote-seeking 
parties significantly differ from policy-seeking and the latter from the office-seeking parties 
(Strom and Mueller 1999). But no matter their goal, as agents, parties tend to maximize their 
utility. As a part of dynamic party systems competing against one or more parties with 
different strategies and ideological orientations, parties have to develop a system of ideas that 
will enable them to better achieve their goals. In this goal, parties are facing the dilemma to 
choose between credibility and adaptation. 
According to the spatial theory of voting, political parties should follow where the median 
voter moves and adapt to different ideological positions in order to attract more of these 
voters (Lachat 2008, Pardos-Prado & Dinas 2010, Fazekas and Meder 2013). In reality all the 
three dominant theories of voting, as has been explained above, suggest that parties should 
constantly ideologically move and shift their positions. According to proximity theory, 
political parties should always move left or right on the ideological spectrum in order to be 
closer to the highest density of voters. Directional theory suggests that parties should care 
about the direction of the voters, but in order to attract their support they have to shift the 
intensity and to emphasize the importance of their ideological positions. According to 
discount theory, parties should be aware which issue is important to the voters in a specific 
electoral context, to pay more attention to that issue and to adopt an ideological position 
regarding the certain issue which would be highly acceptable for the majority of voters. 
On the other hand, credibility is a highly appreciated characteristic in the electoral 
competition. At the same time, it is the “Achilles’ heel” where competitors always try to 
attack their opponent. Consistency is overemphasized as an important positive feature for the 
political parties and a value highly acknowledged by the voters and supporters. Therefore, 
when parties are changing their ideological positions, they should primarily consider how this 
will affect their own voters and supporters and whether this ideological shift will discredit the 
party among the loyal followers.  
While some of the reasons for ideological inconsistency are beyond parties’ control, such as 
the change of the socio-economic circumstances, transformation of the economic conditions 
and globalisation followed with the collapse of the two block division in international 
relations, there are several factors that cause ideological inconsistency and are completely 
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dependent on party strategies and their organisational context. As I have mentioned above, 
whether parties will change their ideological positions depends more of the electoral corpus 
they address, so parties and candidates differ ideologically at the primaries and elections. 
Another important element for ideological consistency is whether a party is in power or in 
opposition. The third element I will discuss below is change of leadership. 
While parties tend to offer citizens electoral programs that will attract more support, once 
they gain the power and enter government they are not always able to fulfill all the promises 
they gave during electoral campaigns. Moreover, often they shift their ideological positions 
and change their policy strategies and priorities while in power. Based on the findings of 
literature on electoral cycles (Nordhaus 1975; Rogoff 1988; Downs 1972; Alesina 1994), 
which has shown that the parties have an incentive to implement their mandate of public 
policy (or to be responsive) especially during electoral times, parties in government 
meanwhile implement policies different from those promised in their electoral programs. 
They are faced to trade-off between “compulsory” and “discretionary” issues in the 
legislative agenda that may be linked to the different levels of influence of parties on the 
legislative agenda, i.e. the ability of parties to include in the passed legislation issues that are 
close to their preferences. 
There are three different categories: Policy-routine (PRO) or the “compulsory” issues of 
legislative agendas, policy-reacting (PRE) or the “unexpected” issues, and policy-persuading 
(PP) or “preferred” issues (Froio 2012). Policy-persuading issues are the ones suggested from 
the party in the electoral campaign and which are ideologically close to the party. Voters will 
examine the consistency and credibility of the party according to the success of implementing 
these issues. Parties should be responsive to voters regarding these promises and they should 
keep their ideological consistency regarding the issues in order to keep the credibility. 
Nevertheless, the previous research has shown that parties are partially successful in 
maintaining their ideological coherence in implementing preferred issues while in power and 
that the legislative agenda is dominated by the policy-routine and policy-reacting issues 
(Edwards 1990, Cox 2006, Workman, Jones et al. 2009).     
Ideological extremity would play an important role in determining which candidates would 
be successful in primaries. According to King et al. (2012) ideological extremity is 
advantageous to those competing for their party’s nomination to senatorial candidacy. “More 
moderate candidates appear to be losing to more extreme candidates in primary elections. If 
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primary electorates are more likely to choose ideologically extreme candidates, then there are 
a number of important consequences for the political system” (King et al. 2012). During 
primaries, parties and candidates address supporters of their party which ideologically differ 
from the entire electoral body. In order to attract the nomination or support they have to 
intensify their ideological statements and hence to run on more extreme ideological stances. 
Nevertheless this seems to hurt a party’s ability to win a higher seat or vote share in the 
general elections. These candidates tend to moderate their ideological positions during the 
electoral campaigns in order to be more attractive to the wider electorates and then they lose 
their political credibility while also risking the extreme supporters they attracted during the 
primaries.  Previous research has also shown when only one party nominates more extreme 
candidate the other party also tends to address more extreme opposite ideological views 
(Burden 2001, Cox and McCubbins2005). “If both parties are nominating candidates farther 
away from the median voter of the overall electorate then this could explain a great deal of 
the polarization we see in politics today” (King et al 2012). 
Most popular accounts argue that during the 2010 congressional elections the Republicans’ 
inability to gain back control of the chamber can be traced to the nomination of extreme 
conservatives in states such as Nevada, Delaware, and Colorado (King et al 2012). While 
Republicans nominated an equal proportion of conservative ideologues for the House, 
Democrats were unable to highlight candidate extremity in those races in the same way that 
they had in the Senate and hence to react on their ideological inconsistency during the 
electoral campaigns. According to King et al (2012) this explains the success of Republicans 
to gain a majority in House of Representatives, but not in the Senate.  
Contrary to the case of Republicans in the US, the Socialist Party’s primaries in France for 
the presidential elections of 2012 brought forth a highly contested ideological race among 
several candidates, with the more moderate Francois Holland and Martine Aubry as more 
extreme candidate as frontrunners. While Aubry was enjoying vast support among the 
partisans as Secretary General of the socialists, the main concern during the primaries was 
that the nominee of the socialists should be a candidate that would be acceptable for the 
majority of voters in order to win against the incumbent Nicolas Sarkozy. Socialists chose 
Holland, who subsequently won the elections with a narrow margin, being the second runner-
up to win against the incumbent in the Fifth Republic. 
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The third very important factor that influences political parties to shift their ideological 
positions is related to the leadership and the party representation. The role of the party leader 
is increasing (Poguntke and Webb 2007). There is a clear pattern of presidentialisation of 
politics. Poguntke and Webb claim that three interrelated processes have led to a political 
process increasingly moulded by the inherent logic of presidentialism: increasing leadership 
power and autonomy within the political executive; increasing leadership power and 
autonomy within political parties; and increasingly leadership-centered electoral processes 
(Poguntke and Webb 2007). 
While there are substantial cross-national differences across 14 modern democracies 
including the US and Canada included in the analysis of Poguntke and Webb, the results 
show that modern democracies are increasingly following a presidential logic of governance 
through which leadership is becoming more central and more powerful, but also increasingly 
dependent on successful immediate appeal to the mass public. Hence this pattern of the 
presidentialisation of parties might have very clear implications on ideologies that parties 
hold and their consistency. The strong leadership and his autonomy within the party means 
that party are becoming more depending on the personal view of the President instead of the 
core values of the party. Leader’s ideological positions are emphasized and attract more 
public interest than official party positions in the platforms and manifestos and the change of 
her position is viewed as an ideological shift of the party as well. The necessity of immediate 
appeal of the mass public means that parties emphasize the most salient political issues and 
take positions that are closer to the wider electoral masses. In this way they diminish the 
importance of their traditional values and core ideological positions on which they have 
mobilized their supporters. 
Another important implication of the presidentialisation of party that directly influences 
ideological positions of the parties is the consequences of the leadership change. The strong 
personalisation and autonomy means that the new leader can bring the party in a very 
different direction compared with her precursor. Once again, the Labour Party in the UK in 
the period of late 70’s onwards is a typical example of this feature. The changes of the 
leadership staring with Michael Foot and finishing with Ed Miliband have brought constant 
ideological shifts including not only the intensity of some ideological values, but also the 
direction of ideology of the party (Evans 2011).  
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In pluralistic party systems like in most of the European countries, the coalition formation 
plays a very important role. The role of the parties in the coalitions can also influence their 
ideological positions. Fortunato and Stevenson (2013) show that coalition participation can 
strongly influence changes of the previous positions of the parties and that once in coalition, 
these parties converge their positions by adopting their manifesto preferences. Consequently, 
they argue that coalition membership is a useful heuristic that voters can use to infer how the 
policy positions of cabinet parties are changing or are likely to change over the life of a 
cabinet (Fortunato and Stevenson 2013). 
In sum, parties tend to shift their ideological positions in order to maximize their utility. 
Some of the reasons for the ideological inconsistency lay in the inevitable changes of the 
socio-economic circumstances, but parties are also motivated to shift their positions because 
(i) they address different electorates and this is the case with campaigns at primaries and 
elections, (ii) parties in power are not always able to implement the policy preferences 
introduced in their platforms, but their governmental agenda is interrupted by policy routine 
and policy reaction and (iii) parties are becoming more dependent on the autonomy of the 
leader and what leadership change can bring to different ideological priorities. 
7.6. Hypotheses, data and methodology 
7.6.1. Hypotheses 
The aim of this chapter is investigate whether voters that have supported a certain political 
party at previous elections stop voting because of party ideology inconsistence. This paper 
will test whether political parties lost a certain number of their supporters as result of their 
adaptive ideological strategy. Consequently, this research will also focus on discovering 
differences in the ideology shifts among the party families and it will also compare the 
number of new non-voters per party family. The following next two hypotheses will be 
tested: 
H1 The bigger the change of the party ideology, the bigger the number of new non-voters for 
parties. 
The starting position regarding this main hypothesis of the research is that when political 
parties change their ideologies, they might hurt their traditional supporters. These voters do 
not feel represented by the party anymore, but as a result of the previously achieved loyalty 
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and affiliation with the political party, they would rather stop voting than swing their vote to 
other political parties. 
H2 The number of the new non-voters is lower in the parties from the far-left (communist) 
and far-right (nationalist) parties despite their ideological shift as a result of the stronger 
loyalty of these supporters. 
This hypothesis follows up on the vast literature about party membership which claims that 
the supporters of the parties on the extreme of the political spectrum develop stronger 
affiliation toward parties they support. Contrary to them, voters closer to the political centre 
have a bigger choice among the catch all parties which display more moderate ideological 
positions and they are more likely to swing vote from one to another party than to stay 
strongly affiliated with the party they voted for in the previous electoral cycles. 
7.6.2. Data and operationalization of the variables 
For testing these hypotheses I use the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems Database 
Module II 2001 – 2011. This dataset enables me to construct the dependent variable that 
represents the percentage of the voters that abandoned voting for a certain political party in 
the second electoral cycle but voted for the party on the previous ballot. A part of the 
majority of the previous approaches dealing with similar question, this research is particularly 
interested in the voters that reported voting for the party but did not cast the ballot in the next 
elections. Therefore, an individual level post-election survey is necessary for construction of 
this variable. All the previous approaches use the difference between the electoral outcomes 
of the parties within two electoral cycles. The later approach does not provide for the 
possibility of answering the question this research precisely deals with. Although the way the 
dependent variable is constructed limits possibility for a very longer longitudinal analysis of 
the phenomenon because of lack of data, this approach still remains the best possible one for 
dealing with the research question. 
The main independent variable “party ideology shift score” once again will be constructed 
from the Comparative Party Manifesto Database. Another variable that will be included in the 
analysis is the government/opposition variable, which will control the position of the party in 
front of their voters and supporters. The party in government has more possibilities to attract 
votes because of their visibility, but also has a greater potential to lose this support because of 
unsatisfied promises. Also, a change in leadership variable will be included, which will 
control whether the change of the leader affects the overall perceptions held by the citizens 
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about that party, as well as whether the change of the leader has an influence on the party 
ideology shift. The two additional variables which are important to be tested are the numbers 
of effective political parties and voting availability. The bigger number of effective political 
parties would mean lower number of new non-voters. It is similar with the voting availability 
options. If voters have a chance to vote via post, using the proxy voting or the possibility of 
internet voting, the number of new non-voters will be smaller than if there is only an option 
for personal vote.   
7.7. Party ideology shift and number of new non-voters by party family 
The number of the new non-voters differs among the different party families. Although, 
political parties compete on the national arena and their strategies are mainly related with the 
domestic political environment, parties from the same party family have similar 
characteristics and implement similar strategies to compete. Also, parties from same party 
family focus on very similar population groups, they cooperate on the European and 
international level and therefore it is expected that their strategies can bring to similar 
outcomes in different political arenas.  
In order to identify the number of new non-voters per party family, I use the CSES Dataset 
Module II and III 2001 – 2011. As I have explained previously, the number of new non-
voters per party represents the percentage of the voters that abandoned voting for a certain 
political party in the second electoral cycle but voted for the party on the previous ballot. 
Results from Table 5.1 show some very interesting patterns. The mean percentage of the 
voters that have stopped voting in the next electoral cycle is 6.1. Every political party and 
party family has lost around six percent of their regular voters in the next electoral cycle. This 
number shows that political parties in average lose a very relevant number of their supporters 
between two electoral cycles. These voters have participated at the elections and supported a 
certain political party, but they decided not to cast the ballot in the next elections. Political 
parties and their behaviour is one of the main reasons why voters decided to stop voting. 
Comparing the number of the new non-voters among the party families, ecologist or green, 
conservative and special issue parties are the ones that have lost most of their supporters. 
Ecologist parties have lost 8 % of their supporters in average, while conservative and special 
issue parties around 7.5 % in average. Social democratic, liberal, agrarian and ethnic regional 
parties belong to the party family groups with the medium loss of their supporters, while the 
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Table 7.1 The Number of New Non-Voters per Party Family 
Party Family Mean St. Deviation No of cases 
Ecologist 8 5.52 16 
Communist 4.25 3.93 26 
Socialist/Social democrat 6.7 4.78 44 
Liberal 5.9 5.32 28 
Christian democrat 4.6 3.76 30 
Conservative 7.5 4.80 32 
Nationalist 3.25 4.23 12 
Agrarian 6.8 5.51 8 
Ethnic Regional 6.6 8.90 7 
Special issue 7.6 8.82 7 
Sum 6.1 4.94 210 
Source: CSES Module II 2001-2011 & CMP 2001-2011 
 
Comparing the number of the new non-voters among the party families, ecologist or green, 
conservative and special issue parties are the ones that have lost most of their supporters. 
Ecologist parties have lost 8 % of their supporters in average, while conservative and special 
issue parties around 7.5 % in average. Social democratic, liberal, agrarian and ethnic regional 
parties belong to the party family groups with the medium loss of their supporters, while the 
parties on the extreme of the political spectrum, far – left or communist and far-right or 
nationalist parties have lost less supporters than any other political family. The Christian 
democratic party family is another interesting case. Also belonging to the party families that 
attract the voters close to the political centre on the right, they seem to be successful in 
keeping their supporters interested in voting.   
Table 7.2  Party Ideology Shift per Party Family 
Party Family Mean St. Deviation No of cases 
Ecologist 5.51 5.50 16 
Communist 7.82 6.0 26 
Socialist/Social democrat 5.39 4.32 44 
Liberal 6.56 6.23 28 
Christian democrat 4.97 7.61 30 
Conservative 5.82 5.08 32 
Nationalist 6.73 11.78 12 
Agrarian 6.55 5.76 8 
Ethnic Regional 0.16 0.32 7 
Special issue 3.87 3.62 7 
Sum 5.76 5.93 210 
Source: CSES Module II 2001-2011 & CMP 2001-2011 
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Nationalist and ecologist party families have confirmed the expected behaviour. Supporters 
of parties that belong to these party families are less likely to stop voting, no matter how their 
political party performs. The supporters of these parties have been identified by numerous 
previous research studies as strongly affiliated with the party and very loyal to the party 
doctrine. Therefore, they remain voting for their political party because no matter the possible 
new strategies that party could implement, voters and supporters of these parties have 
developed higher degree of fanaticism about the party’s doctrine than any of the mainstream 
parties closer to the political centre. According to many research studies, voters of the 
communist parties are mainly older people who are less likely to change their voting habit.   
For measurement of the party ideology shift I use Comparative Manifesto Project Dataset. 
The results from the shift of the ideological positions of the political parties per party family 
in Table 2 show that contrary to all expectations, the far-left or communist parties are the 
ones that shift their ideological positions the most. The mean of the ideological shift of this 
party family is 7.82. Again, the second party family with highest party ideology shift score is 
the nationalist or far-right family.  
These findings are in  favour of the second hypothesis that no matter what kind of strategy 
extreme political parties implement, their supporters remain loyal to the party and decide to 
stop voting in a smaller number comparing with the other party families. Liberal, agrarian, 
conservative and ecologist party families have also a reasonably high score on party ideology 
shift. While Christian democratic and special issues parties have the lowest party ideology 
shift score. The score of the ethnic regional party family can be result of the important data 
limitations: first, the number of these parties in the sample is very small, and second these 
parties do not compete on the left-right spectrum of the political competition and their very 
low score could be a result of this limitation of the operationalisation of the party ideology 
shift variable. 
Table 7.3 The Number of New Non-Voters per party in Government or Opposition 
Government/Opposition New Non-voters 
Mean 
St. Deviation No of cases 
Party in Government 7.3 4.47 76 
Party in Opposition 5.3 5.03 134 
Sum 6.1 4.94 105 
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The role of the party in the political system of the country is also very important factor that 
influences the number of the voters per party that can stop voting at next elections. Whether 
the party is in power and independently or jointly in coalition forms a government, or 
whether it plays the role of opposition, can affect the number of the new non-voters who stop 
voting at the next electoral cycle. Table 3 shows that there is an important difference in the 
number of new non-voters per party as a result of their different role in the political system of 
the country.  The percentage of the new non-voters among parties in power is 7.3%, and it is 
higher by 2 percentage points in comparison with the parties in opposition. The explanation 
for this phenomenon is that parties in power are more likely not to meet the expectations of 
their supporters and to change their policy and ideological positions. These changes can be a 
result of newly developed circumstances, some unexpected shocks or simply that political 
parties easily promise certain policies while in opposition and forget about their fulfillment 
while in power. The percentage of the new non-voters among the parties in opposition is also 
very relevant indicator that political parties can be punished by their supporters, not only 
when they are part of the government, but also when they do not have the responsibility to 
rule the country.  
7.8. Results 
The main hypothesis was tested using linear regression to examine how a party ideology shift 
influences voters to stop voting, or whether as a result of this ideological shift the voters who 
have supported party during past elections will choose to abandon voting for the party in the 
current election. As previously mentioned, the new non-voter variable was constructed from  
The results from Table 7.4 show that the party ideology shift variable is statistically 
significant with p<0.000, in all three tested models, which strongly supports the hypothesis 
for the influence of this variable on the number of new non-voters per party. Not only is it the 
case that this variable is statistical, but also it has the expected direction. If the political party 
makes higher ideological shift, the number of the new non-voters per party will increase. If 
the party is in government instead of being in power this leads to a 1.81 (Model 1, Table 7.4) 
increase of the possibility for increase of the number of new non-voters.  
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Table 7.4 The New Non -Voters per Party: OLS Regression results 
 
Independent variables 
 
Dependent variable: New Non-voters per party 
  
Model 1 
 
Model 2 
 
Model 3 
 
Party Ideology Shift 
 
0.248*** (0.07) 
 
0.249***(0.07) 
 
 0.315***(0.07) 
 
Government/ Opposition 
 
1.81* (0.94) 
 
1.12 (1.01) 
 
1.62*** (0.85) 
 
Leadership Change 
  
 -0.86 (0.94) 
 
-1.16 (0.95) 
 
-  0.94 (0.80) 
 
Electoral Strength 
  
0.07* (0.04) 
 
                         0.07* (0.04) 
GDP Growth 
 
Voting Availability 
 
Number of Parties  
 
Sweden 
 
Denmark 
 
Finland 
 
Iceland 
 
Great Britain 
 
France 
 
Holland 
 
Switzerland 
 
USA 
 
Ireland 
 
New Zealand 
 
Japan 
 
Israel 
 
Czech Republic 
 
Hungary 
 
                            0.04  (0.01) 
 
                     -5.72***(2.08) 
 
                      -2.26** (0.86) 
                      
                          -2.18 (1.89) 
 
                     -7.38***(1.73) 
 
                   -10.77***(2.36) 
 
                           -2.39(2.21) 
 
                           2.74 (2.35) 
 
                            3.30(2.76) 
 
                       -7.22***(1.8) 
 
                   -16.63***(4.00) 
 
                     -   5.6***(1.5) 
 
                            2.35(2.04) 
 
                        4.65***(1.8) 
 
                       -9.30***(3.6) 
 
                     -6.38***(1.84) 
 
                           -2.17(2.18) 
                                          
10.47**(4.50) 
 
Constant 
 
4.15 
 
3.55 
 
-16.83 
 
R – Squared 
 
0.11 
 
0.13 
 
0.44 
 
N 
 
210 
 
210 
 
210 
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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The high significance of t-test values for the variables for party ideology shift (t=-4.759, 
p<.001) and government/opposition belonging to the parties (t=3.072, p<.005) in Model 1 
permits the conclusion that these independent variables make significant contributions to the 
model, being important predictors of number of new non-voters per party. The small t-value, 
with a low significance (t= -1.275, p< .204), for the “leader change between two electoral 
cycles”, indicates that this variable is not a significant predictor. Electoral strength of the 
party or the number of votes that party earned at the previous elections is also statistically 
significant indicator of the number of the voters that have stopped voting. The GDP and party 
family variables are not statistically significant. 
Voting availability and the number of political parties are also statistically significant and 
contribute in explaining the number of new non-voters per party. With both of these variables 
the bigger number of political parties as alternatives for the party the voter used to vote the 
smaller chances for the voters to stop voting. If there are more possibilities for the voter to 
vote, the number of new non-voters will be lower. The third model also includes dummy for 
the countries in order to control for the country level variables. We see some very interesting 
patterns.  
7.8.1. Interpretation of the results: Are there enough arguments to support the hypothesis  
The results of the linear regression model have confirmed expectations. The high significance 
of the political ideology shift variable confirms that this variable influences the number of 
new non-voters per party. More precisely, the model shows that the reason for individuals to 
stop voting in the elections, after having previously voted for a certain party, is party 
ideology shift. Nevertheless, the explanatory power of this variable in the three models is up 
to 13.3%, which is relatively low. However, when all factors are considered, the percentage 
of individuals that did not vote on the current ballot is around 6 percent per party family, with 
20% as the highest value. Additionally, the separate model, which excluded the control 
variables, was run and has shown a high significance P<.001 and adjusted R² =.102, which 
helps to confirm that the results of the previous models can be attributed to a party ideology 
shift and not just to the control variables.  
GDP as control variable on the macro (country) level was also included to measure if the 
number of new non-voters per party ID is dependent on the economic situation in the country. 
The highly insignificant results demonstrate that this variable does not have any influence on 
the dependent variable. 
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Contrary to expectations, the dichotomous variable “leader change between two electoral 
cycles” is not significant, and thus does not provide an explanation for political apathy on 
party the level. The assumptions, while including this variable in the model, were that a 
change in leadership at the party level could influence certain voters not to vote for the party. 
These assumptions have been based on the theoretical claims detailing the highly important 
and increasing role of political party leaders (Webb and Poguntke 2005). The leader change 
variable has been shown not to be a significant in creating new non-voters.  
Additionally, by including dummies for countries in order to control for macro level 
variables, the results show some interesting patterns. The model is statistically significant for 
the majority of the countries.
8
 Also the variables of voter availability and number of effective 
political parties have the expected direction. These variables help to better understand the 
aggregate context and the role of institutional factors such as the availability of vote, but also 
party system variables or more concretely the number of political parties. Although not 
necessarily connected with the theoretical model proposed, the variables are used as controls 
to disentangle the role of the countries and how different institutional setup can influence on 
the number of new non-voters per party.  
The limitations of the database, as well as limiting the model only on several control 
variables affect its explanatory power. In addition to the party ideology shift being highly 
significant, the value of the adjusted R² explains more than 10% of the variation of the 
dependent variable, and therefore represents an important factor in the general explanation of 
the phenomenon of new non-voters. Thus, it provides a substantial contribution to addressing 
the issues of low turnout. Further development of the theoretical and statistical model will 
include additional control variables such as party age, ideological distance between parties, 
effective number of parties, electoral volatility. Also, models that test the effect of ideological 
shift in different policy areas will contribute to better understanding in which area voters are 
more likely to punish their party because of its ideological flip-flopping. 
7.9. Conclusion 
The number of voters that have stopped voting is very significant. More than six percent of 
voters that supported a party have decided not to vote at the next electoral cycle. These new 
non-voters have decided not to cast their ballots despite their regular past of voting and closer 
                                                          
8
 Some countries such as Belgium, Norway, Spain and Italy were omitted as a result of multi-collinearity 
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identification with a certain political parties. This paper hypothesized that ideological 
inconsistence of political parties is one of the main reasons why voters lose their attachment 
with the political party, they feel they are not adequately represented anymore and therefore 
stop voting at the next electoral cycle and attempted to show that while the change of the 
ideological positions of the party is considered by parties as an efficient strategy for attracting 
new voters, it can also cause serious damage to the already existing supporters for the party 
and influence on their decision to stop voting at the next election. 
Parties seem to lose their grip on society and the weight of parties seems to be eroding 
(Blondel 2002). Mair (2005) combines several indicators of involvement in parties and 
reports that turnout, electoral volatility, party identification, and membership have all 
declined over the past few decades in a number of democracies, which points to a general 
decline in involvement in political parties (Van Biezen, Mair, Poguntke 2009, 2011). On the 
other site, political parties change their ideological positions in order to better achieve their 
goals. No matter whether they are policy -, office – or vote-seeking (Muller and Strom 1999), 
they expect to benefit from their ideological move. Political parties are left to make the 
choice between two main strategies: to freeze the party system and to keep their ideological 
positions very stable or to act as an adaptive agent in search of votes and hence to change 
their positions where the median voter belongs. 
Descriptive statistics from the CSES Modules II and III 2001-2011 Dataset and CMP 2001-
2011 shows that the number of new non-voters differs among different party families and 
whether parties are in government or opposition. Parties at the extreme of the political 
spectrum: far-left and far-right parties lose fewer supporters, while the number of the new 
non-voters among green parties is the highest. On the other hand, the ideological shift is 
highest among parties of the extreme party families, which only shows that supporters of 
these parties are most closely attached and affiliated to the party doctrines and they are more 
reluctant to stop voting no matter what party strategy their parties implement. The number of 
the new non-voters is two percent higher among the parties in government than among parties 
in opposition, which indicates that voters can easily be disappointed in the party performance 
when the party is in power rather than in opposition.  
The statistical model that was tested confirms the main hypothesis that the bigger change of 
the party ideology causes a larger number of new non-voters for parties. Party ideology shift 
is not only statistically significant, but also the ideological shift has the expected impact. 
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Whether a party is in government or opposition, and electoral strength, are also statistically 
significant. Contrary to expectations, the dichotomous variable “leader change between two 
electoral cycles” is not significant. Although the model is not fully specified, the results 
strongly support the paper’s main claim for the influence on party ideology shift on the 
number of new non-voters per party. Despite certain limitations, this research offers an 
important impact on the literature of the party ideology and to the literature of electoral 
participation. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
Conclusions 
 
8.1. Main Findings 
The debate as to why citizens participate at elections and what drives their decision to support 
a certain party or candidate has been one of the essential debates in political science from the 
introduction of elections and political parties. Furthermore, voting behaviour scholars are 
interested as to why certain citizens consider voting as a civil duty and exercise their human 
right (Blais, 2016), whilst certain citizen care less about their duties and decide not to 
participate. Meanwhile, while the right to vote has become almost a universal right, many 
categories of citizens have been enfranchised and voting age has been decreasing, the general 
trends of electoral participation seem to be in a constant decay. The number of citizens 
exercising their right to vote is shrinking and the crisis of participation is one of the strongest 
perils of the crisis of democracy (Almond 1960). Different approaches have been applied to 
address this problem, but until now there is still a lack of research that looks into the 
determinants that influence citizens who have participated at elections to stop casting their 
ballot. The aim of the thesis was to fill this gap.  
Citizens who have stopped participating at elections, whom I refer as new non-voters, are 
understudied, and there is very little knowledge about their characteristics and reasons why 
they do stop voting. There already exist theories that explain the behaviour of voters, but they 
do not capture the reasons citizens stop voting. Additionally, there is lack of knowledge about 
the characteristics of these citizens and whether and to what extent they differ from habitual 
voters and habitual non-voters. Therefore I develop a theoretical model and use a different 
data sources to be able to address the issue of the new non-voter in a most adequate way. I 
argue that the spatial model of voting which is based on the claim that voters vote for the 
party which is the closest to their position on the ideological spectrum and thus every shift of 
the party demands a vote swing of the voters, and the opposite has limits to explain the 
behaviour of the new non-voters.  Based on the standard revealed preference argument and 
building on the exit, voice and loyalty model, I argue that voters instead of deciding to shift 
voting for other party once the party shifts its ideological positions, they decide to exit 
participation and that way to react of party’s inconsistency. 
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Several general conclusions hold from this thesis. First, ideological shift matters. It 
accelerates voters’ decision to stop voting. Voters do care about the ideological positions of 
their parties and a change of a position of a party they used to vote for causes an exit of 
participation. This exit is shaped by the strength of partisan identification. Party identification 
has two channels of driving voters’ behaviour. Firstly, it is a manifestation of the loyalty of 
the voters to the party they used to support. Voters identify with their preferred party, build a 
relationship with the party and show interest about a party’s behaviour. They are informed 
and interested how that party represents their interests. This loyalty has been developed 
through the process of voting and strengthens with continuity of supporting the party (Dinas 
2013). Hence a change of a position of the party causes voters to manifest their 
disappointment trough exit of participation instead of shifting a vote choice. In this sense, 
party identification is an accelerator of participation exit. Secondly, party identification 
strength is still a strong anticatalyst of participation exit. When voters are strongly identified 
with the party they used to vote for, they still keep supporting this party besides the 
ideological shift. In this sense, strength of party identification is a crucial determinant, 
citizens with strong identification with the party they used to vote still keep voting. Only 
supporters and not partisans stop voting when parties shift their ideological positions. 
A second valuable conclusion is that it is not only important that parties shift their positions, 
but it also matters what positions of which policy area is shifted. Inconsistency of certain 
policy positions matter more than others. The case of the US shows us that shifts in policy 
areas such as traditional values or opposing values regarding underprivileged minority group 
rights have a very strong impact on the decision of voters to stop casting a ballot. This is not 
the case with the policy positions on economy and labour rights. There are several possible 
explanations as to why this is the case. Issues on traditional values such as religion and 
abortion, or the rights of underprivileged minority groups such as immigrants, or the right to 
same sex marriages, are the most salient policy areas and a majority of the citizens have 
strong positions regarding these issues. Political parties also share strong positions regarding 
these issues and their positions are incompatible. These clear conflicting positions accelerate 
possibilities for differentiation. Therefore, changing positions on these policy areas is easily 
anticipated and harms the credibility of the parties. 
A third main conclusion of the thesis is that there are differences among new non-voters and 
habitual voters and habitual non-voters. New non-voters differ from the other 
abovementioned categories of citizens and this is an important contribution to the general 
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debate of voters’ characteristics. In certain characteristics such as demographics, new non-
voters are more similar to the habitual non-voters. In a comparative group of 15 democracies 
women, younger people, the less educated, the working class and the less religious are more 
confident in stopping voting. In the US trends are similar, except for gender. Men are more 
eager to stop voting than their female compatriots in this country. Nevertheless, a very large 
percentage of the voters that are affiliated with political parties and actively participate in 
political campaigns still decide to stop voting although they have shown a certain closeness to 
a political party, indicating that, regarding party identification and affiliation, new non-voters 
are more close to habitual voters. 
Finally, there are important differences between countries in the number of new non-voters. 
Examining the impact of institutions, socio-economic environment and the role of party 
systems, I show that post-communist countries, larger countries with majoritarian system and 
non-compulsory voting have higher number of new non-voters. Furthermore, I offer 
empirical evidence from 70 electoral studies showing that the number of the new non-voters 
is negatively correlated with the turnout levels in the countries. Additionally, the number of 
new non-voters also significantly influences electoral outcome and turnout difference 
between the last two electoral cycles. This is a very important finding. There is a strong 
negative correlation between the number of new non-voters and the turnout level which 
confirms the importance of the new non-voters as drivers of the turnout level in the countries. 
This additionally emphasizes the importance of studying new non-voters. 
8.2. In pursuit of a general finding: New non-voters in a comparative perspective 
The theoretical expectations were firstly tested on a comparative cross-sectional ground. 
Using CSES Data set Module II I tested the influence of ideological shift on the reasons 
voters stopped voting. A comparative analysis gives ground for testing different institutional, 
socio-economic and party related determinants that might serve as accelerators or 
anticatalysts of participation exit. Furthermore, the model is predominantly tested in a 
comparative perspective and in a plural party systems setup, which is the most conservative 
ground for testing this theoretical model. While in two-party systems voters have limited 
opportunities to swing their vote choice, multi-party systems offer more alternatives to voters 
to change their preference and instead of not voting to choose the party that is closest to their 
first preference. Thus, affirmative findings in a comparative and diversified group have even 
greater additional value. 
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 In order to test the above-elaborated theoretical model I constructed statistical models that 
consist of different levels of analysis. The Multi-Level Logit Models in Chapter 3 provide 
sufficient evidence for confirmation of the main hypothesis for the influence of the party 
ideology shift on voter’s decision to stop participating at elections. The ideological 
inconsistence of political parties causes voters to feel less represented, abandoned and to lose 
trust in the political party that they supported. These results show that instead of deciding to 
shift voting for another party, a certain number of voters are more eager not to cast the ballots 
and in that way to punish the party they used to support.   The result confirmed that 
ideological shift can cause costs for political parties, and therefore that they have to be much 
more careful before deciding to change their ideological positions.  
Furthermore, this chapter confirms the importance of context for the behaviour of individuals. 
The results have also shown that citizens of the post-communist countries are more likely to 
stop voting than the citizens from established democracies. This finding is in favour of the 
third hypothesis and the previous research which has shown a lower level of electoral 
participation in the post-communist countries as a result of the high level of distrust in 
political parties and the state (Rose 1995). The number of political parties also matter. The 
higher the number of alternatives for voters, the less the probability that they will stop voting. 
However, the general conclusion that ideology shift influences voters’ decision to stop voting 
is a very important contribution to the state of art.  
In this way the thesis provides an additional confirmation of the importance of ideology for 
the behaviour of the voters or, as in this case, the role of the ideology as demobilizing factor. 
Furthermore, as we can see from the results, the fact that evaluations of the performance of 
the party citizens voted for is more important than the evaluations of the government shows 
that party attachment is strong and voters do care about the performance of the party they 
supported. Party closeness confirms this. Once again the dual role of the party attachment is 
present. Voters are attached to the party they voted for, they become loyal to the party and 
this keeps them supporting the party, but once party makes ideological changes that are 
against the voters preferences, they rather decide to exit voter participation than to support 
another party. 
The starting point of the thesis is that when looking into determinants of voter demobilisation 
we need to look into the behaviour of the parties. The results of this study go strongly in 
favour of this claim. They are in line with other previous research focused on demobilisation 
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that places an emphasis on parties (Fox Piven and Cloward 1988, 2000, Avey 1989). The 
originality of this study is, however, that it places an emphasis on ideological inconsistency 
and constant positions shifts as factors of demobilization of voters. Voters do register party’s 
movements and react on every significant shift of position by dropping out of participation at 
the elections. Abstention can be caused not just as a result of alienation or indifference, but as 
well as a result of ideological inconsistency. 
8.3. American voters and ideological shift 
The cross-sectional comparative analysis fails to give us information about the nature of the 
citizens’ exit. The data is limited to only two electoral cycles, and therefore it remains 
unknown as to whether the exit is on a permanent basis or just a sporadic reaction to the 
contextual circumstances related for that certain electoral cycle. Therefore an in-depth panel 
data analysis on new non-voters in US provides us with the necessary information and 
enables us to investigate the reasons for voters to drop out of voting in a more coherent way.  
Using the US as a case study has multiple advantages. First, the American electoral context 
provides the most adequate conditions for testing my theoretical model. Second, American 
media discourse is focused on the ideological standings of the parties and their nominees, 
which constitutes a very important part of campaigns. Third, the decline of voter turnout in 
elections in the US in the last six decades emphasizes the necessity of a different approach to 
analyse the reasons why voters stop voting. Fourth and very importantly, the US is the most 
appropriate case study for methodological reasons. Complex data for many electoral cycles 
over a significantly long period of time has only been gathered in the US. Specifically, in 
order to answer my research question I am using Youth and Parents Socialisation Panel data 
from 1984-1997. Last but not least, the US as a two-party system and is the most favourable 
ground for testing my theoretical model. Voters have the choice to vote for the party they 
used to, or to switch support to the main opponent from the other side of the spectrum. 
Shifting vote preference to the other party means supporting exactly the opposite side. The 
vote alternatives are very limited. Therefore, to exit participation is a logical consequence 
when the party or the candidates of that party do not satisfy voters’ preferences. On the other 
side, in electoral studies included in my unit of analysis, a strong third candidate, namely 
Ross Perot, competed against the major party candidates in two out of four presidential races. 
This increased the possibility for vote alteration. Hence my study offers the most 
conservative of the most favourable ground for testing my hypotheses. 
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New non-voters differ from other participants in the electoral cycle. Using simple frequencies 
for analysing the group differences, I found that there are more new non-voters among men, 
the divorced, southerners and people that follow political programmes on television two to 
three times per week. When party identification matters, the number of independents is 
higher among new non-voters than with others, but the fact that around 55% of new non-
voters stress a party affiliation is a strong indicator for analysing party behaviour as a factor 
for voters to stop voting. 
Empirical models that I have tested using multinomial logistic regression provide evidence in 
support of the hypothesis of the influence of ideological inconsistency on voters to stop 
voting. One unit change of the ideology of the parties and candidate voter used to vote for 
increases the probability of the voter to stop voting. This pattern is dramatically different 
among other categories of voters. Going deeper, testing the ideological shifts in eight 
different policy areas, the chapter shows that traditional topics have a very strong 
(de)mobilising power for electoral participation. Traditional values and opposing values 
regarding underprivileged minority group rights have a very strong impact on the decision of 
voters to stop casting a ballot. Also, findings show that while ideology inconsistency is not 
costless, it is a matter of party strategy. Political parties should be very careful when deciding 
to shift their ideological positions.  
The new non-voters in this paper are studied in a particular political context. While the 
findings are generalizable, the possible effect of the certain electoral context characteristic for 
the period of study should still be seriously taken into account. This paper shows that there 
are substantial differences between voters who have stopped voting and other categories of 
citizens. 
8.4. To change or not to change: The number of new non-voters and parties’ electoral 
success 
Political parties are seen as utility maximisers (Wittman 1973) and change their ideological 
positions in order to better achieve their goals. No matter whether they are policy -, office – 
or vote-seeking (Muller and Strom 1999), they expect to benefit from their ideological move. 
Political parties are left to make the choice between two main strategies: to freeze the party 
system and to keep their ideological positions very stable or to act as an adaptive agent in 
search of votes and hence to change their positions where the median voter belongs. When 
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making their decisions parties have to be aware of the reaction from the risk-averse voters 
and their core supporters. 
I build my argument as to parties’ behaviour on Meyer’s claims that ideologies play a very 
important role in the parties’ behaviour. Parties have strong ideological constraints that drive 
their behaviour (Meyer 2012). Well-informed parties differ from badly informed parties by 
the fact that even when they shift their ideological positions, they never leave their 
ideological territories. Meyer argues that ideology provides a partition of the policy space and 
that parties have intrinsic and extrinsic motivations to choose policy positions that conform to 
their ideological area. According to Meyer, answering the question of why parties adapt their 
policy positions, researchers usually proceed from vote-seeking and office-seeking party 
incentives. “Shifts in public opinion, poor electoral performance in the past, or shifts of rival 
parties may make parties to adapt their policy platforms” (Meyer 2013). 
I show that while some of the reasons for ideological inconsistency are beyond parties’ 
control, such as the change of the socio-economic circumstances, transformation of the 
economic conditions and globalization followed with the collapse of the two block division in 
the international relations, there are several factors that cause ideological inconsistency and 
are completely dependent on party strategies and the institutional context. As I have 
mentioned above, whether parties will change their ideological positions depends more on the 
electoral body they address, so parties and candidates differ ideologically at the primaries and 
elections. Another important element for ideological consistency is whether a party is in 
power or in opposition. The third element I have discussed above is the change of leadership. 
Descriptive statistics from the CSES Module II and 2001-2011 Dataset and CMP 2001-2011 
shows that the number of new non-voters differ among different party families and whether 
parties are in government or opposition. Parties at the extreme of the political spectrum: far-
left and far-right parties lose fewer supporters while the number of the new non-voters among 
green parties is the highest. On the other hand, the ideological shift is highest among parties 
of the extreme party families which only shows that supporters of these parties are most 
closely attached and affiliated to the party doctrines and they are more reluctant to stop 
voting no matter what party strategy their parties implement. The number of the new non-
voters is two percent higher among the parties in government than among parties in 
opposition, which indicates that voters can easily be disappointed in the party performance 
when the party is in power rather than in opposition.  
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The statistical model that was tested confirms the main hypothesis that the greater the change 
of the party ideology the larger the number of new non-voters for parties. Party ideology shift 
is not only statistically significant, but also ideological shift has the expected direction. 
Whether party is in government and opposition and electoral strength are also statistically 
significant. Contrary to expectations, the dichotomous variable “leader change between two 
electoral cycles” is not significant. Although the model is not fully specified, the results 
strongly support the main paper’s claim for the influence on party ideology shift on the 
number of new non-voters per party. Despite certain limitations, this research offers an 
important impact on the literature of the party ideology and to the literature of electoral 
participation. 
There are several implications for the parties from this analysis. First, the number of new 
non-voters is correlated with the ideological shift of the parties. Political parties should be 
very careful when they shift their positions because it hurts the support of their traditional 
voters. Secondly, not all parties are influenced in the same way when they shift their 
ideological positions. I argue that this depends mostly on the discipline and attachment their 
voters have to the party. Catch-all parties at the political centre are mostly harmed when they 
shift positions and the attachment of their voters to the party is weaker and they are more 
frequent in adapting their ideological positions in order to attract the media voter.  
8.5. Theoretical implications and the contribution of this thesis 
Turnout decline is a central problem discussed in this thesis, but this research is not a study of 
the turnout determinants. Not directly, at least.  Although voter turnout is not analysed, the 
thesis looks at the turnout phenomenon from a different perspective focusing on a specific 
category of voters who used to participate at elections and stopped voting at a certain 
electoral cycle. Thus it contributes to the study of the turnout by looking at one of the main 
components that drives turnout rates. It attempts to apply a theoretical model of behaviour 
and to detect the main socio-demographic and political characteristics of this certain group of 
voters that depresses turnout levels. This thesis is a call for a different approach into 
analysing turnout declines and findings to show that there is a potential in this approach to 
explain fluctuations in the turnout. Looking into components, instead of the macro approach 
or the big picture view, can give additional information about the determinants that influence 
turnout. 
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Although this is not the intention of the thesis per se, with this research I oppose the 
dominant approach as to the habituality of voters. When new non-voters count, the thesis of 
habituality is not applicable. These citizens used to participate at elections, they were 
practicing their right to choose their Government and at one point they stopped voting. The 
reasons cannot be found in the weakening of their voting habit, but on the contrary, to the 
factors or determinants that demobilise, which might be due to the political actors who 
change their behaviour from election to election. One can say that the number of new non-
voters, which varies from around 1% to the highest pick of 30 %, still confirms that the 
majority of the voters retain their habits. This is a correct observation. The majority of voters 
retain their habituated behaviour amongst both the voters and non-voters, but the ones that 
shift from voting to non-voting are more important in order of the differences in the turnout 
to be explained. In this sense, the approach of the thesis is dynamic rather than static. 
The theoretical model I build in the thesis is based on the rational choice theory, but I tend to 
show that this rationality is constrained. Citizens do not behave always as utility maximisers. 
On the contrary, voters do get attached to the party they used to vote for. This is manifested 
through the strength of their party identification. The high level of party identification 
develops a feeling of loyalty for the party. This is manifested through vote support for that 
party. In this thesis, I attempt to develop a model that deals with the consequences for the 
parties, once they change the quality of their offer. I claim that as a result of the loyalty, 
voters do not act according to the rational choice theory by optimizing their interests and 
supporting the party closest to their preferences, but they rather stop voting than to “betrayal 
their loyalty”. 
A second major contribution of the thesis, an empirical one, it enriches the research on 
different categories of voters by offering first comprehensive analysis of the demographics, 
socio-economic characteristics and political interests of these new non-voters. Little is known 
about new non-voters. To my knowledge there is no research focused on the investigation of 
the characteristics of these citizens and the reasons why they stop voting. This category is 
understudied and, as I have mentioned above, it has been assimilated amongst the work on 
non-voters. Furthermore, the majority of the research on voters assumes homogeneity of 
policy preferences of voters and non-voters. Leighley and Nagler (2014) show that this is not 
the case. Voters and non-voters do not prefer the same policies. This thesis aimed to offer an 
extensive overview of the characteristics of the new non-voters after drawing a clear 
identification of these new non-voters. Not only that it is important these voters to be 
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differentiated from the habitual non-voters, but they have to be distinguished from the 
intermittent voters. In this sense, the thesis aims to identify who the new non-voters are and 
separate them from the larger group of habitual voters, and additionally to analyse those new 
non-voters who quit voting on a permanent or a long-term basis.   
Identifying the most important characteristics of these citizens is of crucial importance in 
order to better understand their behaviour and to develop a theoretical model that will explain 
reasons to stop voting. I am particularly interested to show the differences between these 
citizens on one hand and the habitual voters and non-voters on the other. I will take into 
account three sets of variables: (i) socio-demographic characteristics, (ii) political 
information and trust and (iii) party identification and ideology. 
A third important contribution of the thesis is that it focuses on political parties as the main 
actors on the supply side and looks into their behaviour, or more concretely on their 
ideological consistency as an explanatory factor for citizens to stop voting. Building my 
argument on the standard revealed preference argument and based on the exit, voice loyalty 
model, I focus on the supply side, or more concretely on the parties as the main actors who 
make an offer to the voters through their electoral programs. The notion is that political 
parties as the strongest electoral mobilizers can also influence demobilising citizens from 
participation. The new non-voters constitute precisely a confirmation that certain citizens do 
look at what parties offer; this influences how do they subsequently behave and take a 
decision based on the parties’ offers. 
Fourth, as I have shown in the previous chapters, the thesis contests the existing spatial model 
of voting by adding two important components that shape the behaviour of individuals (i) 
voters build a close relationship with the party they used to vote and their party identification 
or loyalty constrains their rational behaviour as utility maximisers on the political spectrum, 
(ii) when the party voters used to vote for changes its ideological standings voters punish its 
behaviour by deciding to exit the voting and not to swing vote support for other party.  This 
thesis offers just one new aspect in the debate about the limitations of the spatial model of 
voting. Furthermore, neither the main alternative such as directional theory of voters captures 
the behaviour of the new non-voters. Empirical findings confirm that neither voters look as 
political parties exclusively as suppliers, but they have developed an attachment to them, nor 
can political parties permanently shift their positions in order to attract more supporters. 
These ideological shifts are not costless. Why parties might attract new non-voters, they lose 
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certain percentage of their supporters. The average loss per party is more than 6% of their 
voters. 
Finally, one of the most important contributions, and at the same the most serious weaknesses 
of the thesis, is of a methodological nature. There are several considerations that were taken 
into account when designing this research. Conducting research on the new non-voters is 
especially demanding task because of the definition of the nature of the participation exit. 
When one wants to understand whether the exit is on permanent basis, cross-sectional data is 
not sufficient and therefore a long term panel data is needed. I attempt to address this issue by 
conducting a comparative cross-sectional analysis that includes more than 20 electoral 
democracies and an in-depth analysis of the American new non-voters by using a panel data. 
There is very limited opportunity to access panel data that offers sufficient numbers of the 
electoral cycle for my theory to be tested. Although a cohort data and not updated with the 
most recent electoral cycles, Youth and Parents Socialization Panel Wave IV provided the 
best available ground for testing my theoretical assumptions. 
Another serious problem that harms my research is the information as to participation based 
on self-reported turnout. Numerous previous research studies have shown that as a result of 
social desirability, respondents tend to over report turnout. This works against  my research, 
in that I heavily rely on citizens’ participation report. In this sense, using self-reported turnout 
is the most conservative environment for testing my models. Therefore, if we assume that 
better data would just improve and strengthen the findings, the affirmative results in favour of 
my hypotheses are an even more valuable contribution. In order to overcome this problem 
and to offer more reliable information about dropping out trends, I present data from Ohio’s 
vote calls based on recording the participation of the citizens.  
A third methodological problem I face while conducting the research is related to the 
reliability and validity of the available data for construction of my variable on ideology shift. 
Although most comprehensive, a systematic coding error has been identified with 
Comparative Manifesto Project (Benoit and Laver 2002, Benoit Mikhaylov and Laver 2005) 
that might bias the results. To overcome this methodological problem, I conducted a 
robustness check with other alternative data, such as aggregated perceptions of ideological 
positions of the parties from ANES.  Therefore, the main methodological contribution of the 
thesis is that various methodological considerations have been taken into account and 
different data sources have been utilized in order that the most comprehensive and 
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multifaceted analysis of the new non-voters and determinants of their behaviour is to be 
offered. 
Finally, the model I propose and test in this thesis is time independent. The model is general 
and does not control for time periods and external shocks. The data constraints, on the other 
hand, limit the possibilities for testing the model in better and more contemporary conditions. 
The datasets which have been used to test my theoretical model include a time span of nearly 
thirty years. While the American case is tested on data from the eighties and nineties, the 
individual large-N model on data from the beginning of the twentieth century, the aggregate 
data on party and country level includes electoral studies until the year 2011. An analysis 
based on the most contemporary data would certainly be of additional value to the state of the 
art, but for the purposes of the thesis this is not a concern. The fact that the results tend 
toward the same direction even with such a heterogeneous data might be assessed as another 
contribution to the thesis. An update and upgrade with better data is certainly one of the most 
important objectives for future research. 
8.6. Potential for future research 
This thesis offered a comprehensive analysis of the new non-voters and reasons why they 
stop. It took into account many considerations in order that a coherent and well-designed 
research project be conducted. The empirical problem of the decline of participation has been 
observed through citizens who stopped voting and an original theoretical model has been 
applied to test the assumptions as to the determinants of participation exit. Nevertheless, 
taking into account that studying the citizens who stopped voting is, in a certain way, a 
pioneering attempt, there are numerous aspects that were not taken into account and future 
research should tend to fill these newly discovered gaps. 
From an empirical aspect, a certain contribution to the field would be a panel analysis of new 
non-voters in a multi-party system context. Therefore, a panel data analysis of a multi-party 
system would give an important contribution to the study especially taking into account that 
voters have more alternatives to vote for in plural party systems and hence the chances to 
drop out of voting might be smaller. This research would prove whether the findings from the 
US two-party system are validated in a different institutional setup. If this happens, that 
would provide even greater additional value to the research. 
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Secondly, this thesis was focused on the analysis of voting behaviour in first-order elections. 
Thus, a study of the number of new non-voters in second order elections would be an 
additional contribution to the state of art. The turnout at the second order elections is 
significantly lower compared with the first-order elections, which means that a larger number 
of voters decide not to vote at these elections. Having this in mind, it might be very important 
to analyse whether non-voting at second-order elections accelerates the decision to stop 
voting at first-order elections. There is a research showing that being enfranchised to vote for 
the first time at second-order depresses turnout in general, and therefore I consider that is 
valuable to research whether the decision to vote or not to vote at the second-order elections 
catalyses the possibility to stop voting at first elections too. 
Thirdly, this thesis offers a study of the voters that stop voting. But there is another side of 
the story too. While certain voters stop voting, there is a certain number of citizens who re-
enter the electoral process and get remobilised to vote after a period of abstention. I do not 
look at these citizens, but further research on this process could also be very important from 
the aspect of turnout rates. Remobilisation can also be related to ideological inconsistency. 
Parties shifting their positions hope to attract more voters. I have shown that this ideological 
inconsistency is not costless. Parties lose their supporters when they shift positions and the 
bigger the shift, the bigger the number of new non-voters. However, there are numerous real-
world examples which show that a significant ideological shift has resulted in a significantly 
improved electoral outcome. Therefore, a further in-depth analysis should be focused into 
investigating under which conditions parties profit from their ideological changes and how 
this affects general turnout trends. Furthermore, looking into remobilised voters would mean 
a completion of the whole picture as to the components that influence turnout. This study has 
filled the gap by studying voters who stop voting. A further study should complete the picture 
by providing comprehensive knowledge about who the returners are and why they 
remobilise. 
Last but not least, this thesis offered a theoretical model based exclusively of the mobilization 
model, or taking into account ideologies such as the (de)mobilising factor. It attempted to 
contribute to the debate about the (dis)advantages of the spatial theory of voting and offered 
certain original considerations. However, there are many other aspects that can be taken into 
account when analysing new non-voters. Different models can certainly additionally explain 
why voters do stop voting. This thesis did not attempt to offer a holistic approach in studying 
new non-voters and therefore there are many other possibilities for this group of citizens to be 
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studied. A potential direction into further studies of these citizens would be one to look into 
the economy, and how economic performance of the government influenced voters to stop 
voting. Socialisation and social networks offer another possibility for further explanation of 
the reasons why citizens stop voting. In this sense, this thesis can constitute a valuable basis 
for further research in this field.  
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